United States v. Tony Carver , 41 F. App'x 306 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
MAY 24 2002
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 01-1371
(D. C. Nos. 99-D-2213,
TONY LEONARD CARVER, 96-CR-460-1-D)
(D. Colorado)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, EBEL, and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Pro se defendant Tony Carver seeks a certificate of appealability to pursue
his appeal of the district court’s denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
Mr. Carver pleaded guilty in federal district court to one count of
distributing and possession with intent to distribute less than five grams of crack
cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 841(b)(1)(C). The district
court sentenced him to 151 months’ incarceration, and we upheld the sentence on
direct appeal. United States v. Carver, 160 F.3d 1266 (10th Cir. 1998). He then
filed a motion for postconviction relief, asking the district court to vacate his
sentence on several grounds. The district court denied his motion, and denied his
subsequent motion for a certificate of appealability.
Mr. Carver now appeals the district court’s decision, seeking a certificate
of appealability. He argues that his constitutional rights to equal protection and
due process were violated by an alleged breach of the plea agreement, and that he
received ineffective assistance of counsel. In determining whether to grant a
certificate of appealability, we examine whether he has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). “Where a
district court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, the showing
required to satisfy § 2253(c) is straightforward: The petitioner must demonstrate
that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the
constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484
(2000).
-2-
The defendant signed a plea agreement that contained apparently
contradictory language about the drug quantity. It states that he pleads guilty to
one count of possession of less than five grams of crack cocaine with intent to
distribute, but it also indicates that the recommended sentence of 151 months is
based on an amount of 118 grams. At sentencing, the district court found by a
preponderance of the evidence that Mr. Carver’s offense involved 118 grams.
Mr. Carver challenges the district court’s consideration of the uncharged
quantity as a violation of the plea agreement and a violation of Apprendi v. New
Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000). The district court rejected his claim. The 118.2
gram quantity was reflected in the plea agreement, and could be considered for
sentencing even if it were not charged in the indictment. United States v.
Hishaw, 235 F.3d 565, 577 (10th Cir. 2000) (“[A]s long as the defendant’s
sentence falls within the maximum established by statute, Apprendi does not
foreclose consideration of drug quantities beyond the offense of conviction.”).
The Apprendi rule does not apply to sentencing factors that increase a defendant’s
guideline range but do not increase the statutory maximum. United States v.
Sullivan, 255 F.3d 1256, 1265 (10th Cir. 2001). Mr. Carver’s sentence of 151
months falls within the 20 year statutory maximum under § 841(b)(1)(C). We
therefore find no constitutional violation.
Mr. Carver also argues that he received ineffective assistance of counsel.
-3-
A defendant challenging a guilty plea on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel must show that counsel’s advice was not “within the range of competence
demanded of attorneys in criminal cases” and that “there is a reasonable
probability that, but for counsel’s errors, [defendant] would not have pleaded
guilty and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart , 474 U.S. 52,
57, 59 (1985). Mr. Carver alleges that counsel was ineffective in failing to object
to the court’s finding of the 118 gram quantity of crack cocaine by only a
preponderance of the evidence. We already found that the district court did not
err in finding the drug quantity by a preponderance of the evidence. Moreover,
Mr. Carver was informed at sentencing that he would receive a minimum of 151
months’ imprisonment, and he voluntarily decided to plead guilty.
Mr. Carver has failed to raise a constitutional claim debatable by
reasonable jurists. Mr. Carver’s request for a certificate of appealability is
therefore DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Chief Circuit Judge
-4-