Hendricks v. Oklahoma Production Center Group Homes, Inc. , 159 F. App'x 875 ( 2005 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 21, 2005
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clerk of Court
BETTY HENDRICKS, individually
and standing in the stead of other
persons similarly situated; KAREN
KIDD, individually and standing in the
stead of other persons similarly No. 05-7021
situated; KATHERINE (D.C. No. CIV-03-521-P)
SUMMERLIN-PHILLIPS, individually (E.D. Okla.)
and standing in the stead of other
persons similarly situated;
AMANDA DREADFULWATER,
individually and standing in the stead
of other persons similarly situated;
LAURA BRODERICK, individually
and standing in the stead of other
persons similarly situated;
CHARLENE JACKSON, individually
and standing in the stead of other
persons similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
OKLAHOMA PRODUCTION
CENTER GROUP HOMES,
INCORPORATED; EFFIE FOSTER,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
(continued...)
Before KELLY, McKAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
Plaintiffs appeal from the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of defendants on their claims for unpaid wages, including “sleep time”
compensation, and liquidated damages sought pursuant to the Fair Labor
Standards Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (FLSA) and the Portal-to-Portal Pay Act,
29 U.S.C. §§ 251-262 (PPPA). We take jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm.
We review de novo the district court’s summary-judgment order. Braziel v.
Tobosa Dev. Servs., 166 F.3d 1061, 1062 (10th Cir. 1999). “Where there are no
genuine issues of material fact in dispute, we examine the appropriate legal
standards to determine whether the moving party is entitled to summary judgment
as a matter of law.” Id. Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was precluded
*
(...continued)
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
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by the existence of disputed material facts. Our review of the record reveals,
however, that the operative facts are undisputed.
Defendants are a nonprofit corporation and its director who provided
services to developmentally disabled individuals, including residential placement
in group homes. Plaintiffs were employed by defendants to work in the homes as
home managers, working shifts covering several days at a time. While on duty,
plaintiffs were required to sleep in group homes, but they had time off each day
during which they could leave the group homes and spend the time as they
wished. If a plaintiff’s sleep was interrupted by a call to duty, she was paid for
that time, and if her duties prevented her from getting at least five hours’ sleep on
a given night, she was paid for the entire eight-hour sleep period. Each of the
group homes had a furnished private bedroom and bathroom for the home
manager on duty.
At the time each plaintiff was hired, she understood and agreed that she
would not be paid for up to eight hours per night while working as a group home
manager. Each signed a Wage/Training Agreement in which she agreed that
residential staff would not be compensated for sleep time up to eight hours a
night. Moreover, at the time of hire, each understood that defendants’ policy and
practice was that sleep time was not compensated. Several plaintiffs later
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complained about this policy, but none filed a grievance or other written
complaint with the management.
“Regulations promulgated pursuant to the FLSA provide that, absent an
express or implied agreement to the contrary, sleep time . . . constitute[s] hours
worked.” Braziel, 166 F.3d at 1063. Under the regulations, if an employee is on
duty for twenty-four hours or more, “the employer and the employee may agree to
exclude . . . a bona fide regularly scheduled sleeping period of not more than 8
hours from hours worked, provided adequate sleeping facilities are furnished by
the employer and the employee can usually enjoy an uninterrupted night’s sleep,”
and interruptions to sleep are paid. 29 C.F.R. § 785.22. Also, an employee who
resides on her employer’s premises permanently or “for extended periods of time”
is not considered to be working all the time she is on the premises, and “any
reasonable agreement of the parties which takes into consideration all of the
pertinent facts will be accepted.” Id. § 785.23.
Plaintiffs maintain that their work and sleep schedules, as well as their
sleeping accommodations at the group homes, did not meet the requirements of
the regulations permitting the exclusion of sleep time. They also argue that the
written Wage/Training Agreement exempting sleep time is not enforceable.
Plaintiffs appear to claim further that their work situation was controlled by
an “enforcement policy” promulgated by the Department of Labor. See Hours
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Worked in Residential Care (Group Home) Establishments – Sleep Time and
Related Issues – Enforcement Policy, 1998 WL 614199, Dep’t of Labor, Wage
and Hour Div. (June 30, 1988) (1988 Policy). But they did not present this
argument to the district court, arguing instead that the regulations, 29 C.F.R.
§§ 785.21 through 785.23, should not apply to them. An appellate court generally
“does not consider an issue not passed upon below.” Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S.
106, 120 (1976). Included among the issues not passed upon below is the
“situation where a litigant changes to a new theory on appeal that falls under the
same general category as an argument presented [to the trial court].” Lyons v.
Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 722 (10th Cir. 1993). Even if plaintiffs’
appellate argument could be considered related to their trial theory, “we have
consistently turned down the argument that the raising of a related theory was
sufficient.” Tele-Communications, Inc. v. CIR, 104 F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir.
1997) (quotation omitted). Accordingly, we do not address plaintiffs’ claims
based on the 1988 Policy.
Turning to the issues properly before us, we conclude that the facts, issues,
and holding in the Braziel case are sufficiently similar to be dispositive of this
appeal. There, as here, “[w]hether analyzed under § 785.22 as to work shifts
greater than twenty-four hours or under § 785.23 as to overnight work shifts less
than twenty-four hours, the key issue in this case is whether an agreement existed
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between [plaintiffs and defendants] to exempt scheduled sleep periods from hours
worked.” Braziel, 166 F.3d at 1063. Although plaintiffs challenge defendants’
reliance on the written Wage/Training Agreement in this respect, we need not
decide whether the Agreement alone is binding because we conclude that there
was an implied agreement to exempt sleep time, and the Agreement is evidence of
the parties’ understanding. See Braziel, 166 F.3d at 1063 (recognizing that the
requisite agreement can be implied). The record demonstrates that the plaintiffs
“understood and acquiesced to the policy when they were hired.” 1 Id. The record
further shows that the agreement was made prior to the start of each plaintiffs’
employment, plaintiffs were provided adequate sleeping facilities, and plaintiffs
were paid for interruptions to their sleep. In addition, if their duties prevented
them from getting at least five hours’ sleep, plaintiffs were paid for the entire
period, as required by the applicable regulations. Therefore, we affirm the district
court’s ruling that the agreement was enforceable.
Because we affirm the district court’s conclusion that the defendants did
not withhold wages in violation of the FLSA or the PPPA, we need not address
their claim that defendants recklessly disregarded their obligation to pay them for
1
We recognize that plaintiff Jackson stated that she was left with the
impression that the group home she expected to be assigned to did pay for sleep
time, which was an exception to the general policy. Aplt. App. Vol. III, Tab 27.
Nevertheless, she understood the general policy and acquiesced to it.
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sleep time or their argument that defendants were not entitled to a good-faith
defense.
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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