Tom v. Barnhart , 147 F. App'x 791 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 9, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
CLAUDIA L. TOM,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 04-7117
(D.C. No. 04-CV-57-S)
JO ANNE B. BARNHART, (E. D. Okla.)
Commissioner, Social Security
Administration,
Defendant - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, KELLY, and MURPHY Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Claudia Tom appeals the district court’s affirmance of a decision by the
Social Security Administration’s Commissioner that denied Tom disability
insurance benefits and supplemental security income benefits at step four of the
five-step sequential evaluation process. Tom argues that the administrative law
judge (ALJ) (1) disregarded a treating physician’s opinion; (2) failed to
adequately develop the administrative record; and (3) made an unsupported
credibility determination. We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), and we affirm.
I. T HE T REATING P HYSICIAN R ULE
An ALJ is not required to give a treating physician’s opinion controlling
weight if the opinion is not “‘well-supported by medically acceptable clinical and
laboratory diagnostic techniques’” or “consistent with other substantial evidence
in the record.” Watkins v. Barnhart , 350 F.3d 1297, 1300 (10th Cir. 2003)
(quoting SSR 96-2p, 1996 WL 374188, at *2). But even if a treating physician’s
opinion is not entitled to controlling weight, it is still entitled to deference and
must be weighed in light of the following factors:
“(1) the length of the treatment relationship and the frequency of
examination; (2) the nature and extent of the treatment relationship,
including the treatment provided and the kind of examination or
testing performed; (3) the degree to which the physician’s opinion is
supported by relevant evidence; (4) consistency between the opinion
and the record as a whole; (5) whether or not the physician is a
specialist in the area upon which an opinion is rendered; and (6)
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other factors brought to the ALJ’s attention which tend to support or
contradict the opinion.”
Branum v. Barnhart , 385 F.3d 1268, 1275 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting Watkins ,
350 F.3d at 1301); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(d), 416.927(d).
Tom argues that the ALJ disregarded the medical source statement of
treating physician Victoria Pardue, D.O. Specifically, Tom challenges the ALJ’s
reliance on a consulting physician’s opinion and contests the ALJ’s
determinations that Dr. Pardue has not provided much treatment for Tom’s back
and lower extremity pain, that Dr. Pardue’s medical source statement was
inconsistent with the other medical evidence and Tom’s pre-operative activities,
and that Dr. Pardue may have responded sympathetically to Tom’s statement that
she was “considering working on getting her disability,” Aplt. App. at 189. Tom
also contends that the ALJ neither acknowledged Dr. Pardue’s comments on the
medical source statement form nor articulated the weight he afforded Dr. Pardue’s
opinion after finding it non-controlling. Finally, Tom contends that her
post-surgery back pain complaints demonstrate that the laminectomy/discectomy
performed by orthopedic specialist S. Drew Temple, M.D., failed to resolve her
back problems.
We conclude that the ALJ did not err in rejecting Dr. Pardue’s opinion as
controlling. The limitations opined by Dr. Pardue are neither supported by
diagnostic techniques nor consistent with the substantial evidence in the record.
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Further, the ALJ’s reasons for not giving Dr. Pardue’s opinion “as much weight
as the other evidence of record,” Aplt. App. at 26, are in accordance with the
medical-opinion evaluation factors described in Branum . We do note, however,
that the ALJ improperly questioned Dr. Pardue’s impartiality. See Frey v. Bowen ,
816 F.2d 508, 515 (10th Cir. 1987) (stating that a physician’s tendency to
advocate a patient’s cause is generally an insufficient reason to reject that
physician’s medical opinion). Nevertheless, that error is not fatal to the ALJ’s
ultimate discounting of Dr. Pardue’s opinion, given that the ALJ articulated other
legitimate reasons to discount Dr. Pardue’s opinion.
II. THE A DMINISTRATIVE R ECORD
Tom argues that the ALJ should have ordered a consultative examination to
assess her post-surgery limitations. Specifically, Tom asserts that there is no
evidence to support the ALJ’s findings that Tom’s surgery was successful and
involved a short convalescence. We disagree.
An ALJ has the duty to “order a consultative exam when evidence in the
record establishes the reasonable possibility of the existence of a disability and
the result of the consultative exam could reasonably be expected to be of material
assistance in resolving the issue of disability.” Hawkins v. Chater , 113 F.3d
1162, 1169 (10th Cir. 1997). But when, as here, the social security claimant is
represented at the hearing by counsel who fails to request a consultative exam, the
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ALJ’s duty is triggered only when the need for a consultative exam is “ clearly
established in the record.” Id. at 1168 (emphasis added). Although a
post-surgery consultative examination might have been helpful to test the
continuing validity of Dr. Temple’s post-operative observation that Tom was “just
doing wonderfully,” we cannot conclude that the record “clearly” establishes the
need for another consultative examination, Hawkins , 113 F.3d at 1168; cf.
Howard v. Barnhart , 379 F.3d 945, 949 (10th Cir. 2004) (concluding that the
passage of time between the consultative examination and the disability hearing
did not warrant another consultative exam to assess the claimant’s continuing
chest pain, because there was evidence that the pain was not disabling).
III. C REDIBILITY
Finally, Tom argues that the ALJ erred in finding that Tom’s “allegations
regarding her limitations are not totally credible,” Aplt. App. at 30. Credibility
determinations are peculiarly within the province of the fact-finder and will not
be disturbed when closely and affirmatively linked to substantial evidence.
Hackett v. Barnhart , 395 F.3d 1168, 1173 (10th Cir. 2005). Substantial evidence
is “more than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance,” Sorenson v. Bowen ,
888 F.2d 706, 710 (10th Cir. 1989), and is established by “such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Soliz v.
Chater , 82 F.3d 373, 375 (10th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted) . We
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conclude that the ALJ’s credibility determination is legally sound and supported
by substantial evidence. See Kepler v. Chater , 68 F.3d 387, 391 (10th Cir. 1995)
(discussing the process for determining whether subjective complaints are
credible).
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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