McDaniel v. United States , 53 F. App'x 8 ( 2002 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
DEC 9 2002
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JENNIFER McDANIEL, individually and
as personal representative of the Estate of
Robert McDaniel, deceased, and as parent
and next friend of Natasha, Cody and
Shayna McDaniel,
No. 02-2037
Plaintiff - Appellant, D.C. No. CIV-00-959 LFG/KBM
(D. New Mexico)
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before HENRY, PORFILIO, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
This case arises from the death of Robert McDaniel (McDaniel) at Kirtland Air
Force Base (Kirtland) in New Mexico. Jennifer McDaniel (plaintiff) brought suit against
the United States pursuant to the Federal Torts Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1346(b), 2671-2680. Plaintiff filed suit on her own behalf as McDaniel's wife, on
behalf of his estate, and as parent and next friend of the couple's three children. The
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
district court entered summary judgment in favor of the United States and plaintiff
appeals. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
I.
In July 1994, the United States Air Force, as required by Federal Acquisition
Regulations, published an advertisement soliciting bids for a proposed re-roofing project
at Kirtland. The advertisement described the work as “replacement of existing flat roofs
on commercial facilities.” Aplt. App. at 233. In November 1994, Brazos Roofing
International of South Dakota, Inc. (Brazos) was awarded a three-year contract for the
work. In September 1996, the contract was modified to include replacement of the barrel-
shaped roof on Building 37506.
McDaniel, a seasoned roofer and a long-time employee of Brazos, was the
superintendent on the contract. In November 1996, he fell off the roof of Building 37506.
He died the next day as a result of that fall. McDaniel was not using any safety
equipment at the time of the fall.
Both Brazos and the Air Force were on notice prior to the fatal accident that
Brazos was not using an adequate fall protection system on Building 37506. Less than a
month before the accident, the Air Force had requested that Brazos install roof safety
anchors to Building 37506 to comply with safety standards. In addition, both an Air
Force safety officer and an independent safety consultant hired by the Air Force notified
McDaniel of the inadequacy of the fall protection system on the building. Despite these
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warnings, Brazos did not implement a proper fall safety protection system because its
insurance company advised that “because of liability [Brazos] cannot install permanent
safety anchors.” Aplt. App. at 104.
II.
We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the
same legal standard used by the district court. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental
Health & Substance Abuse Servs., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary
judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of
law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). “When applying this standard, we view the evidence and
draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party.” Simms, 165 F.3d at 1326.
III.
Plaintiff argues the district court erred in holding that the independent contractor
exception applied to this case. Specifically, plaintiff argues that Brazos was not an
independent contractor and the Air Force could be held liable for Brazos’ negligence.
“Under the doctrine of sovereign immunity, the United States cannot be sued
unless it consents to be sued, and such consent must be unequivocal.” Bowman v. United
States, 65 F.3d 856, 857 (10th Cir. 1995). The FTCA, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b), “provides a
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limited waiver of sovereign immunity that allows the United States to be sued for
damages arising from torts committed by government employees acting within the scope
of their employment.” Curry v. United States, 97 F.3d 412, 414 (10th Cir. 1996).
Employees of the government include “officers or employees of any federal agency,” but
do not include “any contractor with the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2671. Thus, the
FTCA “does not authorize suits based on the acts of independent contractors or their
employees.” Curry, 97 F.3d at 414.
The power of the federal government “to control the detailed physical performance
of the contractor” is the critical factor in determining whether the independent contractor
exception applies. Logue v. United States, 412 U.S. 521, 528 (1973). “In applying this
test, we focus on whether the Government supervises the day-to-day operations of the
individual.” Curry, 97 F.3d at 414 (internal quotations omitted). Seven factors are
considered in making this determination:
(1) the intent of the parties; (2) whether the United States controls only
the end result or may also control the manner and method of reaching the
result; (3) whether the person uses h[is] own equipment or that of the
United States; (4) who provides liability insurance; (5) who pays social
security tax; (6) whether federal regulations prohibit federal employees
from performing such contracts; and (7) whether the individual has
authority to subcontract to others.
