United States v. Cobos , 92 F. App'x 650 ( 2004 )


Menu:
  •                                                                         F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FEB 17 2004
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 02-2222
    v.                                    (D.C. No. CR-00-1424-JC)
    JOE COBOS,                                          (D. New Mexico)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff - Appellee,
    No. 02-2237
    v.                                    (D.C. No. CR-00-1424-JC)
    ARTURO NATERA,                                      (D. New Mexico)
    Defendant - Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT          *
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Before EBEL , ANDERSON , and HARTZ , Circuit Judges.
    This Order and Judgment consolidates for disposition the appeals in
    United States v. Cobos, No. 02-2222, and United States v. Arturo Natera, No.
    02-2237. After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
    determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the
    determination of either appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.
    34.1(G). The cases are therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    Defendants Arturo Natera (Arturo) and Joe Cobos (Cobos) were arrested
    for their participation in a drug-distribution conspiracy and charged in a fifteen-
    count indictment along with twelve other individuals. They were convicted after
    a jury trial on charges of (1) conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute
    methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine, and (2) manufacturing
    methamphetamine within one thousand feet of a school. In addition, Arturo was
    convicted of possession with intent to distribute less than fifty kilograms of
    marijuana, and Cobos was convicted of possession with intent to distribute less
    than fifty grams of methamphetamine. Arturo was sentenced to imprisonment of
    360 months on the first two charges and sixty months on the third. Cobos was
    sentenced to imprisonment of 360 months on the first two charges and 240 months
    on the third.
    -2-
    Defendants’ appeals raise the same three arguments: (1) that they are
    entitled to resentencing under Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000); (2)
    that there was insufficient evidence to convict them of manufacturing
    methamphetamine within one thousand feet of a school; and (3) that they received
    ineffective assistance from their respective trial attorneys. We exercise
    jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and affirm in each case.
    I. BACKGROUND
    A. Underlying Facts
    Arturo was the head of a drug trafficking conspiracy based in Roswell,
    New Mexico, from 1997 until October of 2000. Four members of the conspiracy
    —among other witnesses—testified against him at trial. Abel Juaregi, Arturo’s
    partner in a car sales lot, testified about Arturo’s involvement in bringing large
    quantities of marijuana, cocaine, and methamphetamine to Roswell. Jeannine
    Sena, Arturo’s girlfriend, testified about accompanying him to Texas to pick up
    cocaine and to Mexico to purchase marijuana. Leta Quesada, Jeannine’s mother
    and a veteran narcotics transporter, testified about obtaining two kilograms of
    cocaine and 80 pounds of marijuana for Arturo. James Bruce Henry (Henry), a
    methamphetamine cook, testified that he manufactured methamphetamine for
    Arturo and his brother, Marcos Natera (Marcos).
    -3-
    Cobos was involved in Arturo’s drug distribution scheme. Juaregi testified
    that he would purchase drugs from Cobos when Arturo had none to sell him. He
    also testified that Cobos was Arturo’s primary conduit for selling illegal drugs.
    Cobos, he said, ran Arturo’s drug trafficking operation while Arturo was in
    prison.
    In April of 2000, Marcos was arrested after police in Tennessee found
    marijuana hidden in a pickup truck he was driving. While in jail awaiting release
    on bond, Marcos met Henry, who was charged with manufacturing
    methamphetamine. Marcos told him that he was looking for a methamphetamine
    cook, and Henry volunteered to return to Roswell with him. Upon arriving in
    Roswell, Henry and his girlfriend stayed at Marcos’s apartment, and then moved
    into a house at 1418 East Tilden Street, which was owned by Arturo. The house
    was within 1000 feet of Mesa Middle School.
    Henry manufactured methamphetamine in the house’s garage for three to
    four weeks, but wished to move the operation in anticipation of having his
    children join him in Roswell. Marcos suggested moving the methamphetamine
    lab to the countryside, and Cobos told them that he had a travel trailer that they
    could use. Cobos and Henry retrieved the trailer, but rather than moving the
    operation outside of Roswell, the trailer remained adjacent to the Tilden Street
    -4-
    house until Henry’s arrest. Henry never lived in the trailer and used it only for
    manufacturing methamphetamine.
