United States v. Adkins ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 1 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, Nos. 01-4058 and 01-4103
v. (D. Utah)
QUINTIN ADKINS, a.k.a. Quinton (D.C. Nos. 2:99-CR-107-J,
Adkins, 2:99-CR-107-02-J)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , HENRY , and BRISCOE , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ requests for decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). These two appeals are, therefore, submitted
without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel, and law of the case. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Quintin Adkins, a federal prisoner appearing pro se, has filed two appeals
of his sentence (actually, his re-sentence) for violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) and
(b)(1)(B) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (possession, with intent to distribute, of in excess of
one hundred grams of heroin and the aiding and abetting of the same). We reach
the substance of Mr. Adkins’ first appeal (appeal number 01-4058); however,
finding no merit in any of Mr. Adkins’ contentions, we affirm the (re-)sentence
imposed upon Mr. Adkins. Having so concluded and because Mr. Adkins’ second
appeal (appeal number 01-4103) is entirely duplicative of the first appeal, we
dismiss, as moot, the second appeal.
I. BACKGROUND
The United States charged Mr. Adkins with (1) one count of possession of
heroin, with intent to distribute, and the aiding an abetting of the same and (2)
one count of possession of marijuana, with intent to distribute, and the aiding and
abetting of the same. Mr. Adkins pleaded guilty to Count I (the heroin count),
conditioned upon his ability to appeal certain legal issues. In exchange, the
United States successfully petitioned the district court for dismissal of Count II
(the marijuana count). The district court sentenced Mr. Adkins to 188 months of
imprisonment, pursuant to Mr. Adkins’ perceived status as a career offender. Mr.
Adkins appealed his conviction and sentence. We affirmed Mr. Adkins’
-2-
conviction but, upon the United States’ concession that Mr. Adkins did not in fact
satisfy the requisites for classification as a career offender, vacated Mr. Adkins’
sentence and remanded for re-sentencing. See United States v. Adkins , No. 99-
4184, 2001 WL 15537 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2001) (unpublished disposition) ( Adkins
I).
At re-sentencing, Mr. Adkins advanced three motions. First, Mr. Adkins
requested that the court vacate his conviction based upon an asserted violation of
the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161-3174. Second, Mr. Adkins, noting that
he pleaded guilty only to the possession, with intent to distribute, of “in excess of
100 grams of heroin,” sought to limit his sentence to that applicable to a quantity
of one hundred-400 grams of heroin. Rec. vol. II, doc. 75, at 4 (Plea Agreement,
filed May 18, 1999). Third, Mr. Adkins sought a downward departure from the
guideline range imposed by the United States Sentencing Guidelines (the
“U.S.S.G.”). Mr. Adkins sought such a departure pursuant to U.S.S.G. §§ 4A1.3
and 5H1.4 (based, respectively, upon (1) Mr. Adkins’ representation that, because
his prior convictions were numerous but relatively minor, Criminal History
Category VI (for purposes of the U.S.S.G.) over-represented his true criminal
history and (2) Mr. Adkins’ asserted chest and back pain, sleep apnea, and
asthma).
-3-
During the course of a March 22, 2001 re-sentencing hearing, the district
court denied each of Mr. Adkins’ motions. Left facing a guideline range
requiring a sentence of between 110 and 137 months of imprisonment, the district
court sentenced Mr. Adkins to a term of imprisonment of 110 months. Mr.
Adkins promptly filed a notice of appeal on March 26, 2001 (thereby initiating
appeal number 01-4058). On April 9, 2001, the district court formally entered the
judgment by which the court imposed the 110-month sentence. Mr. Adkins,
apparently concerned that his March 26, 2001 notice of appeal would be rejected
as premature, subsequently filed a second notice of appeal (thereby initiating
appeal number 01-4103). In each of his appeals, Mr. Adkins asserts that the
district court erred in denying the motions that he advanced at re-sentencing.
II. DISCUSSION
Our appellate jurisdiction arises pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18
U.S.C. § 3742. We consider appeal number 01-4058 on the merits but reject Mr.
Adkins’ assertions of error; we dismiss, as moot, appeal number 01-4103.
A. Appeal Number 01-4058
Mr. Adkins need not have been concerned that, because he filed his notice
of appeal subsequent to the district court’s March 22, 2001 sentencing order but
prior to the district court’s April 9, 2001 entry of judgment in regard to that
-4-
sentence, his notice of appeal would be left without effect. Federal Rule of
Appellate Procedure 4(b)(2) explicitly directs: “A notice of appeal filed after the
court announces a decision, sentence, or order – but before the entry of judgment
or order – is treated as filed on the date of and after the entry.” Thus we have
jurisdiction to consider appeal number 01-4058.