Id. (quoting Lilly v. Fieldstone, 876 F.2d 857, 859 (10th Cir. 1989)).
Here, there is no question that Brazos was an independent contractor. Under the
contract, Brazos was responsible for hiring, supervising and compensating its employees
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in accordance with all applicable state and federal laws. Brazos was responsible for
maintaining workers’ compensation insurance, bodily injury liability insurance, and
comprehensive automobile liability coverage for its employees. In addition, under the
terms of the contract, Brazos was responsible for complying with all applicable safety and
health laws and regulations. Indeed, Brazos had a safety policy that was designed to
comply with state and federal laws and regulations pertaining to the roofing industry.
Under Brazos’ policy, it was McDaniel’s responsibility to ensure the safety program was
implemented. Brazos also retained the authority to subcontract to others.
Although Air Force personnel were occasionally onsite, they did not control the
detailed physical performance of Brazos. The only Air Force officer who was regularly
onsite was Jesse James, a quality assurance evaluator. James would monitor Brazos to
ensure that it complied with the contract, but was “not there to tell or instruct the
contractor how to do his job” or “to determine how safe the contractor [was].” Aplt. App.
at 141, 145.
Plaintiff argues that Brazos and the Air Force had “joint responsibility” over the
safety of Building 37506. To support her argument, plaintiff cites the Air Force’s
authority to monitor and correct safety problems. For example, under the contract, the
contracting officer for the Air Force had the authority to stop all or part of the work to
correct any conditions that posed a risk to the public or to government personnel. Id. at
240; see 48 C.F.R. § 52.236-13. However,
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[t]he fact that the contract may have reserved to the United States the
right to inspect the work and facilities of the independent contractor, and
the right to stop the work, does not in itself override or alter the general
rule of non-liability for the torts of the contractor because no duty is
created to employees or third parties. This includes the reservation to
inspect for the adherence to contract safety provisions.
United States v. Page, 350 F.2d 28, 30-31 (10th Cir. 1965) (holding independent
contractor exception applied even though contractor was required to comply with specific
safety requirements and an Air Force safety engineer monitored contractor’s
performance); see also Craghead v. United States, 423 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1970) (same);
Eutsler v. United States, 376 F.2d 634 (10th Cir. 1967) (same).
Plaintiff also contends that the Air Force controlled Brazos’ work through Daniel
Applegarth, a representative of the roofing manufacturer who monitored installation of
the roof. This argument is without merit because Applegarth was neither a government
employee nor at the site on behalf of the government. We conclude Brazos was an
independent contractor and the United States cannot be held liable for its negligence.
IV.
In addition to the vicarious liability claim, plaintiff brought a claim against the
United States based on its own acts of negligence. Under the FTCA, a plaintiff has a
claim against the United States only “if a private person . . . would be liable to the
claimant in accordance with the law of the place where the act or omission occurred.” 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b). Because the alleged acts and omissions occurred in New Mexico, its
law controls plaintiff’s negligence claim. Plaintiff contends that under New Mexico law,
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she has a negligence claim against the United States based on (1) the Air Force’s duty as a
landowner; (2) the Air Force’s duty to exercise reasonable care under Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 414 (negligence in exercising control retained by employer); (3) the
Air Force’s non-delegable duty based on the inherently dangerous nature of the work; and
(4) the Air Force’s duty to hire a competent contractor to perform the work on Building
37506.
Duty as landowner
Under Restatement (Second) of Torts § 343, the Air Force had a duty to provide a
safe work place for Brazos’ employees. Tipton v. Texaco, Inc., 712 P.2d 1351, 1356
(N.M. 1986); Requarth v. Brophy, 801 P.2d 121, 124 (N.M. Ct. App. 1990). However, in
order to prevail under § 343, plaintiff must show that the Air Force “should have
expected that the employee would not discover or realize the danger, or would fail to
protect himself against it.” Requarth, 801 P.2d at 124-25; see also Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 343(b) (1965). Because it is undisputed that Brazos and McDaniel knew about
the dangers of working on Building 37506 and were aware of the inadequate fall
protection system, and because Brazos and McDaniel were responsible for the safety of
Brazos’ employees and were required to comply with applicable safety laws and
regulations, plaintiff’s claim under § 343 fails. Indeed, after the fatal accident, OSHA
conducted an investigation and cited Brazos for failure to comply with applicable safety
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standards, including failure to implement a proper fall protection system on Building
37506.
