Baughman v. Saffle , 24 F. App'x 845 ( 2001 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 17 2001
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
STEVEN KURT BAUGHMAN,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 00-6296
(D.C. No. 99-CV-355-T)
JAMES L. SAFFLE; STEVE (W.D. Okla.)
HARGETT; DOLORES RAMSEY;
RON CHAMPION; SHERI VINCENT;
BRYAN PALMER; KATHY HALE;
SGT. CHADWICK; CORPORAL
KING; PAM WALLACE; RICHARD
HENRY; CHARLES DORSEY;
LINDA HILL,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL , PORFILIO , and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The Court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This case considers the appeal of the district court’s grant of summary
judgment in favor of defendants on fourteen civil rights claims brought pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and dismissal of a fifteenth claim for failure to state a claim.
We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings.
I
Plaintiff is a Texas prisoner who is currently incarcerated in Oklahoma
pursuant to an Interstate Compact Agreement. On March 16, 1999, plaintiff filed
this lawsuit against officials and staff of the Oklahoma Department of
Corrections, alleging numerous violations of his constitutional rights. His claims
stemmed from: an inventory and seizure of his belongings, including five diaries,
on December 5, 1997; a disciplinary proceeding initiated after officials seized a
log book used by plaintiff as a diary; the alleged circulation of one of the diaries
to inmates and staff who were discussed therein; the destruction of plaintiff’s
diaries; the prohibition on plaintiff’s communication with Texas inmates; an
allegedly retaliatory transfer to the Dick Conner Correctional Center (DCCC); and
the inventories and seizures of his property before and after the transfer.
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After submitting a Martinez report, 1 defendants moved to dismiss plaintiff’s
action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), or, in the alternative, for summary
judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. The magistrate judge to whom the case
was referred issued a report recommending that summary judgment be granted on
fourteen of plaintiff’s claims, and that the fifteenth claim be dismissed for failure
to state a claim. Plaintiff filed objections, and after a de novo review, the district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendations. Plaintiff appeals.
We review the grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same
standard as that applied by the district court. Lopez v. LeMaster , 172 F.3d 756,
759 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and . . . the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). In applying this standard,
“we examine the factual record and reasonable inferences therefrom in the light
most favorable to the party opposing the motion.” Lopez , 172 F.3d at 759(citation omitted). “Where the nonmovant will bear the burden of proof at trial on
a dispositive issue, however, that party must go beyond the pleadings and
designate specific facts so as to make a showing sufficient to establish the
1
See Martinez v. Aaron , 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978) ( approving order
requiring prison officials to investigate facts surrounding inmate’s civil rights suit
to construct an administrative record from which court may decide jurisdictional
issues and make determination of frivolity).
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existence, as a triable issue, of an element essential to that party’s case in order to
survive summary judgment.” Id.II
Plaintiff argues that summary judgment should not have been granted
because he, a pro se litigant, was not informed of the requirement that he must
file affidavits to preserve factual issues for trial. Not only did the district court
treat plaintiff’s verified complaint as an affidavit, but it also considered the
evidence that plaintiff attached to his objections to the magistrate judge’s
recommendation regarding summary judgment. As this allowed plaintiff the
opportunity to correct any deficiencies in his summary judgment evidence, and as
plaintiff has not identified other information he would have presented, the
judgment need not be reversed based on the failure to inform plaintiff of the
summary judgment requirements. Cf. Jaxon v. Circle K Corp. , 773 F.2d 1138,
1140 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding pro se plaintiff should have been granted
continuance to remedy his defective summary judgment materials by submitting
affidavits or verifying his complaint).
III
Although two of plaintiff’s diaries were eventually returned to him, three
others were classified as contraband and were destroyed. Plaintiff states that
these diaries contained notes regarding incidents that defendants knew would
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become the subject of a lawsuit, as well as drafts of pleadings intended for the
instant action. Accepting this statement as true, plaintiff has not met his burden
of proving that he has been denied access to the courts. To show such a violation,
plaintiff must demonstrate that he was prejudiced by the seizure. Peterson v.
