Clark v. Barnhart , 64 F. App'x 688 ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
APR 22 2003
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
DONA CLARK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 02-5093
(D.C. No. 01-CV-520-J)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (N.D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO , McKAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff Dona Clark asserts she has been disabled since February 1998 due
to multiple sclerosis. Here, she appeals the district court’s decision 1
upholding
*
The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument pursuant
to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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In the district court, the parties consented to have a magistrate judge decide
this case and waived their right to have the district court review any such
decision. 28 U.S.C. § 636(c)(3).
the Commissioner’s denying her disability benefits. The administrative law judge
(ALJ) determined, at step five of the relevant analysis, that Clark remains capable
of performing such sedentary jobs as clerical mailer and production assembly
worker. The Appeals Council then denied review, making the ALJ’s
determination the Commissioner’s final decision. Reviewing to determine
whether there is substantial evidence to support the ALJ’s decision and whether
the ALJ correctly applied the law, see Grigsby v. Barnhart , 294 F.3d 1215, 1218
(10th Cir. 2002), we reverse that determination and remand this cause for the
Commissioner’s further consideration.
No one disputes that Clark has met the first two steps of the five-step
disability analysis, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. The ALJ found both that Clark has
not performed substantial gainful activity since February 1998 and that she
suffers from a severe impairment, multiple sclerosis. “At step three, [then,] the
ALJ [must] determine[] whether the claimant’s impairment is equivalent to one of
a number of listed impairments that the [Commissioner] acknowledges as so
severe as to preclude substantial gainful activity.” Drapeau v. Massanari ,
255 F.3d 1211, 1212 (10th Cir. 2001) (quotation omitted). Clark asserts she met
her burden, see id. at 1213, by establishing that she satisfied the multiple sclerosis
listing, see 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.09. Although this listing
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provides three different means by which a claimant can establish that she is
disabled, Clark invokes only two of those three sections, id. § 11.09(A) & (C).
Listing 11.09(A) provides that a claimant suffering from multiple sclerosis
will be presumptively disabled if she suffers “[s]ignificant and persistent
disorganization of motor function in two extremities, resulting in sustained
disturbance of gross and dexterous movements, or gait and station.” Id.
§ 11.04(B), incorporated into § 11.09(A). The ALJ found, however, that Clark’s
condition was not sufficiently severe to meet this listing, in light of her continued
ability to walk with a cane, drive long distances, and perform household chores.
Nonetheless, Clark asserts that the ALJ, in making this step-three determination,
should not have considered such nonmedical evidence.
In making a step-three determination, the ALJ must rely on only medical
evidence, without considering vocational factors such as age, education and work
experience. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(d); see also , Hargis v. Sullivan , 945 F.2d 1482,
1487 (10th Cir. 1991); Davidson v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 912 F.2d
1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 1990) (addressing claim for widow’s disability benefits).
Nonetheless, the ALJ may properly consider the claimant’s residual functional
capacity (RFC) when making this medical determination under step three. Id.And, because a claimant’s RFC “consists of those activities that [she] can still
perform on a regular and continuing basis despite . . . her physical limitations,”
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White v. Barnhart , 287 F.3d 903, 906 n.2 (10th Cir. 2001), the ALJ did not err in
relying upon this evidence to make his step-three determination.
Furthermore, substantial evidence supported the ALJ’s decision that Clark
did not meet Listing 11.09(A). And the ALJ provided a sufficient analysis
supporting that determination. Cf. Drapeau , 255 F.3d at 1213 (holding ALJ had
failed to address properly whether claimant met listing); Clifton v. Chater ,
79 F.3d 1007, 1009 (10th Cir. 1996) (same).
Clark further faults the ALJ for failing even to consider whether she met
Listing 11.09(C). The multiple sclerosis listing, however, provides that the ALJ
should apply either § 11.09(A) or, instead, § 11.09(C), but not both. 20 C.F.R. Pt.
404, Subpt. P, App. 1, § 11.00(E). “Paragraph C provides criteria for evaluating
the impairment of individuals who do not have muscle weakness or other
significant disorganization of motor function at rest, but who do develop muscle
weakness on activity as a result of fatigue.” Id. If, instead, “the disorganization
of motor function is present at rest, paragraph A must be used, taking into account
any further increase in muscle weakness resulting from activity.” Id. Clark has
never argued that § 11.09(A) does not apply to her case. In fact, Clark’s attorney
specifically asserted to the ALJ that Clark was disabled under § 11.09(A). (2 R.
at 169.) The ALJ, therefore, did not err in failing also to consider § 11.09(C). In
any event, the record does not support a finding that Clark has met Listing
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11.09(C). Cf. Barnett v. Apfel , 231 F.3d 687, 689 (10th Cir. 2000) (refusing to
disturb ALJ’s decision denying benefits, where claimant failed to direct court to
any evidence that ALJ disregarded that established his disability).
Next, Clark challenges the ALJ’s determination that she retained sufficient
RFC to perform sedentary work, as further limited by her ability to lift only five
pounds occasionally and three pounds frequently. Substantial evidence supports
this determination as to Clark’s exertional limitations. Nonetheless, the ALJ also
had to consider any other limitations Clark may have, such as the chronic
disabling fatigue of which she complains. Objective medical evidence
established that Clark suffers from multiple sclerosis, which can reasonably be
expected to produce the fatigue Clark alleges. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(b); see
also Young v. Apfel, 221 F.3d 1065, 1067 n.3 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting multiple
sclerosis’s symptoms “include muscle weakness, numbness, fatigue, loss of
balance, pain, and loss of bowel and bladder control”). Therefore, the ALJ should
have considered her subjective complaints of chronic fatigue in light of all of the
evidence. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1529(c).