    By Henry’s estimates, he manufactured four or five pounds of
    methamphetamine while residing at the Tilden Street house. He testified that he
    supplied methamphetamine to Defendants for their personal use, and also that he
    gave Cobos methamphetamine to “get rid of” for him. In addition, Henry testified
    that Arturo gave him $500 to purchase pseudoephedrine pills for use in the
    manufacture of methamphetamine, and that he gave Arturo two ounces of
    methamphetamine in return. According to Henry, he also gave Arturo an ounce of
    methamphetamine in lieu of paying rent on the house.
    As discussed in United States v. Ramirez, 
    348 F.3d 1175
    , 1178 (10th Cir.
    2003), the conspiracy ultimately attracted the attention of state and federal law
    enforcement agencies in late 1999 and early 2000. Their investigation included
    the use of undercover agents and wiretaps on two of Arturo’s cellular telephones.
    On October 27, 2000, a federal grand jury handed down a fifteen-count
    indictment charging Defendants and twelve others with conspiracy and other drug
    offenses.
    B. Proceedings Below
    Four counts of the indictment are relevant to these appeals. In Count I
    Defendants and others were charged with conspiring, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , to commit the following crimes:
    -5-
    Possession with intent to distribute 50 grams and more of
    methamphetamine . . . contrary to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A); possession with intent to distribute 100
    kilograms and more of marijuana . . . contrary to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B); and possession with intent
    to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine . . . contrary to 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1) and 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C).
    R., Vol. I, Doc. 31 at 2. Count II charged Arturo, Cobos, and Marcos with
    “knowingly and intentionally mak[ing] a building or enclosure available for the
    purpose of unlawfully manufacturing a controlled substance within 1000 feet of a
    school.” R., Vol. I., Doc. 31 at 6. Count IX charged Cobos with “possess[ion]
    with intent to distribute less than 50 grams of a mixture and substance containing
    a detectable amount of methamphetamine, its Salts, isomers, and Salts of its
    isomers . . . .” R., Vol. I, Doc. 31 at 9. Count XIV charged Arturo, among
    others, with “possess[ion] with intent to distribute less than 50 kilograms of
    Marijuana . . . .” R., Vol. I, Doc. 31 at 11.
    The jury convicted Defendants on all counts. On a special verdict form, the
    jury found that the objectives of the conspiracy to which Defendants agreed
    involved methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine. As to Arturo, it found that
    the amount of methamphetamine and marijuana “involved in the scope of the
    conspiracy” included: “50 grams and more (pure methamphetamine),” and “100
    kilograms and more” marijuana. R., Vol. I, Doc. 319 at 2. As to Cobos, it found
    that the conspiracy involved “[l]ess than 50 grams, but more than 5 grams (pure
    -6-
    methamphetamine),” and “[a]t least 50 kilograms, but less than 100 kilograms”
    marijuana. 
    Id. at 8
    . Defendants were sentenced to 360 months’ imprisonment on
    Counts I and II. Arturo received 60 months’ imprisonment on Count XIV, and
    Cobos received 240 months’ imprisonment on Count IX.
    Defendants timely appealed. Their respective attorneys filed briefs in
    accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), asserting that after
    reviewing the record, they could discern no meritorious basis for appeal.
    Defendants subsequently filed pro se appellate briefs, and the United States, upon
    the order of this Court, responded. Cobos then filed a reply brief.
    II. ANALYSIS
    A. Apprendi
    Defendants contend that the district court’s imposition of 360-month
    sentences for their convictions on Counts I and II was unconstitutional under
    Apprendi v. New Jersey, 
    530 U.S. 466
     (2000). Neither of them, however, raised
    such an argument before the district court. Therefore, we review for plain error
    the sentences that the district court imposed. Under this standard, Defendants
    must demonstrate: “(1) an error; (2) that is plain or obvious; (3) that affects
    substantial rights; and (4) that seriously affects the fairness, integrity or public
    reputation of judicial proceedings.” United States v. James, 
    257 F.3d 1173
    , 1182
    -7-
    (10th Cir. 2001). Although “we apply this rule less rigidly when reviewing a
    potential constitutional error,” 
    id.,
     we can find no Apprendi violation here.
