Joseph v. Corradini ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
NOV 26 2002
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROBERT JOSEPH,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
DAVID YOCUM, in his individual
capacity; SALT LAKE COUNTY,
Defendants - Appellees, No. 01-4142
D.C. No. 2:00-CV-340-K
and (D. Utah)
DEE DEE CORRADINI, in her
individual capacity; ROSS C.
ANDERSON, in his individual
capacity; RUBEN B. ORTEGA, in his
individual capacity; JERRY
MENDEZ, in his individual capacity;
A.M. CONNOLE, also known as Mac
Connole, in his individual capacity;
SALT LAKE CITY, a municipal
corporation, and JOHN DOES I
THROUGH XX, in their individual
capacity,
Defendants.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
(continued...)
Before BRISCOE , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and HARTZ ,
Circuit Judge.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiff Robert Joseph appeals the district court’s order granting summary
judgment in favor of defendants-appellees David Yocum and Salt Lake County in
his malicious prosecution complaint brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. We affirm.
At the time of the events in question, plaintiff was a Salt Lake City police
officer. While off-duty, he observed a speeding driver and initiated a traffic stop.
He drew his service revolver as he approached the vehicle. The driver attempted
to leave by backing up. Plaintiff jumped on the car’s running board and fired his
weapon. He shot eleven times, wounding the driver in the face and foot. A police
investigator later testified that plaintiff gave differing accounts of the event and
that police could not confirm plaintiff’s claim that the driver had dragged him with
the vehicle.
*
(...continued)
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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The Salt Lake County District Attorney’s office charged plaintiff with
aggravated assault in the second degree. At a preliminary hearing, the state court
judge found probable cause to believe the plaintiff had committed the offense
charged in the information and plaintiff was bound over for trial. The state trial
court denied plaintiff’s motion to dismiss. Prior to trial, plaintiff’s experts
performed a laser reconstruction of the bullet strikes which revealed some
inconsistencies in the driver’s version of events. As a result, the District
Attorney’s Office decided to dismiss the charges against plaintiff.
Plaintiff then filed a civil rights action against numerous defendants,
including appellees David Yocum, the Salt Lake City District Attorney, in his
individual capacity, and Salt Lake County, on the ground that the Salt Lake County
District Attorney’s Office is a division or department of the County. Plaintiff
claimed appellees violated his constitutional rights by issuing a criminal
information based on an inadequate police investigation, transmitting news of his
arrest to the media, and waiting approximately five months after the preliminary
hearing before dismissing the charges against him.
The appellees moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims against
them were barred by prosecutorial immunity and the Utah Governmental Immunity
Act. The appellees presented evidence indicating that all of the allegations of
wrongdoing against them arose solely from the performance of their prosecutorial
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functions. In response, plaintiff presented no evidence to support his claims
against appellees, but argued the alleged wrongdoing implicated appellees’
administrative, rather than prosecutorial, functions. The district court granted
appellees’ motion for summary judgment. It later granted appellees’ motion to
certify the judgment as final pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure
54(b).
On appeal, plaintiff contends the district court erred in ruling the appellees
were entitled to prosecutorial immunity. He argues that his claims that the
appellees conducted an inadequate investigation, held press conferences, and
delayed in dismissing the case involve administrative functions, rather than
functions within the role of a prosecutor, and thus, are not barred by prosecutorial
immunity.
The district court’s decision that appellees are entitled to prosecutorial
immunity is a question of law which we review de novo. England v. Hendricks ,
880 F.2d 281, 285 (10th Cir. 1989). This court has explained the reach of absolute
prosecutorial immunity as follows:
State attorneys and agency officials who perform functions analogous
to those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil and
administrative enforcement proceedings are absolutely immune from
suit under section 1983 concerning activities intimately associated
with the judicial process. Absolute immunity does not extend to
actions that are primarily investigative or administrative in nature,
though it may attach even to such administrative or investigative
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activities when these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may
fulfill his function as an officer of the court.
Scott v. Hern , 216 F.3d 897, 908 (10th Cir. 2000) (quotations, citations and
alterations omitted).
