Ford v. Dowling ( 2023 )


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  • Appellate Case: 22-6138     Document: 010110832874       Date Filed: 03/27/2023     Page: 1
    FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                          Tenth Circuit
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                           March 27, 2023
    _________________________________
    Christopher M. Wolpert
    Clerk of Court
    MARCUS D. FORD,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    v.                                                          No. 22-6138
    (D.C. No. 5:22-CV-00341-HE)
    JANET DOWLING,                                              (W.D. Okla.)
    Respondent - Appellee.
    _________________________________
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
    _________________________________
    Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
    _________________________________
    Marcus D. Ford appeals pro se1 from the dismissal of his 
    28 U.S.C. § 2254
    habeas application. The district court dismissed the application as untimely but
    granted a certificate of appealability (COA). Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. §§ 1291
     and 2253, we affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent,
    except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It
    may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
    and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    1
    We liberally construe Ford’s pro se pleadings but do not advocate on his
    behalf. See Childers v. Crow, 
    1 F.4th 792
    , 798 n.3 (10th Cir. 2021), cert. denied,
    
    142 S. Ct. 2718 (2022)
    .
    Appellate Case: 22-6138    Document: 010110832874        Date Filed: 03/27/2023    Page: 2
    I
    In 1998, Ford pleaded guilty in an Oklahoma court to first-degree murder and
    larceny of a motor vehicle. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of life in prison
    without the possibility of parole and twenty years, respectively, and did not appeal.2
    Twenty-two years later, on July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court held in McGirt v.
    Oklahoma, 
    140 S. Ct. 2452
    , 2459-60, 2482 (2020), that Congress did not disestablish
    the lands in Oklahoma reserved for the Creek Nation and those lands remain Indian
    country for purposes of exclusive federal jurisdiction under the Federal Major Crimes
    Act, 
    18 U.S.C. § 1153
    (a). Based on McGirt, Ford sought postconviction relief in
    state court, arguing that Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him. The state
    district court denied postconviction relief, and the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
    Appeals (OCCA) affirmed. The OCCA relied on its decision in State ex rel. Matloff
    v. Wallace, which held that McGirt announced a new procedural rule that does not
    operate retroactively to invalidate state convictions that were final before McGirt, see
    
    497 P.3d 686
    , 688 (Okla. Crim. App.), cert. denied sub nom. Parish v. Oklahoma,
    
    142 S. Ct. 757 (2022)
    .
    Ford then filed his § 2254 application and a brief in support, claiming that,
    under McGirt, Oklahoma lacked jurisdiction to prosecute him because his crimes
    occurred in Indian country and he is partly Native American. See R. at 8, 45, 51.
    2
    We take judicial notice of documents from Ford’s state postconviction
    proceedings. See Pacheco v. El Habti, ___ F.4th ___, 
    2023 WL 2576457
    , at *2 n.2
    (10th Cir. 2022).
    2
    Appellate Case: 22-6138    Document: 010110832874          Date Filed: 03/27/2023   Page: 3
    A magistrate judge recommended that the § 2254 application be dismissed as
    untimely, reasoning that it was not filed within one year of the date on which his
    convictions became final and McGirt did not extend the limitations period.3 The
    district court adopted the recommendation, dismissed the application, and granted
    a COA.
    II
    We review de novo the district court’s dismissal based on timeliness, see
    Serrano v. Williams, 
    383 F.3d 1181
    , 1184 (10th Cir. 2004), and consider only those
    arguments that Ford has adequately presented in his opening brief, see Fairchild v.
    Trammell, 
    784 F.3d 702
    , 723-24 (10th Cir. 2015).
    Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(1), Ford had one year to file his § 2254
    application, “run[ning] from the latest of” four dates:
    (A)    the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of
    direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such
    review;
    (B)    the date on which the impediment to filing an application created
    by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the
    United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from
    filing by such State action;
    3
    The magistrate judge also determined: 1) the limitations period should not be
    tolled during the pendency of Ford’s state postconviction proceedings, see 
    28 U.S.C. § 2244
    (d)(2); 2) there was no basis for equitable tolling; and 3) Ford offered no
    allegations or evidence that he was actually innocent. Ford did not raise these issues
    in his § 2254 application, nor did he address them in his objections to the magistrate
    judge’s report and recommendation. Moreover, he does not address them in his
    opening brief on appeal, and therefore, we do not consider them. See Fairchild v.
    Trammell, 
    784 F.3d 702
    , 723-24 (10th Cir. 2015) (recognizing inadequate briefing
    can result in waiver).
    3
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    (C)    the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially
    recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly
    recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
    applicable to cases on collateral review; or
    (D)    the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims
    presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due
    diligence.
    
