United States v. Kennedy , 106 F. App'x 688 ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
AUG 10 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 03-3301
(D.C. No. 99-CR-10105-MLB)
MICHAEL R. KENNEDY, (D. Kan.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before EBEL, TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges, and HEATON, District Judge.**
Michael R. Kennedy appeals the revocation of his term of supervised release and
the imposition of an additional term of imprisonment. Exercising jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
The Honorable Joe Heaton, District Judge, United States District Court for the
Western District of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
Background
Kennedy pled guilty to one count of receiving child pornography in violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2). He was sentenced to twenty seven months imprisonment followed
by a three year term of supervised release. As a condition of supervised release, Kennedy
was forbidden to possess “any sexually explicit material.” He did not appeal his
conviction or sentence or the conditions of his supervised release.
One year into his term of supervised release, Kennedy admitted to a polygraph
examiner and a therapist that he had read sexually explicit stories involving minors. The
therapist reported Kennedy’s activity to his probation officer who then petitioned the
district court to revoke Kennedy’s term of supervised release. In the petition, the
probation officer alleged that Kennedy had violated the special conditions of supervision
by engaging in unsupervised contact with minors and by possessing sexually explicit
material. After conducting a hearing on the petition, the district court found there had
been no violation of the conditions as to contact with minors. The court did, however,
find sufficient evidence of Kennedy’s possession of sexually explicit material. Based on
this finding, the district court revoked Kennedy’s term of supervised release and
sentenced him to an additional twenty four months in prison.
Kennedy asserts that the special condition of supervision prohibiting the
possession of sexually explicit material is vague as applied to his conduct. He also asserts
that the district court admitted and relied on improper evidence during the revocation
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hearing, abused its discretion in revoking rather than modifying his term of supervised
release, and made an unreasonable sentencing decision. We review the district court’s
decision revoking supervised release for abuse of discretion. United States v. Disney, 253
F.3d 1211, 1213 (10th Cir. 2001). Legal issues related to the revocation of supervised
release are reviewed de novo. Id. Finally, the district court’s sentencing decision is
reviewed to determine whether it was reasoned and reasonable. United States v. Lee, 957
F.2d 770, 774 (10th Cir. 1992).
Discussion
Waiver
Kennedy claims that the special condition of supervision related to possession of
sexually explicit material is vague as applied to his conduct. The government asserts that
Kennedy waived this argument when he failed to appeal the special condition within ten
days after entry of judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). See Budinich v. Becton
Dickinson and Co., 486 U.S. 196, 203 (1988) (upholding court of appeals’ dismissal for
lack of jurisdiction based on untimeliness of notice of appeal). As Kennedy is not
challenging the propriety of the special condition on its face, but rather is challenging the
special condition as applied to his conduct, we conclude we have jurisdiction to hear his
vagueness as applied argument. See, e.g., Waltower v. Kaiser, No. 00-6281, 2001 WL
276962, at *2 (10th Cir. Mar. 21, 2001) (allowing an as applied challenge to proceed after
the events necessary to state a claim accrued).
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Vagueness
Due process requires that the conditions of supervised release be sufficiently clear
to inform a released prisoner of what conduct will result in his or her return to prison.
United States v. Simmons, 343 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2003). Although the meaning of a
condition “may be plain on its face, it can be unconstitutionally vague in application.”
United States v. Agnew, 931 F.2d 1397, 1403 (10th Cir. 1991). Kennedy does not assert
that the district court abused its discretion by imposing a condition prohibiting his
possession of sexually explicit material while on supervised release. Instead, he argues
the district court’s application of this condition to his possession of textual stories
rendered the condition unconstitutionally vague. Noting that his conviction involved the
possession of visual depictions of minors, he asserts he lacked notice that the condition
would apply to conduct beyond that found in his conviction for receiving child
pornography. We review this claim de novo and reject Kennedy’s argument.
Kennedy admitted that the textual material he possessed was sexually explicit.
The condition imposed in this case prohibited the possession of any sexually explicit
material. Although the condition does not mention specifically the possession of textual
material, it must be read and applied in a “commonsense way” in order to determine its
scope. United States v. Gallo, 20 F.3d 7, 12 (1st Cir. 1993). Conduct prohibited by a
condition of supervised release need not mirror conduct specified in a conviction in order
to pass constitutional muster. See, e.g., Gallo, 20 F.3d at 12 (“Conditions of probation
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may afford fair warning even if they are not precise to the point of pedantry.”); Agnew,
931 F.2d at 1404 (“Laws cannot define the boundaries of impermissible conduct with
mathematical certainty.”) (internal quotations and citations omitted). To the contrary, due
process merely requires that the condition be sufficiently clear to “give the person of
ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited so that he may
act accordingly.” Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). Read in a
commonsense manner, the language of the condition provided Kennedy with sufficient
notice that his possession of sexually explicit material, whether visual or textual, was
prohibited. The condition, as applied in this case, is not unconstitutionally vague.
