United States v. Duncan , 99 F. App'x 196 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAY 18 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 03-4207
(D. Utah)
EMMETT R. DUNCAN, JR., (D.Ct. No. 2:02-CR-195-01-PGC)
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, and PORFILIO and BRORBY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Appellant Emmett R. Duncan, a federal prisoner represented by counsel,
pled guilty to using, carrying or possessing a firearm during and in relation to a
crime of violence, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), and two counts of forcible
assault and interference of an officer engaged in official duties, pursuant to 18
U.S.C. §§ 111(a)(1) and (b). The district court sentenced Mr. Duncan to sixty-
months imprisonment on the firearm count, to run consecutively with forty-six
months imprisonment for the assault counts.
While Mr. Duncan has filed a timely notice of appeal, his counsel has filed
an appeal brief, pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967),
alleging that, in her opinion, no meritorious appellate issues exist and requesting
an order permitting her to withdraw as Mr. Duncan’s counsel. Consistent with the
dictates of Anders, counsel has nevertheless pointed out two sentencing issues to
support an appeal, namely, asserting the district court erred when it 1) applied
United States Sentencing Guidelines (U.S.S.G.) §2A2.2 for aggravated assault to
determine his offense level, and 2) declined to reduce his sentence under U.S.S.G.
§5K2.13 for reduced mental capacity. Although the holding in Anders entitles a
defendant to raise additional points in response to an Anders brief and such
opportunity was given in this case, Mr. Duncan made no such filing. See Anders,
386 U.S. at 744. We affirm the district court’s sentence.
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I. Factual and Procedural Background
The relevant facts for the purpose of addressing the two sentencing issues
presented on appeal follow. Mr. Duncan participated in an armed break-in of a
home located on the Ute Reservation and remained at large for approximately
three months until a Utah Highway Patrol trooper stopped the vehicle in which he
was riding. The trooper called for backup from officers from the Roosevelt
Police Department who, in turn, called for officers from the Bureau of Indian
Affairs to assist. At one point, after the passengers exited the vehicle, they were
given the option of getting back into the vehicle to stay warm; at this time, Mr.
Duncan returned to the vehicle and sat in the driver’s seat.
After Bureau of Indian Affairs Officer Myore arrived and identified Mr.
Duncan, for whom an outstanding arrest warrant was pending, Officer Myore
placed him under arrest and ordered him to exit the vehicle, which he refused to
do. Officer Myore and Roosevelt Police Officer Denver then leaned into the
vehicle to remove him. While Officer Myore was holding Mr. Duncan’s left arm,
Mr. Duncan grabbed Officer Denver’s wrist and then sped off, injuring one
officer, and dragging and injuring the other. During an ensuing high-speed police
pursuit reaching speeds in excess of 100 miles per hour, Mr. Duncan deliberately
swerved his vehicle into a patrol car, and then lost control and rolled the vehicle
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he was driving. A passenger in the car driven by Mr. Duncan received serious
injuries as a result of the rollover. Officers then arrested Mr. Duncan, who later
pled guilty to carrying a firearm during the home break-in, in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 924(c), and forcible assault and interference of two officers, in violation
of 18 U.S.C. § 111(a)(1) and (b).
Following the sentencing hearing, the district court found the vehicle used
by Mr. Duncan constituted a dangerous weapon and that Mr. Duncan intended to
use it to harm the officers involved in his arrest. Based on these findings, the
district court concluded the offense category under U.S.S.G. §2A2.2 for
aggravated assault applied. In addition, the district court denied Mr. Duncan’s
motion for a downward departure under U.S.S.G. §5K2.13 for reduced mental
capacity, determining him ineligible to receive such a departure because his
conduct resulted in “actual violence.” Applying these and other Sentencing
Guidelines, the district court imposed a sixty-month sentence for the firearm
count and forty-six months imprisonment on the two assault counts, to run
consecutively. In so doing, the district court noted the sixty-month sentence for
the firearm count is the “mandatory minimum term for armed home invasion.”
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II. Discussion
Application of United States Sentencing Guideline §2A2.2
When reviewing an application of the Sentencing Guidelines, “[t]his court
reviews the district court’s legal conclusions under the Sentencing Guidelines de
novo and its factual findings for clear error, affording great deference to the
district court’s application of the Guidelines to the facts.” United States v. Eaton,
260 F.3d 1232, 1237 (10th Cir. 2001). This court “will not disturb a factual
finding of the district court unless the court’s finding was without factual support
in the record, or if after reviewing all the evidence we are left with the definite
and firm conviction that a mistake has been made.” United States v. Easterling,
921 F.2d 1073, 1077 (10th Cir. 1990) (quotation marks and citation omitted), cert.
denied, 500 U.S. 937 (1991).
