United States v. Wiens ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 1, 2005
TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee, No. 05-3109
v. D. Kansas
DAVID K. WIENS, (D.C. No. 03-10187-01 JTM)
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, Chief Circuit Judge, ANDERSON and HARTZ, Circuit Judges.
On April 13, 2004, David Wiens pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to
manufacture the controlled substances psilocin and psilocybin. See 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). The presentence report (PSR) computed a guidelines sentencing
range of 41-51 months. On July 15, 2004, Mr. Wiens filed objections to the PSR,
arguing that under Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004), his sentence
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of orders and
judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the terms and
conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
could not be enhanced using facts (the quantity of drugs and his position in the
criminal hierarchy) not charged in the indictment or admitted when he entered his
plea. Without those facts, the resulting guidelines range was zero to six months.
Before Mr. Wiens was sentenced, however, United States v. Booker, 125
S. Ct. 738 (2005), was decided. Relying on due process and ex post facto
doctrine, Mr. Wiens then filed a memorandum contending that because his crime
occurred before Booker was decided, he could not be sentenced to more than the
guidelines range based on admitted facts. The district court rejected the
argument, considered the guidelines and the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a), and sentenced Mr. Wiens to 24 months’ imprisonment.
On appeal Mr. Wiens again argues that the retroactive application of the
remedial portion of Booker to his sentencing violated the Due Process Clause.
See Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 191-92 (1977) (Due Process Clause
protects against judicial infringement of the interests served by Ex Post Facto
Clause). His argument is answered by this court’s recent decision in United
States v. Rines, 419 F.3d 1104 (10th Cir. 2005), in which we rejected the same
argument. Noting that the Booker remedial majority explicitly instructed that its
holding be applied to “‘all cases on direct review[,]’ [w]e decline[d] Defendant’s
invitation to hold that the Supreme Court ordered us to violate the Constitution.”
Id. at 1106 (quoting Booker, 125 S. Ct. at 769). We also noted that “Defendant
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was not deprived of constitutionally required notice” because “[t]he only
difference between the Booker regime under which his sentence is determined and
the regime he would have anticipated at the time of his offense is that the
guidelines are not mandatory.” Id. at 1107. Because the defendant “was
sentenced within the guidelines range, . . . he cannot complain of any
unanticipated harshness.” Id. Mr. Wiens has actually been the beneficiary of
unanticipated leniency. At the time his crime was committed, neither Blakely nor
Booker had been decided, and, as set forth in the PSR, the guidelines called for a
sentencing range of 41-51 months, about twice his actual sentence.
We AFFIRM the judgment below.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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