Admission of Evidence
Kennedy asserts the district court admitted and relied on improper and undisclosed
evidence at the revocation hearing. Specifically, he objects to the testimony of his
therapist, Darian Rohr, who testified that while Kennedy showed up for his weekly group
therapy sessions as required, he did not satisfactorily participate in the group discussions
and disclosed his possession of sexually explicit stories only after he was required to take
a polygraph examination. She further testified that Kennedy participated very minimally
in his therapy once his conduct was reported to his probation officer. Kennedy’s counsel
objected to this testimony claiming it had not been disclosed to him prior to the
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revocation hearing. The district court overruled the objection.1 Kennedy asserts his due
process rights were violated by admission of the previously undisclosed evidence.
A defendant facing a possible revocation of supervised release is entitled to certain
minimum due process protections. United States v. Copeland, 20 F.3d 412, 414 (11th
Cir. 1994); United States v. Copley, 978 F.2d 829, 831 (4th Cir. 1992); cf. Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 782 (1973) (probation revocation); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408
U.S. 471, 480-82 (1972) (parole revocation). These minimum protections include: (1)
written notice of the claimed violation; (2) disclosure of the evidence against the
defendant; (3) the opportunity to be heard and present evidence; and (4) the right to cross-
examine adverse witnesses. See Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 489; cf. Fed. R. Crim. P.
32.1(b)(2).
Kennedy had notice of the alleged violations of supervised release and knowledge
of the identity of Ms. Rohr as a witness related to these violations. Both before and
during the hearing, Kennedy moved the district court for a modification of the term of
1
The district judge stated:
Well, again, I don’t think that there would have to be disclosure regarding
this. I would think, given your experience, Mr. Monnat, you would know
that would be one of the issues that I would be interested in since you asked
for in your submissions that if I find that he has violated this condition that I
continue or I fashion a disposition that would allow him to continue with
his treatment. I’m sure you knew that I would be interested to know if he
was making progress in his treatment. So the objection is overruled.
Anyway, I’d ask her that question if Ms. Barnett had not.
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supervised release rather than revocation, based in part on his performance in therapy.
Ms. Rohr’s testimony related directly to Kennedy’s performance in therapy and was thus
relevant to the issues placed before the district court. The government did not elicit the
testimony as evidence of an uncharged violation and the district court did not utilize it in
that manner. Kennedy has demonstrated neither a due process violation nor a violation of
Rule 32.1 as a result of the admission of this testimony.
Revocation and Sentence
Finally, Kennedy claims that the district court abused its discretion in revoking
rather than modifying his term of supervised release and made an unreasonable
sentencing decision by imposing the maximum term of imprisonment. Based on the
violation at issue in this case, the district court had the discretion to revoke Kennedy’s
term of supervised release and impose prison time. 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3); United States
v. Kelley, 359 F.3d 1302, 1304 (10th Cir. 2004). “Because there is no applicable
sentencing guideline for the sentence to be imposed after a violation of supervised
release, our standard of review is ‘plainly unreasonable.’” Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1304(quoting United States v. White, 244 F.3d 1199, 1204 (10th Cir. 2001)). This court will
not reverse a sentence imposed after a violation of supervised release “‘if it can be
determined from the record that the decision was reasoned and reasonable.’” Id.In imposing a sentence, the district court must consider the factors listed in 18
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U.S.C. § 3553(a)2 and state the reasons for its sentence. Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1305. In
addition, it may follow the recommended range of imprisonment set forth in Chapter 7 of
the United States Sentencing Guidelines. Id. (noting that the policy statements found in
chapter 7 of the Sentencing Guidelines Manual are advisory rather than mandatory in
nature).
In this case, the district court considered the factors set forth in § 3553(a) and
stated the reasons for its sentence. The court explained, in part, that Kennedy’s
conviction and initial sentence had not diminished his interest in materials involving
sexually explicit conduct with children. It noted his acknowledgment of his problem to
persons involved in his supervision had been “minimal and perfunctory, at best,” and that
his progress in the sexual offender treatment program had been minimal. Based on the
evidence presented at the revocation hearing as to the nature of the violation and
Kennedy’s progress under the treatment program, we conclude that the district court did
not abuse its discretion in revoking rather than modifying Kennedy’s term of supervised
release nor was its sentencing decision plainly unreasonable.
2
These factors include: 1) the nature and circumstances of the offense; 2) the
history and characteristics of the defendant; 3) the need for the sentence to afford
adequate deterrence to criminal conduct; 4) the need to protect the public from further
crimes of the defendant; 5) the need to provide the defendant with needed training,
medical care, or correctional treatment; and 6) the sentencing range established under the
sentencing guidelines or the policy statements applicable to a violation of supervised
release. Kelley, 359 F.3d at 1305; 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).
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The decision of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Joe Heaton
District Judge
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