    Defendants may assert a claim under Apprendi only if the district court
    imposed a sentence in excess of the statutory maximum for the offense of which
    they were convicted. See, e.g., United States v. O’Flanagan, 
    339 F.3d 1229
    , 1232
    n.2 (10th Cir. 2003). This was not the case here. As to Count I, the jury found
    Defendants guilty under 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
     of conspiring to possess with intent to
    distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine, in violation of 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (a)(1). According to 
    21 U.S.C. § 846
    , “Any person who . . . conspires to
    commit any offense defined in this subchapter shall be subject to the same
    penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the
    object of the . . . conspiracy.” The jury returned special verdict forms finding that
    possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine, marijuana, and cocaine
    were objects of the conspiracy. The jury also found by special verdict that as to
    Arturo, the conspiracy involved “50 grams and more (pure methamphetamine),”
    R., Vol. I, Doc. 319 at 2, and as to Cobos, the conspiracy involved “[l]ess than 50
    grams, but more than 5 grams (pure methamphetamine),” 
    id. at 8
    . Hence, as to
    the methamphetamine alone, Arturo faced a sentence as severe as life
    imprisonment, see 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(A)(viii), and Cobos faced as much as
    forty years’ imprisonment, see 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(B)(viii).
    -8-
    As to Count II, the jury convicted Defendants of violating 
    21 U.S.C. §§ 856
    (a)(2) and 860(a). Section 856(a)(2) makes it unlawful to:
    manage or control any place, whether permanently or temporarily,
    either as an owner, lessee, agent, employee, occupant, or mortgagee,
    and knowingly and intentionally rent, lease, profit from, or make
    available for use, with or without compensation, the place for the
    purpose of unlawfully manufacturing, storing, distributing, or using a
    controlled substance.
    Their sentences were enhanced under Section 860(a), which provides:
    Any person who violates . . . section 856 of this title by . . .
    manufacturing a controlled substance in or on, or within one
    thousand feet of, the real property comprising a public or private
    elementary, vocational, or secondary school . . . is . . . subject to (1)
    twice the maximum punishment authorized by section 841(b) of this
    title . . . .
    (emphasis added). Even under 
    21 U.S.C. §841
    (b)(1)(C), which provides the most
    lenient sentence for the manufacture of a schedule II controlled substance such as
    methamphetamine, Defendants were eligible for a sentence of 20 years’
    imprisonment. Once this sentence is doubled under 
    21 U.S.C. § 860
    (a),
    Defendants faced up to forty years’ imprisonment.
    Thus, the district court did not err, let alone plainly err, under Apprendi by
    imposing sentences (30 years) well within the statutory range for each conviction.
    B. Sufficiency of Evidence
    Defendants contend that the district court improperly denied their motions
    for judgment of acquittal on Count II of the indictment because the government
    -9-
    presented insufficient evidence to convict them of making available a building or
    enclosure for the manufacture of methamphetamine within 1000 feet of a school.
    Specifically, Defendants contend that the government did not prove beyond a
    reasonable doubt (1) that they knew that Bruce Henry used the travel trailer to
    manufacture methamphetamine; (2) that Henry produced 50 grams or more of
    methamphetamine in the trailer; or (3) that the trailer was within 1000 feet of a
    school.
    “We review de novo the district court’s denial of a motion for a judgment
    of acquittal,” viewing “all the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    government.” United States v. Ramirez, 
    348 F.3d at 1180
     (internal quotation
    marks omitted). “We must determine whether there is evidence from which a jury
    could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt,” but “[w]e do not . . .
    weigh the evidence or consider the credibility of the witnesses in making our
    determination.” 
    Id.
     (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
    Defendants’ arguments are without merit. As for Defendants’ knowledge
    that the trailer was used for the manufacture of methamphetamine, Henry testified
    that because his children were to join him in Roswell at the Tilden Street house,
    he discussed with Marcos the possibility of moving the manufacturing operation.
