Brock v. Presbyterian Healthc ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
March 28, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JOE BROCK, individually and on
behalf of all similarly situated
persons; SA N D RA M C CU LLO UGH,
Plaintiffs,
and No. 06-2192
(D.C. No. CV -99-189 M V/RH S)
V IN CE D IM A RC O, (D . N.M .)
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
PRESBYTERIAN H EALTHCARE
SERVIC ES, IN C.,
Defendant-Appellee.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before L UC ER O, BROR BY, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent w ith Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Vince DiM arco appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in
favor of Presbyterian H ealthcare Services, Inc. DiM arco brought suit against
Presbyterian under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h) of the Federal False Claims Act, alleging
that Presbyterian retaliated against him for reporting its fraudulent activities.
Specifically, DiM arco claimed that Presbyterian provided misleading, defamatory,
and false employment information to a prospective employer, thereby causing him
to lose a job offer. In its summary judgment ruling, the district court held that
DiM arco granted Presbyterian absolute immunity from suit by signing a release
that authorized the disclosure of his employment history. Exercising jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Facts and Proceedings
DiM arco is a physician’s assistant who formerly worked at one of
Presbyterian’s hospitals, Lincoln County M edical Center (LCM C). After learning
that patients at LCM C were being billed for services they did not receive,
DiM arco initiated a qui tam suit and resigned. That suit was eventually settled,
and some three years later, DiM arco obtained a provisional offer of employment
at another hospital, Gerald Champion Regional M edical Center (GCRM C). The
job offer from GCRM C was contingent upon receipt of DiM arco’s employment
history at LCM C. To facilitate the transfer of this information, DiM arco signed
releases authorizing the disclosure of his employment history to GCRM C.
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After receiving DiM arco’s information, GCRM C opted not to hire him. Its
decision was based in part on a form entitled, “Hospital Affiliation Evaluation.”
Aplee. Suppl. App. at 45-46. On this form, Presbyterian disclosed, among other
things, that “[DiM arco] terminated 9/30/00,” failed to “continuously render[] the
level of care established by [LCM C],” and “had to be counseled regarding patient
relations with inadequate improvement.” Id. Asserting that these representations
were false, deliberately misleading, and in retaliation for his filing of the earlier
qui tam suit, DiM arco sought relief under the False Claims Act’s whistleblower
provision, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
The district court rejected DiM arco’s contention, however, ruling that he
consented to Presbyterian’s disclosures by signing a broad Release and Immunity.
The court held that by signing the release, DiM arco extended absolute immunity
to Presbyterian and thereby relinquished his right to sue for retaliation.
Additionally, because the language in the release was clear and unambiguous, the
court declined to consider whether another release signed by DiM arco limited
Presbyterian’s immunity to disclosures made in good faith. Hence, the court
granted summary judgment in favor of Presbyterian.
DiM arco subsequently filed this appeal. First, he claims he intended to
release Presbyterian only for disclosures made in good faith. Second, he argues
the district court improperly cited a case that has been superseded by statute.
Third, he claims Presbyterian violated the implied covenant of good-faith and fair
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dealing. And finally, DiM arco contends Presbyterian possessed at most a
conditional privilege, which it lost by providing false information.
II. Analysis
W e review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo to
determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, view ing the record in
the light most favorable to the non-moving party, DiM arco. Cam pbell v. Gam bro
Healthcare, Inc., ___ F.3d ___, No. 06-3062, 2007 W L 706934, at *4 (10th Cir.
M ar. 9, 2007).
A.
DiM arco first claims the district court erred in concluding that Presbyterian
was absolutely immune from suit. His position is essentially that he did not
intend to be bound by the terms of the Release and Immunity, but rather by the
terms of another release providing for only good-faith disclosures. This
“good-faith” release, DiM arco argues, limited Presbyterian’s immunity to
good-faith disclosures.
Before addressing DiM arco’s contention, however, we first examine New
M exico’s law governing the disclosure of employment information. Courts in
New M exico have established that where an employee consents to the release of
information, a former employer enjoys absolute immunity from suit. Baker v.
Bhajan, 871 P.2d 374, 377-78 (N.M . 1994); Gengler v. Phelps, 589 P.2d 1056,
1057-58 (N.M . Ct. App. 1978). This rule is predicated on the notion that “[i]n the
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business and professional world, public policy necessitates the disclosure of an
employee’s prior services when inquiry is made with the consent of the
employee.” Gengler, 589 P.2d at 1058. By contrast, where an employee has not
consented to the release of his employment information, a former employer has a
qualified privilege to release information “if for a proper purpose and to one
having a legitimate interest in the statements.” Baker, 871 P.2d at 378 (citation
omitted). This qualified privilege attaches “to protect from liability those who,
for the purpose of furthering the interest in question, give information which,
without their knowledge or reckless disregard as to its falsity, is in fact untrue.”
Gengler, 589 P.2d at 1058 (quotation omitted).
Applying these principles to the case before us, we conclude that by
signing the Release and Immunity, DiM arco granted Presbyterian absolute
immunity from suit. The express terms of the release provide, “I extend absolute
immunity to, release from any liability, including civil liability, and agree not to
sue . . . any third parties . . . for any actions, recommendations, reports,
statements[,] communications, or disclosures.” Aplt. App. at 41. It continues, “I
also expressly authorize said third parties to release this information to [GCRM C]
and its authorized representative upon request.” Id. Lastly, the Release and
Immunity defines the term “third parties” to mean “all individuals from whom
information has been requested.” Id. This unambiguous, all-inclusive language
denotes the broad scope of DiM arco’s consent, see Baker, 871 P.2d at 377, and
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clearly manifests his intent to grant absolute immunity to third parties such as
Presbyterian.