“‘[T]here is no question in this circuit that prosecutors are absolutely
immune from liability for allegedly failing to conduct an adequate, independent
investigation of matters referred to them for prosecution.’” Id. at 909 (quoting
Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. , 929 F.2d 1484, 1490 (10th Cir. 1991)). Further,
a prosecutor’s decision as to when to dismiss charges is entitled to absolute
prosecutorial immunity because it is “intimately associated with the judicial phase
of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman , 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also
Brodnicki v. City of Omaha , 75 F.3d 1261, 1268 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The decisions
relating to the initiation and dismissal of cases are at the very heart of a
prosecutor’s function as an advocate for the state, and absolute immunity thus
attaches to those decisions.”). Thus, the district court correctly ruled that
appellees are absolutely immune from liability under § 1983 for the decision to
prosecute, even based on an allegedly inadequate police investigation, and the
decision whether and when to dismiss the charges against plaintiff.
It is true that a prosecutor is only entitled to qualified, not absolute,
immunity when holding a press conference and making comments to the media.
See Buckley v. Fitzsimmons , 509 U.S. 259, 277-78 (1993). Qualified immunity
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shields a § 1983 defendant from liability so long as his actions do not violate
clearly established federal statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable
person would have known. Harlow v. Fitzgerald , 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
Plaintiff alleges only that news of his arrest was transmitted by appellees to the
media, which caused him to be held up to ridicule and scorn. This allegation fails
to state any constitutional violation. See McGhee v. Draper , 639 F.2d 639, 643
(10th Cir. 1981) (stating that “stigmatization or reputational damage alone, no
matter how egregious, is not sufficient to support a § 1983 cause of action”); s ee
also Arnold v. McClain , 926 F.2d 963, 968 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that
governmental employee must show publication of false and defamatory
information in connection with job termination in order to establish claim of
liberty interest violation). Thus, the district court did not err in ruling plaintiff’s
claims against appellees were barred by prosecutorial immunity.
Plaintiff next argues the district court erred by dismissing his claims against
appellees with prejudice pursuant to the entry of final judgment under Fed. R. Civ.
P. 54(b). Plaintiff does not contend that the judgment lacked finality, nor does he
challenge the district court’s finding that there was no just reason for delay, the
determinations required for entry of a Rule 54(b) certification. See Okla. Turnpike
Auth. v. Bruner , 259 F.3d 1236, 1242 (10th Cir. 2001). Rather, plaintiff appears to
mistakenly believe that his claims were dismissed with prejudice only when the
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Rule 54(b) certification was entered. Plaintiff’s claims, however, had already been
dismissed with prejudice when the district court granted summary judgment in
appellees’ favor. See Wheeler v. Hurdman , 825 F.2d 257, 259 n.5 (10th Cir. 1987)
(stating that a grant of summary judgment necessarily resolves the issues on the
merits and is, therefore, a disposition of the claim with prejudice).
We do not address plaintiff’s claim that the district court should have
afforded him an opportunity to respond to appellees’ motion before granting the
Rule 54(b) certification because he failed to raise this perceived procedural
violation in a motion to alter or amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 59(e). Because the district court was not allowed the opportunity
to decide whether plaintiff was denied any right to respond, this court has nothing
to review. Cf. Morrison Knudsen Corp. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co. , 175 F.3d
1221, 1256 n.45 (10th Cir. 1999) (holding that “‘[g]rounds for new trial that arise
solely in the context of post trial proceedings must be presented to the trial court
for consideration by a motion for new trial, and the failure to do so deprives the
appellate court [of] any record that is reviewable for error,’” quoting Moore's
Federal Practice 3d § 59.55, at 59-136 (1997)). In short, we find no error in the
district court’s Rule 54(b) certification.
Finally, plaintiff seeks to supplement his appendix with additional materials
and documents. Because these materials were not presented to the district court,
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we do not consider them and his motion to supplement his appendix is DENIED.
Myers v. Okla. County Bd. of County Comm’rs , 151 F.3d 1313, 1319 (10th Cir.
1998).
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of Utah is
AFFIRMED for substantially the reasons set forth in the district court’s order
dated June 8, 2001.
Entered for the Court
Wade Brorby
Senior Circuit Judge
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