Melanson v. Colorado Department of Corrections ( 2003 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 9 2003
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
ROY A. MELANSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
No. 02-1193
COLORADO DEPARTMENT OF (District of Colorado)
CORRECTIONS, named as Director or (D.C. No. 00-M-931)
Warden Colorado Corrections Dept.;
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
STATE OF COLORADO,
Respondents-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before EBEL, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Proceeding pro se, Roy A. Melanson seeks a certificate of appealability
(“COA”) from this court so he can appeal the district court’s denial of his 28
U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A) (providing that no
appeal may be taken from a final order disposing of a § 2254 petition unless the
petitioner first obtains a COA). Because Melanson has not “made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” this court denies his request for a
COA and dismisses this appeal. Id. § 2253(c)(2).
On September 1, 1993, Melanson was convicted of first degree murder in
Colorado state court and was subsequently sentenced to a term of life
imprisonment. Melanson’s conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. See People
v. Melanson, 937 P.2d 826 (Colo. Ct. App. 1996). On August 21, 1997, Melanson
filed a motion seeking post-conviction relief pursuant to Rule 35(c) of the
Colorado Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion was denied and Melanson
appealed to the Colorado Court of Appeals. On July 29, 1999, the Colorado Court
of Appeals affirmed the denial of Melanson’s Rule 35(c) motion. The Colorado
Supreme Court denied certiorari on February 15, 2000.
In the § 2254 petition Melanson filed in federal court on May 30, 2000, he
raised twenty-two claims for relief. Respondents argued that some of Melanson’s
claims were procedurally barred either because he did not present them to the
state court or because they were presented to the state court as matters of state
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law. The district court, however, addressed each of the claims, including the
merits of the claims that arguably were procedurally barred. As to the
constitutional claims adjudicated on the merits by the Colorado state court and
reviewed by the federal district court, the district court refused to grant the writ
sought by Melanson because it concluded that the state court adjudication did not
result in a decision that “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application
of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412-13
(2000). The claims not addressed by the state court were rejected on the merits
by the district court. The court, accordingly, denied the § 2254 petition.
In his appellate brief, Melanson seeks a COA on only the following five
issues: (1) whether the trial court’s admission of statements made by Melanson to
an FBI agent in violation of Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981) was
harmless; (2) whether the state met its burden of proving the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt; (3) whether Melanson’s rights to be present
at his trial, to testify, and to confront witnesses were violated by the trial court’s
ruling that he wear a “stun belt” while in the courtroom; (4) whether Melanson
was denied a fundamentally fair trial because the trial court was biased against
him and his trial counsel; and (5) whether the trial court had the authority to order
Melanson’s life sentence to run consecutive to a sentence he is currently serving
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in Kentucky. This court cannot grant Melanson a COA unless he can demonstrate
“that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (quotations omitted).
In evaluating whether Melanson has carried his burden, this court
undertakes “a preliminary, though not definitive, consideration of the [legal]
framework” applicable to each of his claims. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 123 S. Ct.
1029, 1040 (2003). Melanson is not required to demonstrate that his appeal will
succeed to be entitled to a COA. He must, however, “prove something more than
the absence of frivolity or the existence of mere good faith.” Id. (quotations
omitted). This court has reviewed Melanson’s application for a COA and
appellate brief, the district court’s order, and the entire record on appeal,
including the decisions of the Colorado Court of Appeals, pursuant to the
framework set out by the Supreme Court in Miller-El and concludes that
Melanson is not entitled to a COA. The district court’s resolution of Melanson’s
claims is not reasonably subject to debate and the claims are not adequate to
deserve further proceedings. Accordingly, Melanson has not “made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right” and is not entitled to a COA. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
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This court denies Melanson’s request for a COA for substantially those
reasons set forth in the district court’s order dated April 18, 2002 and dismisses
this appeal. Melanson’s request to proceed on appeal in forma pauperis is
granted.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Michael R. Murphy
Circuit Judge
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