    Marcos suggested getting a piece of land in the country. Cobos, who was present
    during this discussion, volunteered a travel trailer and later took Henry to retrieve
    -10-
    it. But rather than setting up the trailer somewhere in the country, it remained
    next to the house, where it was used exclusively for manufacturing
    methamphetamine. Henry testified that he gave both Defendants
    methamphetamine for their personal use, and that he gave Cobos some to “get rid
    of,” R., Vol. XI at 317:15. He also testified that he gave Arturo two ounces of
    methamphetamine made from pseudoephedrine pills paid for by Arturo, and one
    ounce in lieu of rent. From this, a jury could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
    that each Defendant knew that Henry used the trailer to manufacture
    methamphetamine.
    With respect to the amount of drugs manufactured, Defendants claim that
    the government’s evidence was insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt
    that Henry manufactured more than 50 grams of methamphetamine in the trailer.
    As an initial matter, we are uncertain why Defendants believe that the government
    was required to prove as an element of the crime that any benchmark amount of
    methamphetamine was manufactured in the trailer. As discussed above, the
    district court sentenced them to thirty years’ imprisonment, well within the range
    permitted under 
    21 U.S.C. § 841
    (b)(1)(C), as enhanced by 
    21 U.S.C. § 860
    (a).
    Thus, the government was not required to charge in the indictment, and prove to
    the jury beyond a reasonable doubt as an element of the offense, that Henry
    -11-
    manufactured a given benchmark amount in the trailer. See United States v.
    Jones, 
    235 F.3d 1231
    , 1236 (10th Cir. 2000).
    Furthermore, even if the government was required to produce evidence that
    Henry manufactured more than 50 grams of methamphetamine in the trailer, it met
    this burden. Although Henry’s estimates of the total amount of methamphetamine
    that he manufactured varied during the course of his testimony, all estimates
    exceeded one pound. He also estimated that in each batch he manufactured
    between one and three ounces. Because 50 grams is less than two ounces, this
    testimony clearly sufficed.
    As for the distance between the trailer and the school, Agent Eric Brackeen
    of the Roswell Police Department testified that he used a “roll-a-tape device” to
    measure the distance. He testified that the trailer was adjacent to the house at
    1418 East Tilden Street in Roswell. Starting on the sidewalk to the west of that
    address, he proceeded east along East Tilden Street to Hinkel Street, then
    southeast on Hinkel to the sidewalk of Mesa Middle School, and then on to the
    back door on the northwest side of the school. The distance measured 628 feet,
    11 inches. He then “reset the measurement and took it back to see if it was going
    to be in close proximity and it was about 11 inches off, is all. It was 628 feet
    from the back of the school door back to the beginning of the residence.” R.,
    Vol. XI at 215: 22-25. He also testified that the measurement “as the crow flies”
    -12-
    would have been less than 628 feet. From this testimony the jury could conclude
    beyond a reasonable doubt that the trailer in which Henry manufactured
    methamphetamine was within 1000 feet of a school.
    C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    Finally, Defendants contend that they received ineffective assistance of
    counsel because their attorneys did not object to the presentence report on which
    their sentences were based. Defendants argue that they were especially
    prejudiced by their attorneys’ failure to object to the government’s evidence of
    their knowledge that methamphetamine was being manufactured, the distance
    between the methamphetamine lab and the school, and the quantity of drugs
    manufactured.
    As a general rule, “[i]neffective assistance of counsel claims should be
    brought in collateral proceedings, not on direct appeal. Such claims brought on
    direct appeal are presumptively dismissible, and virtually all will be dismissed.”
    United States v. Galloway, 
    56 F.3d 1239
    , 1240 (10th Cir. 1995) (en banc).
    Requiring ineffective assistance claims to be brought on collateral attack allows
    the district court to create a factual record, if necessary, on the issue of
    ineffective assistance. It also gives “counsel accused of deficient performance”
    the opportunity to “explain their reasoning and actions, and the district court can
    render its opinion on the merits of the claim.” 
    Id.
    -13-
    We do not depart from the general rule in this case and dismiss this claim
    as premature.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We AFFIRM the judgments in Nos. 02-2222 and 02-2237. The motions to
    withdraw by Defendants’ appellate attorneys are GRANTED. Arturo Natera’s
    motion for appointment of counsel is DENIED. We construe Cobos’s reply brief
    as a motion for appointment of counsel; this motion is also DENIED.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Harris L Hartz
    Circuit Judge
    -14-