Akers v. Martin ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 23, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
M ONTG OM ERY CA RL AKERS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 06-3273
KIM I. M ARTIN, Assistant U. S. (D.C. No. 06-CV-3175-SAC)
Attorney, also known as K im Burger, (D. Kansas)
also known as K im Fowler;
JACQUELINE E. ROKUSEK, Defense
Counsel; JAM ES K ESZEI, Special
Agent, Federal Bureau of
Investigation; K A TH RY N H .
VRATIL, U. S. District Judge; ERIC
F. M ELGREN, U. S. Attorney,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before BRISCO E, EBEL, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however,
for its persuasive value consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is,
therefore, ordered submitted without oral argument.
M ontgomery Carl Akers (Akers), a federal prisoner appearing pro se,
appeals the district court’s dismissal of his civil complaint, styled as a 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 action, but construed by the district court as a claim brought pursuant to
Bivens v. Six U nknown N amed A gents, 403 U .S. 388 (1971). W e exercise
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm the dismissal.
Akers’ civil rights action alleges a broad conspiracy to deprive him of
various constitutional rights. He alleges the conspiracy involves a federal district
court judge, federal prosecutors, a federal public defender, and an FBI agent – all
of whom were involved in his then pending federal wire fraud case. Akers sought
relief for alleged constitutional violations in the form of monetary damages and
the cessation of all further proceedings in his criminal case. The district court
construed Akers’ complaint as a Bivens claim, then dismissed it pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
Specifically, insofar as A kers sought injunctive and declaratory relief in
regards to his criminal case, the district court determined that the appropriate
avenue for the remedy sought would be a direct appeal and/or the filing of a post-
conviction petition as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court also
relied on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994) to conclude that the relief he
sought was premature until and unless he could first demonstrate that his
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conviction had been reversed, set aside, or otherwise invalidated. The district
court also held that Akers’ claims against the district court judge and the federal
prosecutors were barred by recognized immunities from suit and that Akers’
allegations were insufficient to defeat these immunities. Last, the district court
determined that permitting Akers to amend his complaint to cure these
deficiencies would be futile.
Akers challenges this dismissal, essentially reasserting those allegations set
forth in his complaint. W e review de novo a dismissal under § 1915A for failure
to state a claim. See M cBride v. Deer, 240 F.3d 1287, 1289 (10th Cir. 2001).
“D ismissal of a pro se complaint for failure to state a claim is proper only where
it is obvious that the plaintiff cannot prevail on the facts he has alleged and it
would be futile to give him an opportunity to amend.” Perkins v. Kansas Dep’t of
Corr., 165 F.3d 803, 806 (10th Cir. 1999). In conducting our review, we construe
the pro se pleadings liberally, applying a less stringent standard than formal
pleadings drafted by lawyers. Garrett v. Selby Connor M addux & Janer,
425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). But “we are not bound by conclusory
allegations, unwarranted inferences, or legal conclusions” contained in those
pleadings. Hackford v. Babbitt, 14 F.3d 1457, 1465 (10th Cir. 1994).
After reviewing the record, we agree with the district court that to the
extent Akers seeks monetary damages, success on the merits of this case would
necessarily imply the invalidity of his criminal conviction. In Heck, 512 U.S. at
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486-87, the United States Supreme Court held that “in order to recover damages
for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm
caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence
invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been
reversed on direct appeal,” or otherwise declared invalid, called into question by
the issuance of a habeas writ, or expunged. See Crow v. Penry, 102 F.3d 1086,
1087 (10th Cir. 1996) (concluding that Heck applies to a Bivens claim). Akers
has failed to allege or show that his conviction has been reversed, declared
invalid, expunged, or called into question. Thus, his claim is premature and he
has failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.
W e also agree with the district court that to the extent Akers seeks to
challenge his criminal conviction and sentence, he may file a direct appeal 1 and/or
seek post-conviction relief as provided by 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See M cIntosh v.
U.S. Parole Com’n, 115 F.3d 809, 811 (10th Cir. 1997) (explaining that a § 2255
proceeding is a collateral attack on the validity of a conviction and sentence).
A nd, as A kers’ complaint contains no other cognizable cause of action, we
conclude that the district court did not err in its dismissal.
1
Akers was eventually convicted of wire fraud in federal district court and his
criminal appeal is currently pending before this court.
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Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court’s dismissal of Akers’ complaint
and DENY Akers’ second motion for appointment of counsel.
Entered for the Court
M ary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
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