Upon reaching the merits of appeal number 01-4058, however, we reject
each of Mr. Adkins’ contentions of error. Mr. Adkins first claims that the United
States secured his indictment in violation of the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§
3161-3174. Mr. Adkins, however, raised this issue upon his initial appeal to our
court. In Adkins I , we concluded that “[t]he trial court carefully considered all
the relevant factors in its decision [that the United States could re-indict Mr.
Adkins despite the dismissal of an initial indictment, pursuant to the Speedy Trial
Act] and did not abuse its discretion [in making that decision].” United States v.
Adkins , No. 99-4184, 2001 WL 15537, at *1 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2001) (unpublished
disposition). Ultimately, we reiterated: “We affirm the conviction and sentence
except for the part of the sentence attributable to career offender status.” Id.Our decision, in Adkins I , on the Speedy Trial Act issue controls our
current analysis under the “law of the case” doctrine. See United States v.
Alvarez , 142 F.3d 1243, 1246-48 (10th Cir. 1998) (explaining that, “when a case
is appealed and remanded, the decision of the appellate court establishes the law
-5-
of the case and ordinarily will be followed by both the trial court on remand and
the appellate court in any subsequent appeal ,” with one relevant, though narrow,
exception: “where the [prior] decision was clearly erroneous and would work a
manifest injustice”) (emphasis added). As Mr. Adkins has failed to establish that
our decision in Adkins I was “clearly erroneous and would work a manifest
injustice,” id. at 1247, we reject Mr. Adkins’ contention of error on this point.
Second, Mr. Adkins makes two related claims regarding the fact that his
sentence is partly based upon his possession, with intent to distribute, of between
400 and 700 grams of heroin, whereas his Plea Agreement only specified that he
was pleading guilty to a crime involving “in excess of 100 grams of heroin.” Rec.
vol. II, doc. 75, at 4 (Plea Agreement, filed May 18, 1999). 1
Mr. Adkins insists
that such a sentence violates the terms of his Plea Agreement; Mr. Adkins also
argues that such a sentence is inconsistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in
Apprendi v. New Jersey , 530 U.S. 466 (2000).
We address Mr. Adkins’ concerns in turn. First, we note that Mr. Adkins’
sentence is, in fact, not inconsistent with the plea into which he entered. Mr.
Adkins’ Plea Agreement simply states that he is pleading guilty to “knowingly
and intentionally possess[ing] in excess of 100 grams of heroin . . .” Rec. vol. II,
1
Mr. Adkins does not, however, challenge the reality that, as a purely
factual matter, he is indeed responsible for the possession of between 400 and 700
grams of heroin.
-6-
doc. 75, at 4 (Plea Agreement, filed May 18, 1999). Mr. Adkins was sentenced
for the possession of between 400 and 700 grams of heroin. Since 400 to 700
grams of heroin is a quantity “in excess of 100 grams of heroin,” id. , Mr. Adkins’
sentence is not inconsistent with his Plea Agreement. Further, in his Plea
Agreement, Mr. Adkins acknowledged: “I know that the maximum possible
penalty provided for by law for Count I of the Indictment to which I am pleading
guilty . . . is[] a term of imprisonment of . . . life . . .” and “I know that there is no
appellate review of any lawful sentence imposed under a plea of guilty.” Id. at 1,
3 (emphasis added). During a colloquy with the district court, Mr. Adkins further
acknowledged: “Yes, sir, it was more than 100 grams.” Rec. vol. IV, at 17 (Tr. of
Mr. Adkins’ Plea, dated May 18, 1999). During the same colloquy, Mr. Adkins
also answered “Yes, sir” after being advised by the court that a guilty plea meant
a term of imprisonment of “[n]ot . . . more than life.” Id. at 17-18. Finally, Mr.
Adkins answered “Yes, sir” when asked to acknowledge the fact that the Plea
Agreement, as drafted, fully contained any and all promises made by the United
States. Id. at 19-20.
As to the second aspect of Mr. Adkins’ claim regarding the quantity of
heroin for which he is properly accountable, we note that while some of the
reasoning of Apprendi may seem to bear on Mr. Adkins’ claim, certainly the
holding of Apprendi itself does not require that Mr. Adkins be sentenced only as
-7-
if his crime involved between one hundred and 400 grams of heroin. Apprendi
simply forbids a court from imposing (except as to sentence enhancements
imposed on account of a prior conviction) a sentence in excess of the statutory
maximum for the crime for which the defendant was charged and convicted. See
Apprendi , 530 U.S. at 490 (“Other than the fact of a prior conviction, any fact
that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum
must be submitted to a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”). Here, Mr.