Duty to exercise reasonable care
Plaintiff argues the Air Force violated Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 by
failing to reasonably supervise Brazos’ work. Specifically, plaintiff argues that the Air
Force retained control over the job site and had a duty to remedy any safety hazards, yet
failed to take such action despite knowledge of the inadequate fall protection system.
In New Mexico, the general rule is that an “employer of an independent contractor
is not liable for injuries to an employee of the independent contractor.” Valdez v.
Cillessen & Son, Inc., 734 P.2d 1258, 1262 (N.M. 1987). However, under § 414, if the
employer of the independent contractor “has the right to, and does, retain control of the
work performed by the independent contractor, [it] owes the duty of care to the
independent contractor’s employee which, if breached, can result in liability to the
employee.” Id. In order for § 414 to apply,
the employer must have retained at least some degree of control over the
manner in which the work is done. It is not enough that he has merely a
general right to order the work stopped or resumed, to inspect its
progress or to receive reports, to make suggestions or recommendations
which need not necessarily be followed, or to prescribe alterations and
deviations. Such a general right is usually reserved to employers, but it
does not mean that the contractor is controlled as to his methods of work,
or as to operative detail. There must be such a retention of a right of
supervision that the contractor is not entirely free to do the work in his
own way.
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Restatement (Second) of Torts § 414 cmt. c (1965) (emphasis added). Thus, the right to
stop the contractor “from proceeding with the work if dangerous practices are observed,
does not carry with it liability to the employees of the very same [contractor] causing the
dangerous condition.” Fresquez v. Southwestern Indus. Contractors & Riggers, Inc., 554
P.2d 986, 993 (N.M. Ct. App. 1976); see also Flynn v. United States, 631 F.2d 678, 680-
81 (10th Cir. 1980) (holding that the “general right to inspect and make safety
requirements is not enough” and that the “existence of a safety program does not create
liability when the contractor . . . is primarily responsible for safety”) (applying New
Mexico law).
Here, although the Air Force generally supervised the progress of the work and
retained the authority to stop the work, the Air Force did “not . . . tell or instruct the
contractor how to do his job.” Aplt. App. at 141. Brazos was responsible for supervising
its employees and was responsible for the safety of its employees. Thus, the Air Force
did not retain sufficient control over Brazos to create a duty of care owed to Brazos’
employees.
Non-delegable duty
Plaintiff also argues the Air Force owed a non-delegable duty to Brazos’
employees because of the inherently dangerous nature of the work. However, under New
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Mexico law, a non-delegable duty based on the inherently dangerous nature of the work
does not run from the employer of an independent contractor to the independent
contractor’s employees. See New Mexico Elec. Serv. Co. v. Montanez, 551 P.2d 634,
637 (N.M. 1976); see also Fresquez, 554 P.2d at 990 (holding duties created by
Restatement (Second) of Torts §§ 413, 416, and 427 are not applicable to employees of
independent contractors); Bramer v. United States, 595 F.2d 1141, 1146 (9th Cir. 1979)
(“We conclude that New Mexico law would not impose upon the government a
nondelegable duty running to [the employee of an independent contractor].”). Thus, the
Air Force did not owe McDaniel’s a non-delegable duty.
Negligent hiring
Finally, plaintiff argues the Air Force was negligent in hiring Brazos to replace the
roof on Building 37506. Under New Mexico law, the employer of an independent
contractor is not liable to the independent contractor’s employees for negligently hiring
the contractor. See Valdez, 734 P.2d at 1263 (holding that a contractor cannot be held
liable to employee of subcontractor for contractor’s alleged negligence in hiring
subcontractor). Accordingly, plaintiff’s negligent hiring claim fails.
AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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