In this case, however, the ALJ never specifically considered Clark’s
allegations of fatigue at all. And, while the ALJ did discount Clark’s “allegations
of pain, and other limitations ,” (2 R. at 22) (emphasis added), here, that analysis
alone is inadequate to disregard her complaints of chronic disabling fatigue. See ,
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e.g. , White , 287 F.3d at 909 (holding ALJ must give specific reasons why he
rejects claimant’s subjective pain complaints); Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391
(10th Cir. 1995) (noting administrative agencies have to give reasons for their
decisions) .
Even if we could deem the ALJ’s passing reference to Clark’s “other
limitations” to have included her complaints of chronic fatigue in his credibility
analysis, the ALJ’s reasons for disregarding Clark’s subjective complaints are still
insufficient here to discount her allegations of fatigue.
First, the ALJ rejected Clark’s subjective complaints of “other limitations”
based on “the objective findings, or the lack thereof, by treating and examining
physicians, the lack of medication for severe pain, the frequency of treatments by
physicians and the lack of discomfort shown by the claimant at the hearing.” (2
R. at 22.) This analysis is insufficient to discredit Clark’s complaint of disabling
chronic fatigue primarily because it focuses instead on pain. Two of the four
factors upon which the ALJ relied, Clark’s lack of any severe pain medication and
her apparent comfort during the hearing, expressly focused on any pain
allegations and did not address her fatigue complaints.
As for the ALJ’s other two factors, while Clark had not seen her treating
physician in the six months preceding her hearing, she had seen her treating
physicians over ten times in the year and a half before that. And, during these
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visits, she had complained of fatigue. Cf. Barnett , 231 F.3d at 690 (upholding
ALJ’s discounting claimant’s pain allegations where, among other reasons,
claimant had not reported such complaints to treating physician, whom claimant
had not seen in nine months preceding hearing). Additionally, Clark testified that
she sought medical treatment only when her multiple sclerosis flared up. This,
however, is consistent with the episodic nature of her illness. See Wilcox v.
Sullivan , 917 F.2d 272, 277 (6th Cir. 1990) (requiring ALJ to consider multiple
sclerosis’s episodic nature).
Furthermore, in discounting Clark’s subjective complaints of pain and
“other limitations,” (2 R. at 22), the ALJ relied heavily on Clark’s testimony
concerning her daily activities, which the ALJ deemed “fairly strong,” (id. at 23).
In fact, those daily activities, instead, support Clark’s allegations of disabling
fatigue. Although Clark did testify she was able to make her bed, this amounted
only to pulling up the comforter. And while she was able to shower and dress
herself, it would take her two hours to do so and she would have to rest during the
process. She could also dust and mop her floors, but only if she rested
periodically. And Clark testified she could do the laundry if her husband carried
the clothes to and from the laundromat. Clark did assert she remained able to
wash dishes and cook meals, and she could grocery shop if she leaned on a
grocery cart to move about the store. She exercised by doing leg lifts and
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stretches, but only because she could lie down while doing them. And she
attended church, went out socially with her husband once a week and listened to
music. By themselves, these activities would not support the ALJ’s discreditation
of Clark’s complaints of chronic and disabling fatigue. See Ragland v. Shalala,
992 F.2d 1056, 1060 (10th Cir. 1993). “The sporadic performance [of household
tasks or work] does not establish that a person is capable of engaging in
substantial gainful activity.” Thompson v. Sullivan, 987 F.2d 1482, 1490 (10th
Cir. 1993) (further quotation omitted; alteration in original). Neither would her
one-time drive from New Jersey to Oklahoma to attend her Social Security
hearing. See Broadbent v. Harris, 698 F.2d 407, 413 (10th Cir. 1983).
So, even if we could conclude that the ALJ’s brief reference to Clark’s
“other limitations” included her complaints of disabling chronic fatigue, the
record does not contain substantial evidence supporting the ALJ’s reasons for
rejecting those complaints. See McGoffin v. Barnhart , 288 F.3d 1248, 1254 (10th
Cir. 2002) (holding ALJ’s credibility determination must be closely linked to
substantial evidence). Because the ALJ did not adequately consider Clark’s
complaints of chronic fatigue, therefore, we must reverse the Commissioner’s
decision denying disability benefits and remand this case for the Commissioner’s
further consideration. See Newton v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 448, 459 (5th Cir. 2000)
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(remanding where ALJ ignored claimant’s allegations of severe fatigue, weakness
and swelling, which her condition would reasonably be expected to produce).
In addition, while the ALJ did, at step five, credit Clark’s testimony that
she could read very little, the ALJ did not further address her blurred vision and
diminished vision acuity. Yet her medical records clearly reflect diminished
visual acuity and include her consistent complaints of blurred vision. Cf. Diaz v.
Sec’y of Health & Human Servs. , 898 F.2d 774, 777 (10th Cir. 1990) (holding
ALJ had not erred in discounting claimant’s complaints of blurred vision where
there was no corroborative objective evidence).
On remand, therefore, the Commissioner should consider whether Clark’s
complaints of chronic fatigue are credible. If so, the Commissioner should then
further consider the effect her chronic fatigue, as well as her blurred and
diminished vision, had on her ability to perform work activity. Finally, these
additional impairments, to the extent the Commissioner concludes they are
credible, must be reflected in any hypothetical question posed to the vocational
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expert. We, therefore, REVERSE and REMAND this case to the district court
with instructions to remand it to the Commissioner for her further consideration
consistent with this decision.
Entered for the Court
Carlos F. Lucero
Circuit Judge
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