Adkins pleaded guilty to (i.e. was convicted for) violation of a statute for which
the maximum term of imprisonment was forty years. 2
Mr. Adkins’ sentence is for
110 months’ imprisonment (i.e. nine years and two months). Since 110 months of
imprisonment is not greater than 40 years of imprisonment, Mr. Adkins’ sentence
does not violate the dictates of Apprendi . See United States v. Sullivan , 255 F.3d
1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001) (“[So long as the sentence ultimately imposed
remains below] the [relevant] statutory maximum[,] . . . Apprendi does not apply
to sentencing factors that increase a defendant’s guideline range . . .”).
2
For cases (1) involving in excess of one hundred grams of heroin and (2)
where the defendant has a “prior conviction for a felony drug offense,” 18 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B) provides for a maximum sentence of life imprisonment. Mr.
Adkins’ case both involved in excess of one hundred grams of heroin and featured
a defendant (Mr. Adkins) with a prior conviction for a felony drug offense. As
part of Mr. Adkins’ Plea Agreement, however, the United States agreed not to file
a particular notice necessary to trigger § 841(b)(1)(B)’s possibility of life
imprisonment. Hence, the statutory maximum applicable to Mr. Adkins, also via
§ 841(b)(1)(B), is only forty years’ imprisonment.
-8-
Third and finally, Mr. Adkins claims that the district court erred in
declining to grant a downward departure from the otherwise applicable U.S.S.G.
guideline range. Mr. Adkins asserts that the district court should have departed,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 5H1.4, due to Mr. Adkins’ alleged chest and back pain,
sleep apnea, and asthma. 3
More particularly, Mr. Adkins argues that the district
court declined to depart based solely on Mr. Adkins’ failure to present evidence
of these conditions and, further, invited Mr. Adkins to return to court with
evidence of such conditions.
Where a district court is aware of the court’s authority to enter a downward
departure under the U.S.S.G. and, in exercise of that court’s discretion, elects not
to so depart, we are without power to reverse the district court. See United States
v. Castillo , 140 F.3d 874, 887 (10th Cir. 1998) (“We clarify here that the courts
of appeal[] cannot exercise jurisdiction to review a sentencing court’s refusal to
depart from the sentencing guidelines except in the very rare circumstance that
the district court states that it does not have any authority to depart from the
sentencing guideline range for the entire class of circumstances proffered by the
3
Before the district court, Mr. Adkins also sought a downward departure,
pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3, based upon the alleged fact that Criminal History
Category VI, the admittedly mathematically correct classification of Mr. Adkins’
criminal history, over-represents Mr. Adkins’ true criminal history due to the
relatively minor nature of some of Mr. Adkins’ prior offenses. Mr. Adkins does
not appeal the district court’s refusal to depart on this ground.
-9-
defendant.”). Here, the district court was clearly aware of the court’s power to
depart, pursuant to § 5H1.4, from the applicable guideline range. The court
commented:
Well I’ll deny each of the motions. In reference to the one relating to
physical condition[,] I should note that that matter on occasion has been
visited before and I’m pleased that [Mr. Adkins has] been able to relieve
his sleep problem with the use of a standard machine that others have used
over the years and to note also that in the federal institutions medical
assistance is available, and I’ll be glad to listen to any additional elocution
that people are interested in calling to my attention within the wiggle room
that I have.
Aple’s Br. Attach. C, at 13-14 (Tr. of Sentencing Hr’g, dated Mar. 22, 2001).
The district court’s comments make clear that the court was aware that § 5H1.4
indeed provided some room for a downward departure, that the court was aware
of the general nature of Mr. Adkins’ request for a departure under that section of
the guidelines, and that the court was willing to hear, at that time , further
evidence regarding the appropriateness of such a departure. We are without
authority to second-guess the district court’s discretionary denial of the requested
departure.
B. Appeal Number 01-4103
We dismiss, as moot, Mr. Adkins’ second appeal (appeal number 01-4103).
Mr. Adkins’ second appeal raises arguments identical to those raised in his first
-10-
appeal; indeed, Mr. Adkins filed identical briefs in the two appeals. Having
addressed Mr. Adkins’ arguments via his first appeal, and having rejected each of
those arguments, we now dismiss, as moot, Mr. Adkins’ second appeal.
III. CONCLUSION
Given Mr. Adkins’ pro se status and pursuant to Haines v. Kerner , 404 U.S.
519, 520-21 (1972) (per curiam), we have liberally construed Mr. Adkins’ filings.
For the reasons stated above, however, we utilize appeal number 01-4058 to
AFFIRM Mr. Adkins’ conviction and sentence; we DISMISS, as moot, appeal
number 01-4103.
Entered for the Court,
Robert H. Henry
Circuit Judge
-11-