United States v. Standridge ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
October 18, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 04-5066
v. (D.C. No. 03-CR-67-K)
WESLEY DEAN STANDRIDGE, (N.D. Okla.)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f). The case is therefore submitted without
oral argument.
Defendant pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and to possessing an unregistered firearm in
violation of 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d). The district court then sentenced Defendant to
thirty-eight months’ imprisonment.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Initially, Defendant appealed his conviction to this court on Fourth
Amendment grounds. We previously affirmed the district court’s judgment and
sentence on that issue. United States v. Standridge, No. 04-5066, 2004 WL
2944161, at *3 (10th Cir. Dec. 21, 2004). Subsequently, Defendant petitioned the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. After granting Defendant’s
cert petition, the Supreme Court vacated the judgment and remanded the case to
this court for further consideration in light of its holding in United States v.
Booker, __U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. 738 (2005) (holding that the mandatory application
of the United States Sentencing Guidelines violates a Defendant’s Sixth
Amendment rights). Standridge v. United States, __U.S.__, 125 S. Ct. 1962(2005).
Consistent with the directive given to us by the Supreme Court, we ordered
supplemental briefing from the parties regarding sentencing. In his supplemental
brief, Defendant challenges his sentence as being imposed in violation of his
constitutional rights, as articulated in Booker. Because Defendant did not raise
this issue to the district court, we review for plain error. United States v.
Gonzalez-Huerta, 403 F.3d 727, 732 (10th Cir. 2005) (en banc) (citations
omitted). Under that standard, we will only reverse Defendant’s sentence if
Defendant can prove that the sentence imposed was (1) error, (2) which is plain,
(3) which affects his substantial rights, “and which (4) seriously affects the
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fairness, integrity or public reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (quotation
omitted).
We have recognized two types of Booker errors–constitutional and non-
constitutional. Id. at 731-32. In this appeal, Defendant claims that the district
court committed non-constitutional error when it applied the United States
Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in a mandatory fashion at sentencing.
We agree with the parties that the district court’s mandatory application of
the Guidelines was plain error, thereby satisfying the first two prongs of
plain-error review. See id. We must therefore consider whether Defendant has
satisfied the third and/or fourth prongs of plain-error review.
In this case, the district court, after reviewing the presentence report and
applying the Guidelines enhancement, determined that Defendant’s Guidelines
imprisonment range was from thirty-seven to forty-six months. After making this
determination, the sentencing court decided to impose a sentence of thirty-eight
months, “between the low end and the middle” of the Guidelines range. Supp.
Rec., Vol. 1, Sent. Tr. at 5. Based on this sentence, there is no reason to believe
that the district court would have imposed a less severe sentence with its new
post-Booker discretion. See United States v. Riccardi, 405 F.3d 852, 876 (10th
Cir. 2005) (denying defendant relief even when applying the less rigorous
harmless error test). The fact that the district court judge did not impose a
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sentence at the bottom of the Guidelines range indicates that there is no
reasonable probability that the court would reduce Defendant’s sentence on
remand post-Booker. See id. (“Having exercised his limited discretion under the
pre-Booker system to give [Defendant] the highest permissible sentence, there is
no reason to think the judge would exercise his now-greater discretion to reduce
the sentence.”) (citation omitted). Also, there are no remarks in the record which
demonstrate that the thirty-eight-month sentence was inappropriate in light of all
the circumstances. See id. Thus, Defendant fails to satisfy the third prong of the
plain error test. Having determined as much, we need not address whether
Defendant meets the fourth prong of the plain error test. See United States v.
Dowlin, 408 F.3d 647, 671 (10th Cir. 2005) (explaining that a party’s failure to
meet one prong of the test is a sufficient reason not to notice plain error).
Accordingly, even though Defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation
of the Sixth Amendment standards set forth in Booker, the error did not violate
Defendant’s substantial rights and must be disregarded. We AFFIRM
Defendant’s sentence and REINSTATE all non-sentencing portions of our
previous opinion.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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