Gordon v. Ward ( 2004 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 22 2004
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
JAMES H. GORDON,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 04-6157
v. W. D. of Okla.
RON WARD, Director of the (D.C. No. CV-03-1351-M)
Department of Corrections,
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY *
Before KELLY , HENRY , and TYMKOVICH , Circuit Judges. **
Petitioner-Appellant James Gordon, a state prisoner appearing pro se, filed
a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in the district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254 (2000). Upon the magistrate judge’s recommendation, the district court
denied Gordon’s petition. The district court also denied Gordon a certificate of
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders; nevertheless, an order may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
appealability (COA). See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1) (2000) (providing that a
petitioner may not appeal the denial of habeas corpus relief from a state detention
unless he first obtains a COA). Gordon now seeks to appeal the district court’s
ruling. For the reasons that follow, we deny Gordon’s COA and dismiss the
appeal.
Background
An Oklahoma state court convicted Gordon of larceny of merchandise from
a retailer in violation of Okla. Stat. tit. 21, § 1731 (1993). Gordon appealed the
conviction and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed.
Subsequently, the state district court denied post-conviction relief and the OCCA
upheld the ruling.
Thereafter Gordon filed the instant § 2254 petition in federal district court.
In the district court, Gordon claimed: (1) the state trial court erroneously
instructed the jury on flight; (2) the prosecutor impermissibly used a peremptory
challenge on the basis of race; and (3) the trial and appellate attorneys provided
ineffective assistance of counsel. After adopting the Report and Recommendation
of the magistrate judge and rejecting additional grounds put forward by Gordon to
support his ineffective assistance of trial counsel claim, the district court denied
the petition.
Discussion
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On appeal and in his application for a COA from us, Gordon now asserts
for the first time that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and
that he was denied a fair trial because of comments made by the prosecutor. In
addition, Gordon asserts that the district court applied the wrong law and
incorrectly determined the facts in rejecting his ineffective assistance of counsel
claims. 1
The Insufficient Evidence Claim
Gordon’s first claim is that there was insufficient evidence to support his
conviction based on the value attributed by the trial court to the items he stole.
More particularly, Gordon claims that he was convicted of stealing a comforter
that the testifying Loss-Prevention Officer, Sara Holley, valued at $145, that
Gordon testified that the comforter was valued at $29.99 in the J.C. Penney
catalog prior to the theft, and that aside from the testimony of Holley, there was
no evidence presented at trial that the value of the comforter was $145.
Generally, a federal appellate court does not consider an issue not raised in
the lower court. See Hill v. Kansas Gas Serv. Co. , 323 F.3d 858, 866 (10th Cir.
2003) (“[A]bsent extraordinary circumstances, we do not consider arguments
raised for the first time on appeal.”) (citation omitted). Gordon did not raise his
1
Gordon does not appeal the district court’s determination with respect to
his jury instruction and peremptory challenge claims.
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sufficiency of the evidence claim before the district court, nor did he do so in
front of the Oklahoma state courts. Furthermore, he offers no explanation for his
failure to do so. As a result, we decline to reach the merits of the claim. 2
The Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim
Gordon also argues for the first time on appeal that he was denied the right
to a fair trial when the prosecutor “commented about ‘reasonable doubt’
compared to ‘beyond a shadow of a doubt,’ and other improper comments.”
Though Gordon asserted before the district court that the prosecutor behaved
impermissibly in allegedly excluding a potential juror based on race, Gordon did
not argue that the prosecutor’s comments during trial were constitutionally
deficient. Gordon has made no attempt to justify not addressing this argument to
the district court. Therefore we decline to reach the merits of the claim.
The Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims
Gordon alleges that the district court erred in denying his ineffective
assistance of trial and appellate counsel claims. Gordon is entitled to a COA on
these claims only upon making a substantial showing of the denial of a
2
In addition, we note that Gordon’s assertion contradicts the trial record in
several respects. First, the jury convicted Gordon of larceny with regard to two
dresses, not a comforter. Second, Holley testified that each dress was valued at
$134. Third, Gordon did not testify at trial as to any value reflected in a catalog,
nor did his attorney offer any evidence as to value. Indeed, Gordon did not testify
at all.
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constitutional right. See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (2000). Gordon can make such a
showing by demonstrating that the issues he seeks to raise are deserving of further
proceedings, debatable among jurists of reason, or subject to different resolution
on appeal. See Slack v. McDaniel , 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000). “Where a district
court has rejected the constitutional claims on the merits, . . . [t]he petitioner must
demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of
the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id.Gordon has failed to meet this standard for several reasons. Initially,
Gordon’s application for a COA and brief contain nothing more than conclusory
allegations that the district court erred in evaluating his ineffective assistance
claims. Gordon asserts such error, states that the district court applied the
incorrect law and erred in deciding the facts, and provides a citation to Strickland
v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Though recognizing that we must liberally
construe Gordon’s pro se petition, “we are not required to fashion [Gordon’s]
arguments for him where his allegations are merely conclusory in nature and
without supporting factual averments.” U.S. v. Fisher , 38 F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th
Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). Gordon’s application for COA and brief provide no
basis for determining what he finds objectionable about the district court’s
determinations as to the matters in question. Therefore, we find the statements
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contained in these filings insufficient to constitute a substantial showing of the
denial of a constitutional right.
Furthermore, with respect to Gordon’s assertion that his trial counsel
performed ineffectively, we are not persuaded by Gordon’s argument to the
district court that the court’s determination of this issue is debatable. Gordon
asserted that his attorney failed to present evidence that his codefendant, James
Mann, acted alone in the larceny. Adopting the magistrate judge’s
recommendation on the issue, the district court found that Gordon failed to
establish the prejudice prong of the two-part deficient performance and prejudice
test established by Strickland. See 466 U.S. at 687. More particularly, the
district court found that: (1) Gordon’s trial counsel did argue that Mann acted
alone; (2) a notarized statement authored by Mann and eventually submitted to the
district court, which supposedly exonerated Gordon, in fact suggested that the two
men worked together in the larceny; and (3) Mann’s guilty plea implicating
Gordon in the larceny could have been used to impeach Mann had he taken the
stand and testified that Gordon was not involved.
Gordon also argued that trial counsel’s performance was defective for
failure to make a prima facie showing that the prosecutor exercised his
peremptory challenge based on a prospective juror’s race. The district court
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found Gordon’s conclusory allegations with respect to this claim insufficient to
meet his burden under Strickland. See 466 U.S. at 689-90.
As Gordon offers no substantive argument as to why these otherwise
permissible findings of the district court are either erroneous or debatable, we
find Gordon has not made a sufficient showing to justify granting a COA.
Finally, regarding Gordon’s claim to the district court that his appellate
counsel was ineffective, we are similarly convinced that the conclusion reached is
not debatable. Gordon argued to the district court that his appellate counsel was
ineffective because he did not assert that Gordon’s trial counsel was himself
ineffective for failing to present evidence that Mann worked alone. The district
court correctly recognized that where an ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claim is without merit, appellate counsel’s failure to raise trial counsel’s
performance does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. See Miller v.
Mullin , 354 F.3d 1288, 1299 (10th Cir. 2004). Having found satisfactory the
district court’s determination that Gordon’s trial counsel was not ineffective, we
also conclude that the court’s finding that appellate counsel was not defective for
failing to raise trial counsel’s performance is not debatable.
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY COA and DISMISS the case.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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