Still, DiM arco insists that he intended to release Presbyterian only for
disclosures made in good faith. To substantiate this claim, he offers the
deposition testimony of GCRM C’s medical staff coordinator, Diane M elendrez,
and argues it show s that GCRM C used only the so-called “good-faith” release
when obtaining information from other facilities. W e need not consider this
evidence because the Release and Immunity clearly and unambiguously manifests
his intent. See Montoya v. Villa Linda M all, Ltd., 793 P.2d 258, 259 (N.M . 1990)
(“absent an ambiguity, a court is bound to interpret and enforce a contract’s clear
language”). Nevertheless, our review of this testimony indicates that
M s. M elendrez used the good-faith release interchangeably with the Release and
Immunity for purposes of convenience. Indeed, when asked if only the good-faith
release would be provided to LCM C, M s. M elendrez replied, “It’s just more
convenient for me to have a separate release that [applicants] sign so that I can
just send it instead of having to copy this part of their application.” A plee. Suppl.
App. at 49. Although she acknowledged that the good-faith release was “to be
used to obtain information from other facilities,” id., she maintained that she has
also used the Release and Immunity to do so as well. Construing this testimony
in the light most favorable to DiM arco, we fail to see how it demonstrates his
intent to limit Presbyterian’s immunity, or his intent not to be bound by the terms
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of the Release and Immunity. His argument ignores the plain provisions of that
contract, as well as New M exico’s law granting employers absolute immunity
where an employee consents to the disclosure of his employment information.
Accordingly, we conclude that by signing the Release and Immunity, DiM arco
granted Presbyterian absolute immunity for all disclosures concerning his
employment history.
B.
Nevertheless, DiM arco challenges the district court’s summary judgment
ruling by arguing that the court relied on superseded authority. He argues that
Baker v. Bhajan, 871 P.2d 374 (N.M . 1994), which was cited by the district court,
was effectively overruled by New M exico’s employer immunity statute, N.M .
Stat. § 50-12-1. To support this proposition, he points out that N.M . Stat.
§ 50-12-1 was enacted in the legislative session following Baker, demonstrating
that New M exico’s legislature intended to overrule that decision.
N.M . Stat. § 50-12-1 is the statutory embodiment of New M exico’s
common-law qualified privilege that attaches to good-faith disclosures. See Davis
v. Bd. of County Com m’rs, 987 P.2d 1172, 1182 (N.M . Ct. App. 1999) (“The
statute w ould appear to track much of the common-law privilege relating to
defamation and good-faith comments in the employment context.”); see also
Lawrence L. Summers, Wrongful Discharge: Contract, Public Policy, and Tort
C laim s, 663 PLI/Lit 9, 110-11 (2001) (citing both N.M . Stat. § 50-12-1 and Baker
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to explain that “many states have enacted legislation to shield employers from
statements made in employee references,” but “a signed release acts as a consent
to statem ents made to prospective employers and holds them absolutely
privileged”). The statute provides:
W hen requested to provide a reference on a former or current
employee, an employer acting in good faith is immune from liability
for comments about the former employee’s job performance. The
immunity shall not apply when the reference information supplied
was knowingly false or deliberately misleading, was rendered with
malicious purpose or violated any civil rights of the former
employee.
N.M . Stat. § 50-12-1.
As DiM arco correctly points out, N.M . Stat. § 50-12-1 was enacted in 1995,
one year after Baker was decided. But nothing in the language of the statute
indicates that it was intended to overrule Baker or its rule that absolute immunity
attaches when the parties so contract. “A statute will be interpreted as
supplanting the common law only if there is an explicit indication that the
legislature so intended.” Sim s v. Sims, 930 P.2d 153, 158 (N.M . 1996) (citation
omitted). Given the absence of any such indication, we decline to divine a
legislative intent to overrule Baker.
C.
DiM arco also contends Presbyterian violated the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by deliberately disclosing false and misleading information.
“Generally, in the absence of an express provision on the subject, a contract
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contains an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing between the parties.”
Kropinak v. ARA Health Servs., Inc., 33 P.3d 679, 681 (N.M . Ct. App. 2001)
(citations omitted). But an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot
override the express provisions of a contract. M elnick v. State Farm M ut. Auto
Ins. Co., 749 P.2d 1105, 1109-10 (N.M . 1988). Here, DiM arco signed a release
extending absolute immunity to third parties such as Presbyterian for any
disclosures, and the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot
counteract those express terms. Additionally, the covenant is “breached only
when a party seeks to prevent the contract’s performance or to withhold its
benefits from the other party.” Azar v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 68 P.3d
909, 925 (N .M . Ct. App. 2003). As D iM arco admits, Presbyterian “was not a
party to any of the releases.” Aplt. Br. at 9. Consequently, it cannot be said to
have violated an implied covenant of a contract to which it was not a party.
D.
Finally, DiM arco argues that Presbyterian possessed no more than a
conditional privilege, which it lost by making false disclosures. This argument is
foreclosed, however, because we have already concluded that Presbyterian
enjoyed absolute immunity.
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III. Conclusion
The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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