United States v. Muniz , 93 F. App'x 208 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 24 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 03-4186
v. D. Utah
DAVID ROJAS MUNIZ, (D.C. No. 2:02-CR-124-TS)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR , ANDERSON , and EBEL , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
David Rojas-Muniz was arrested at his home on December 11, 2001,
pursuant to an arrest warrant, as part of a task force operation seeking to
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
*
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
apprehend those suspected of using false documentation to obtain employment at
Salt Lake International Airport. Following the arrest, Mr. Rojas-Muniz, in
response to the arresting officer’s questions, indicated the location of his Social
Security card and resident alien card. The officer then seized both cards as
evidence. The cards were later determined to be counterfeit, and Mr. Rojas-
Muniz was charged with two counts of knowingly possessing counterfeit
documents in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546(a).
Mr. Rojas-Muniz moved to suppress the cards at trial on the basis that the
arresting officer had failed to give him Miranda 1 warnings before asking the
questions that led to the seizure of the cards. Following a hearing, the district
court denied the motion to suppress. A jury found Mr. Rojas-Muniz guilty on
both counts, and he was sentenced to sixty months probation. Mr. Rojas-Muniz
now appeals the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress.
In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress based on an alleged
Miranda violation, “we accept the factual findings of the district court unless they
are clearly erroneous and view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
district court’s ruling.” United States v. Toro-Pelaez , 107 F.3d 819, 826 (10th
Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). “‘The credibility of witnesses, the weight to be
given evidence, and the reasonable inferences drawn from the evidence fall within
1
See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
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the province of the district court.’” United States v. Castorena-Jaime , 285 F.3d
916 (10th Cir. 2002) (quoting United States v. Long , 176 F.3d 1304, 1307 (10th
Cir. 1999)).
Here, the district court found the arresting officer’s testimony at the
suppression hearing credible. Based on this testimony, the court specifically
found that the officer, who speaks Spanish, “read [Mr. Rojas-Muniz] his rights in
Spanish, following along on a Miranda warning card he keeps in his wallet,” at
the time of the arrest, before asking Mr. Rojas-Muniz about his papers. R. Vol. I
doc. 57 at 2. Accordingly, the court found that “the government has met its
burden, by a preponderance of evidence, of showing that [Mr. Rojas-Muniz] was
given a proper Miranda warning.” Id. at 3.
Mr. Rojas-Muniz claims that the officer’s testimony alone is insufficient
evidence for a finding that Miranda was satisfied because the officer did not state
in his testimony, nor does other evidence indicate, “exactly what was stated or
what was contained on the card,” nor was the card itself introduced into evidence.
Appellant’s Br. at 5. There are cases in which courts have held that the
government failed to meet its burden of proving that adequate Miranda warnings
were given where the arresting officer failed to testify concerning the specific
content of the warnings. See, e.g. , Moll v. United States , 413 F.2d 1233, 1238
(5th Cir. 1969) (“The government’s burden may not be met by presumptions or
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inferences that when police officers read to an accused from a card they are
reading Miranda warnings or that what is read, without revelation of its contents,
meets constitutional standards.”); United States v. Gilmer , 793 F. Supp. 1545,
1555 (D. Colo. 1992) (“[O]nly with specific testimony can the court decide
whether the officers conveyed all of the proper warnings . . . .”); Ex parte Price ,
725 So. 2d 1063 (Ala. 1998) (“In the absence of any evidence indicating the
contents of the form that was read to Price or explaining [the arresting officer’s]
understanding of what rights must be explained to a suspect, we are forced to
conclude that there was no evidence from which the court could have properly
concluded that Price was advised of each of the rights established in Miranda
. . . .”). However, we decline to establish a bright line rule in this circuit whereby
a trial court’s denial of a motion to suppress may be overturned based solely on
the lack of specific testimony at the suppression hearing. See United States v.
Klein , 592 F.2d 909, 914 (5th Cir. 1979) (declining to require specific testimony
of warnings’ content where the defendant admitted warnings were given and
arresting officer testified he read from a card containing “the standard Miranda
warnings”).
Under the circumstances here, we conclude that the district court’s finding
that the Miranda warnings were read was not clearly erroneous based on the
evidence before it. The arresting officer testified at the suppression hearing that
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he read Mr. Rojas-Muniz his rights from a “ Miranda card,” which had the
Miranda warnings written in English on one side and in Spanish on the other. R.
Vol. II at 25, 35, 37. Although the card was not admitted into evidence, the
officer produced it on the stand, and it was examined at that time by Mr. Rojas-
Muniz’s attorney. Id. at 37. The fact that neither the government nor Mr. Rojas-
Muniz’s attorney asked the officer to read the warnings printed on the card or
otherwise explain the content of the warnings given indicates to us that the
primary dispute here was not over the content of the warnings but over whether
any warnings had been given at all. While Mr. Rojas-Muniz denied that he had
been read any warnings, the district court credited the arresting officer’s version
of events rather than Mr. Rojas-Muniz’s. The court did not clearly err in doing so
or in drawing the reasonable inference, in the absence of any allegation to the
contrary, and in light of its finding that the officer read the warnings from a pre-
printed Miranda card, that the warnings given were indeed the standard Miranda
warnings.
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s denial of the motion to
suppress is AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
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