Shanks , 149 F.3d 1140, 1145 (10th Cir. 1998). Plaintiff has not shown that his
ability to prosecute this lawsuit was prejudiced. To the contrary, he has recreated
the seized pleadings and has recounted the incidents from the diary therein. In
addition, plaintiff’s own testimony regarding the alleged misconduct he observed
can remedy any evidentiary void created by the seizure of his diaries.
IV
Because one of the seized diaries was a log book similar to that used by
prison officials, plaintiff was charged with theft of state property. Plaintiff
alleges that defendants violated his due process rights by convicting him of theft
of state property without any evidence that a state log book had been stolen.
However, the charge upon which plaintiff was convicted included “[u]nauthorized
use” of state property. ( See Martinez Report Offense 07-1 Attach. G) The
undisputed evidence showed that plaintiff had been given the log book by the
Sons of the American Legion for use as the organization’s public relations
officer. The disciplinary committee concluded that any property belonging to a
prison organization was state property and that plaintiff misused this property by
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using it for his personal diary. We cannot say that this reasoning is so arbitrary as
to violate plaintiff’s right to due process of law.
V
Plaintiff argues next that the disciplinary charge was brought against him in
retaliation for statements in his diary about several member of the prison staff.
One of these staff members was defendant Vincent, who filed the misconduct
charge against plaintiff, and whose alleged improprieties were recorded in the
diaries. Plaintiff also alleges that his diaries were destroyed in retaliation for the
statements contained therein.
We have held that prison officials may not retaliate against or harass an
inmate in retaliation for the inmate’s exercise of his constitutional rights. Smith
v. Maschner , 899 F.2d 940, 947 (10th Cir. 1990). “This principle applies even
where the action taken in retaliation would be otherwise permissible.” Id. at 948.
To prevail, a prisoner must show that the challenged actions would not have
occurred “but for” a retaliatory motive. Id. at 949–50; Peterson , 149 F.3d at
1144.
Plaintiff presented evidence that defendant Vincent brought charges against
him immediately after she read his statements about her, that she was angered by
the diary allegations, and that she took other steps in retaliation, including
labeling plaintiff as a “snitch” and circulating one of his diaries to inmates and
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staff. In addition, plaintiff showed that defendant Vincent had no evidence that
the log book was stolen when she brought the charges and that his conviction
rested only on his affidavits showing that he was given the log book by the Sons
of the American Legion. Viewing all inferences in plaintiff’s favor, we conclude
that summary judgment should not have been granted in favor of defendant
Vincent on the retaliation claim, and that plaintiff should be given an opportunity
to present his retaliation claim to a trier of fact. 2
Summary judgment against the
other named defendants was proper, however, as there is no evidence that they
acted based on a retaliatory motive.
Regarding the confiscation and destruction of plaintiff’s diaries, even
assuming defendants were justified in destroying the allegedly stolen log book,
they have not explained why two other diaries were destroyed. As the only reason
given for the diaries’ seizure and destruction was their content, which allegedly
described prison illegalities, we conclude plaintiff has a valid First Amendment
claim concerning his diaries against those defendants who were involved in the
decisions to seize and destroy them. See Turner v. Safley , 482 U.S. 78, 90 (1987)
2
We note that because plaintiff did not suffer physical injury, he cannot
receive compensatory damages for any emotional harm caused by the alleged civil
rights violation. See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). He can, however, recover nominal
and punitive damages if the trier of fact concludes that his constitutional rights
were violated. See Searles v. Van Bebber , 251 F.3d 869, 875–76, 878–80 (10th
Cir. 2001).
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(emphasizing that restrictions on prisoners’ First Amendment rights should
“operate[] in a neutral fashion, without regard to the content of the expression”).