Section 2A2.2, entitled “Aggravated Assault,” sets the offense level for
“felonious assault[s] that involved (A) a dangerous weapon with intent to cause
bodily harm (i.e., not merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily
injury; or (C) an intent to commit another felony.” U.S.S.G. §2A2.2, cmt. n. 1.
This section is disjunctive because “[t]he plain language of this definition
requires §2A2.2 be applied if any of the three described situations exist.” United
States v. Rue, 988 F.2d 94, 96 (10th Cir. 1993). For the purposes of §2A2.2, a car
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may be considered a “dangerous weapon,” if it was involved in the offense with
the intent to commit bodily injury.” U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, cmt. n.1. A car is clearly
“an instrument capable of inflicting death or serious bodily injury.” See United
States v. Sherwin, 271 F.3d 1231, 1233-35 (10th Cir. 2001) (determining patrol
car door kicked by defendant into officer’s knee-caps, upper legs and waist,
constituted a “dangerous weapon” for the purposes of §2A2.2). In this case, the
district court determined the car constituted a “dangerous weapon,” and was both
intended to and did cause bodily harm, for the purposes of both parts (A) and (B)
of the commentary to §2A2.2.
On appeal, counsel for Mr. Duncan acknowledges §2A2.2 is properly
applied in calculating a sentence when bodily harm occurs. However, she points
out that U.S.S.G. §2A2.4, entitled “Obstructing or Impeding Officers,” is
designed to encompass less severe conduct than §2A2.2, and thereby, counsel
seems to intimate it should be applied in this case. We disagree.
Unlike U.S.S.G. §2A2.2, U.S.S.G. §2A2.4 is only applicable “[i]f the
conduct involved physical contact, or if a dangerous weapon (including a firearm)
was possessed and its use was threatened.” See U.S.S.G. § 2A2.4(b)(1). Thus,
unlike §2A2.2, §2A2.4 does not mention injury or intent to cause bodily injury.
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Compare U.S.S.G. §2A2.2 with U.S.S.G. §2A2.4. Only §2A2.2 is more clearly
applicable when a serious bodily injury is sustained or an intent to do bodily harm
is evidenced. Moreover, for more severe conduct, §2A2.4 expressly provides a
cross reference to §2A2.2, in instances where “the conduct constituted aggravated
assault.” See U.S.S.G. §2A2.4(c).
In this case, the two police officers clearly sustained serious bodily injuries
and the district court determined, after receiving hearing evidence, that Mr.
Duncan intended to harm the officers either by grabbing Officer Denver’s wrist
while he drove off dragging him, or when he aggressively drove into the police
vehicle during the high-speed chase. Under the circumstances presented, and
applying the applicable standard of review, we conclude the district court did not
err in applying §2A2.2 in determining Mr. Duncan’s sentence.
B. Failure to Apply United States Sentencing Guideline §5K2.13
Section 5K2.13 allows “[a] sentence below the applicable guideline range”
if “(1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a significantly
reduced mental capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced mental capacity
contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.” U.S.S.G. §5K.13.
However, this section does not apply in certain circumstances, including when the
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“the facts and circumstances of the defendant’s offense indicate a need to protect
the public because the offense involved actual violence or a serious threat of
violence.” Id. (emphasis added). We lack jurisdiction to review a sentencing
court’s refusal to apply §5K2.13 and depart downward from the guidelines, absent
a clear misunderstanding by the court of its discretion to depart. See United
States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003); United States v. Busekros,
264 F.3d 1158, 1159 (10th Cir. 2001).
In this case, the district court found Mr. Duncan ineligible for a departure
under §5K2.13, because his offense conduct involved “actual violence,” including
1) speeding away which caused injuries to two officers, including one taken away
in an ambulance, 2) operating a vehicle at speeds over 100 miles per hour during
police pursuit to avoid arrest, and 3) crashing a car into a patrol car, which
resulted in a rollover and injury to the passenger. In so holding, it is clear the
district court was aware of its discretion to depart, but declined to do so given its
determination Mr. Duncan was ineligible under §5K2.13 because his conduct
resulted in “actual violence.” Accordingly, we lack jurisdiction to review the
court’s decision not to depart downward. Moreover, we note Mr. Duncan’s
counsel’s acknowledgment that current law prohibits a §5K2.13 departure under
the circumstances of Mr. Duncan’s case.
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III. Conclusion
After careful review of the record on appeal, we conclude no grounds for
appeal exist. We thereby grant counsel’s request to withdraw and DISMISS the
appeal.
Entered by the Court:
WADE BRORBY
United States Circuit Judge
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