Williams v. Potter ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
September 29, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
KATHY V. WILLIAMS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 04-3358
v. (D.C. No. 02-CV-2568-KHV)
(D. Kan.)
JOHN E. POTTER, Postmaster
General, United States Postal Service,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before O’BRIEN , HOLLOWAY , and BALDOCK , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Kathy V. Williams appeals from a grant of summary judgment in favor of
the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (USPS), her employer.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Williams alleges that the USPS discriminated against her on the bases of race,
sex, religion, and disability and retaliated against her for protected activity, in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Vocational
Rehabilitation Act of 1973. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Williams, an African-American woman, has been an employee of the USPS
since 1987. In the present lawsuit, she claims discrimination by rejection for the
Associate Supervisor Program, lack of consideration for promotions to Supervisor
of Customer Services in two locations, denial of her bids on the positions of Clerk
Stenographer and Air Records Processor, and unfair imposition of mandatory
leave until her physician eased her work restrictions. She also makes general
allegations of discriminatory and retaliatory activity resulting in harassment and
unfounded disciplinary action.
On the Postmaster’s first motion for summary judgment, the district court
dismissed all but Williams’ race and sex claims. During a motions hearing, the
court invited the Postmaster to file a second motion on the remaining claims. It
then denied Williams’ motion to reconsider the initial entry of summary judgment,
granted the Postmaster’s second motion for summary judgment, and entered
judgment on the entire case. This appeal followed.
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II. DISCUSSION
Because Williams is representing herself in this appeal, we must construe
her brief liberally. See Cannon v. Mullin , 383 F.3d 1152, 1160 (10th Cir. 2004),
cert. denied , 125 S. Ct. 1664 (2005). Her first argument seems to be that she was
denied due process of law by operation of the district court’s administrative
procedural rule generally prohibiting pro se litigants from filing their submissions
electronically. D. Kan. Admin. P. for Filing, Signing, & Verifying Pleadings &
Papers by Elec. Means in Civ. Cases, § I(A)(2). Parties proceeding pro se are
directed to file paper originals, which the clerk’s office scans into the Electronic
Filing System and maintains in a paper file. Id. at § III(B).
Williams alleges that certain exhibits attached to her response to the
Postmaster’s motion for summary judgment and to her motion for reconsideration
were missing from the Electronic Filing System. Pyramiding on this allegation,
she speculates that the district court failed to consider these documents. The
docket, however, reflects that the documents submitted by Williams were filed
and made electronically accessible, except exhibits accompanying her motion for
reconsideration. These documents were filed as part of the district court record,
in accord with the administrative rule allowing the conventional filing of exhibits
“that are not available in electronic form or that are too lengthy to electronically
image, i.e., ‘scan.’” Id. at § IV(C). It is apparent that the district court had
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ready access to all of Williams’ filings. 1
There is no factual basis for a due-
process contention. As a result, the district court did not err in denying Williams’
motion for postjudgment relief.
Williams also mounts an attack on the content of the district court’s
summary-judgment orders. We review de novo a district court’s grant of
summary judgment. Simms v. Okla. ex rel. Dep’t of Mental Health & Substance
Abuse Servs ., 165 F.3d 1321, 1326 (10th Cir. 1999). Summary judgment is
appropriate if there are no genuine issues of material fact and the movant is
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. “A disputed fact is ‘material’ if it
might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law, and the dispute is
‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for
the nonmoving party.” Allen v. Muskogee, Okla. , 119 F.3d 837, 839 (10th Cir.
1997). Unsupported conclusory allegations, however, do not create an issue of
fact. See Salehpoor v. Shahinpoor , 358 F.3d 782, 789 (10th Cir.), cert. denied ,
125 S.Ct. 47 (2004).
1
We note that the appellate paper record includes all exhibits filed by
Williams. See 10th Cir. R. 30.3 (exempting a pro se appellant from appendix
requirements and permitting a pro se appellant to proceed on the record on
appeal).
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To survive summary judgment on her Title VII claims, Williams relies on
the burden-shifting framework established by the Supreme Court in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792 (1973). As we have explained:
McDonnell Douglas first requires the aggrieved employee to
establish a prima facie case of prohibited employment action. . . . If
the employee makes a prima facie showing, the burden shifts to the
defendant employer to state a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
for its adverse employment action. If the employer meets this
burden, then summary judgment is warranted unless the employee
can show there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the
proffered reasons are pretextual.
Plotke v. White , 405 F.3d 1092, 1099 (10th Cir. 2005) (citations and quotations
omitted). Using the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the district court carefully
sorted through Williams’ discrimination claims. It determined that Williams
failed to demonstrate her prima facie case for most of these claims and, in
instances which she did, she did not establish pretext. In making its ruling, the
court informed Williams that her unsupported accusations of perjury and
misrepresentation were an insufficient showing of pretext. We agree with the
district court and affirm the entry of summary judgment on Williams’ Title VII
claims.
Williams’ claim under the Rehabilitation Act is based on the Postmaster’s
failure to provide light-duty work to accommodate her lifting restriction from
September 1998 through January 1999. To determine whether an individual is
disabled under the Act, a court examines the nature and severity of the
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impairment, along with the expected duration of the impairment and the
permanent or expected long-term impact of the impairment. Doebele v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 342 F.3d 1117, 1130 (10th Cir. 2003) (discussing the
Americans with Disabilities Act, which defines “disability” in the same way as
the Rehabilitation Act, see Nielsen v. Moroni Feed Co ., 162 F.3d 604, 608 n.7
(10th Cir. 1998)).
Williams argues that the district court erred in concluding that she did not
have a disability as defined by the Rehabilitation Act and that the Postmaster
considered her as having a permanent disability. To the contrary, the district
court correctly determined that Williams’ four-month restriction was of
insufficient duration to qualify as a disability under the Act. Furthermore, the
record demonstrates that the Postmaster did not consider Williams to be
permanently disabled. Accordingly, Williams failed to establish a prima facie
case under the Act, and summary judgment in the Postmaster’s favor was the
appropriate disposition of her claim.
III. CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED for substantially the
reasons stated in the district court’s orders of May 5, 2004 and August 19, 2004.
As for Williams’ “Motion[] to Compel Delivery, Extend Appellant’s Time for
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Filing, for Appellee Sanction and Finding in Favor of Appellant,” her motion
already has been granted to the extent it asks for leave to file a reply brief. The
remainder of the motion is denied as moot. The mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
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