Plaintiff’s evidence shows that three of the named defendants—Vincent,
Henry, and Hargett—were involved in the decisions to seize and destroy the
diaries. On remand, the district court should conduct further proceedings on
plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against these defendants. As the Eleventh
Amendment bars plaintiff’s claims against the State and its employees in their
official capacities, the district court should consider only plaintiff’s claims
against these defendants in their individual capacities.
VI
The district court dismissed plaintiff’s endangerment claim for failure to
state a claim pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). Legal sufficiency of a claim is
a question of law that we review de novo. Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf
& Blind , 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999).
Dismissal of plaintiff’s claim was predicated on failure to allege a
compensable injury under 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(e). On appeal, plaintiff does not
explain why this conclusion was erroneous, focusing instead on whether there was
a factual dispute regarding the circulation of his diaries. Because plaintiff does
not argue that the district court’s application of § 1997e(e) was incorrect, we
affirm the dismissal of his endangerment claim. See Hernandez v. Starbuck , 69
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F.3d 1089, 1093 (10th Cir. 1995) (discussing appellant’s burden to demonstrate
errors and noting that court will not manufacture appellant’s argument, but will
consider issue waived).
VII
Plaintiff claims his transferral to DCCC was in retaliation for his
participation in the grievances of several inmates regarding a prison television
broadcast. A retaliation claim does not arise, however, when the underlying
activity is the plaintiff’s legal assistance to other inmates, because a prisoner
“does not have a protected interest in providing legal representation to other
inmates.” Maschner , 899 F.2d at 950. Thus, even if plaintiff was transferred
because of his participation in the grievance process on behalf of the other
inmates, his constitutional rights were not violated.
Plaintiff contends that his transfer was unconstitutional because it deprived
him of the opportunity to take and complete classes, which would entitle him to
credit against his sentence, and which is a factor affecting security level and
parole decisions. Generally speaking, inmates have no legally protected interest
in remaining in a particular location of confinement. Meachum v. Fano , 427 U.S.
215, 226–27 (1976). Although plaintiff argues that the ability to take and
complete classes is a protected liberty interest, he has not pointed to a state
statute creating such an interest. See id. ; Sandin v. Conner , 515 U.S. 472,
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483–84 (1995). Further, the potential effect of preventing plaintiff from taking
classes on the duration of his sentence is “too attenuated to invoke the procedural
guarantees of the Due Process Clause.” Sandin , 515 U.S. at 487 (holding that
effect of misconduct record on duration of sentence was too attenuated even
though it was a relevant consideration for parole).
VIII
Challenge of the seizure of plaintiff’s diaries and other property during his
transfer to DCCC as deprivations of property without due process of law is also
unavailing. Plaintiff asserts that he had a due process right to be present when his
property was inventoried, and that the destruction of his property while he had
grievances pending violated his due process rights. The district court granted
summary judgment in favor of defendants on the ground that Oklahoma provides
plaintiff an adequate post-deprivation remedy. We agree.
The Supreme Court has held that an inmate does not have a due process
right to be present when his property is searched. Block v. Rutherford , 468 U.S.
576, 590–91 (1984). In addition, random and unauthorized deprivations of
property do not violate the Due Process Clause if the state provides an adequate
post-deprivation remedy. Although Oklahoma has not waived tort liability for
claims arising out of the administration of prisons, see Okla. Stat. tit. 51,
§ 155(24), a prisoner has a remedy against the state in the form of a replevin
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action based on contract, see Gibson v. Copeland , 13 P.3d 989, 991–92 (Okla. Ct.
App. 2000). Plaintiff is incorrect in arguing that a post-deprivation remedy does
not cure a due process violation when the deprivation was intentional. See
Hudson v. Palmer , 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding post-deprivation remedy is
adequate even when deprivation was intentional).
The judgment is AFFIRMED in part and REVERSED in part, and the case
is remanded for further proceedings on plaintiff’s retaliation claim against
defendant Vincent regarding the bringing of disciplinary charges, and his First
Amendment claim against defendants Vincent, Henry, and Hargett, regarding the
seizure and destruction of his diaries.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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