    Id.
     § 2244(d)(1)(A)-(D).
    In adopting the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation, the district
    court determined Ford’s convictions became final on June 1, 1998, and, under
    § 2244(d)(1)(A), the one-year limitations period expired on June 1, 1999. Ford filed
    his § 2254 application almost 23 years later, on April 25, 2022, so it was untimely
    under § 2244(d)(1)(A). The district court also determined that Ford appeared to
    invoke § 2244(d)(1)(C) and (D) but neither subsection applied. Subsection (C) was
    inapplicable, the court ruled, because McGirt did not announce a new constitutional
    rule, and subsection (D) was inapplicable because Ford offered no new,
    undiscoverable factual evidence to support his claim.
    On appeal, most of Ford’s brief maintains that Oklahoma lacked authority to
    prosecute and convict him. But these arguments do not address the district court’s
    grounds for dismissal—that the § 2254 application was untimely. See Nixon v. City
    & Cnty. of Denver, 
    784 F.3d 1364
    , 1366 (10th Cir. 2015) (“The first task of an
    appellant is to tell us why the district court’s decision was wrong. Recitation of a
    tale of apparent injustice may assist in that task, but it cannot substitute for legal
    4
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    argument.”); see also 
    id. at 1369-70
     (affirming dismissal of claims where appellant’s
    arguments failed to explain how the district court erred).
    Ford does suggest, however, that the limitation period should not accrue until
    the date McGirt issued, July 9, 2020. See Aplt. Br. at 2 (“The date of awareness that
    the Judgment was known to all to be void was recent[,] July 9, 2020[,] McGirt vs.
    Oklahoma[].”). To the extent this argument challenges the district court’s ruling that
    the application was untimely under § 2244(d)(1)(C) and (D), the argument fails.
    Section 2244(d)(1)(C) is inapplicable because “McGirt announced no new
    constitutional right. It self-professedly resolved a question of statutory interpretation
    . . . to determine that the federal government . . . has never” disestablished the Creek
    Reservation. Pacheco v. El Habti, ___ F.4th ___, 
    2023 WL 2576457
    , at *8 (10th Cir.
    2022) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, Ford cannot rely on § 2244(d)(1)(C).
    Likewise, § 2244(d)(1)(D) is inapplicable because nothing in McGirt can be
    said to reveal a new factual predicate for Ford’s claim. Notwithstanding Oklahoma’s
    “historical prosecutorial practice of asserting jurisdiction over Indians in state court,
    even for serious crimes on the contested lands,” McGirt, 
    140 S. Ct. at 2470
    , the
    factual basis for Ford’s claim—that Congress did not disestablish the Creek
    Reservation—could have been discovered with due diligence by consulting “Acts of
    Congress,” 
    id. at 2462
    . Indeed, we recognized the factual predicate for the claim in
    2017. See Murphy v. Royal, 
    875 F.3d 896
    , 966 (10th Cir. 2017). And with due
    diligence, Ford might have raised the issue sooner. Cf. Prost v. Anderson, 
    636 F.3d 578
    , 580, 588-89 (10th Cir. 2011) (recognizing nothing prevented a habeas petitioner
    5
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    from raising a question of statutory interpretation before the Supreme Court resolved
    the issue in a different case). Thus, § 2244(d)(1)(D) is unavailing as well.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the district court is affirmed.
    Entered for the Court
    Timothy M. Tymkovich
    Circuit Judge
    6