United States v. Ashlock ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 3, 2007
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-3151
v. (District of K ansas)
JAM ES P. ASHLOCK, III, (D.C. No. 05-CR-20027-001-JW L)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M U RPH Y, SE YM OU R, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Defendant James Ashlock appeals his conviction by a jury of possessing a
firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
I.
Officer Dorsett of the Kansas City, Kansas Police Department began
following M r. Ashlock’s white Jeep after receiving a report of a suspicious
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
vehicle in the area. W hen the jeep came to a stop, Officer Dorsett pulled up
behind it. Officer Dorsett approached the Jeep’s driver’s side door and began
questioning M r. Ashlock. M r. Ashlock initially cooperated with Officer Dorsett,
but eventually fled on foot. During Officer Dorsett’s pursuit, he observed that
M r. Ashlock was carrying a gun, and at one point he witnessed M r. Ashlock firing
the gun in his direction. M r. Ashlock escaped, but through a tip from a neighbor,
police eventually found him at his girlfriend’s apartment, whereupon they arrested
him and seized a handgun from the chair where he had been sitting.
Though police officers attempted to interrogate M r. Ashlock as soon as
they brought him to the station, even going so far as to obtain a signed M iranda
waiver form, they soon determined that he was likely under the influence of
illegal narcotics and unable to w aive his rights knowingly and voluntarily. Thus,
they ended the interrogation. The following day the police again read M r.
Ashlock his rights and proceeded to interrogate him. They did not obtain a signed
waiver for the second interrogation. M r. Ashlock admitted that the gun found by
the police was the same gun he possessed while fleeing Officer D orsett.
Although the police recorded this interrogation, the tapes were lost or destroyed.
At his subsequent trial, the jury found M r. Ashlock guilty of possessing a firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2).
M r. Ashlock raises three issues on appeal. First, he argues that the district
court should not have admitted his confession that he possessed a firearm because
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the government did not prove that the confession was knowing and voluntary.
Second, he contends that the district court erred in allowing Officer Dorsett to
testify that he saw M r. Ashlock shoot the gun during the chase because it was
unfairly prejudicial. Third, he argues that juror bias prevented him from
receiving a fair trial. For the reasons stated below, we AFFIRM the conviction.
II.
M r. Ashlock first argues that the destruction of the tape recordings of the
police interrogation prevented the government from proving that his confession
was knowing and voluntary. At trial, M r. Ashlock objected to the admission of
the transcript of his confession without proper foundation, but did not object to its
substantive content after the government laid proper foundation. Because he did
not object, w e review the admission of his statements for plain error. United
States v. Castorena-Jaim e, 285 F.3d 916, 931 (10th Cir. 2002). To show plain
error, M r. Ashlock “must demonstrate that (1) the district court erred; (2) the
error was plain; (3) the error affected [his] substantial rights; and (4) the error
seriously affects the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” Id. at 926.
The district court did not err in admitting M r. Ashlock’s testimony. W hen
determining whether a confession is voluntary, a court must look to the totality of
the circumstances. M itchell v. Gibson, 262 F.3d 1036, 1059 (10th Cir. 2001). In
this case, the police waited to interrogate M r. Ashlock until after he was no
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longer under the influence of drugs. Before questioning him, they read him his
M iranda rights and confirmed that he understood them. There is no evidence that
the police used coercive tactics to force M r. Ashlock to confess. Accordingly, the
district court did not err in finding that M r. A shlock’s confession was voluntary.
M r. Ashlock also mentions that the destruction of the tapes could have
constituted a violation of his Due Process rights under California v. Trombetta,
467 U.S. 479 (1984), but he does not explain how. A Trombetta violation occurs
when police destroy evidence that “possess[es] an exculpatory value that was
apparent before the evidence was destroyed, and [is] of such a nature that the
defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by other reasonably
available means.” Id. at 489. The defendant must also show that the destruction
of the evidence was done in bad faith. United States v. Pearl, 324 F.3d 1210,
1215 (10th Cir. 2003) (citing Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51, 58 (1988)).
After learning that the tape recordings had been destroyed, M r. Ashlock
filed a M otion to Suppress Evidence of Confession, relying on California v.
Trombetta and claiming that the tape would have provided “crucial evidence”
regarding his state of mind, thus “confirm[ing] his mental impairment despite
what the transcript reflects.” R. Vol. I, Doc. 44, at 1. But, M r. Ashlock conceded
at trial that the government did not act in bad faith. Consequently, M r. Ashlock’s
Trombetta argument must fail.
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III.
M r. Ashlock contends that admission of Officer Dorsett’s testimony
regarding M r. Ashlock’s use of the gun during the pursuit was unfairly prejudicial
“other act” evidence that should have been excluded under Rules 404(b) and 403
of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Prior to the trial, the district court denied M r.
Ashlock’s motion to exclude Officer Dorsett’s testimony regarding the shot fired
during his pursuit.
W e review the district court’s admission of evidence for abuse of
discretion. United States v. Jenkins, 313 F.3d 549, 559 (10th Cir. 2002). W e will
overturn a district court’s evidentiary ruling only if “it was based on a clearly
erroneous finding of fact or an erroneous conclusion of law or manifests a clear
error in judgment.” Id.Rule 404(b) prohibits the admission of evidence of a defendant’s “other
crimes, wrongs, or acts to prove the character of a person in order to show action
in conformity therewith.” Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). However, “[d]irect or intrinsic
evidence of the crime charged does not fall within the ambit of the rule.” United
States v. Green, 175 F.3d 822, 831 (10th Cir. 1999). To carry its burden under 18
U.S.C. § 922(g), the government had to prove that M r. Ashlock actually or
constructively possessed the firearm. At trial, M r. Ashlock argued that he did not
know the gun was capable of firing, and thus did not knowingly possess a firearm.
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Officer Dorsett’s testimony regarding the shooting was thus not about unrelated
or previous bad acts, but rather about M r. Ashlock’s actual possession of a
functional firearm. Such testimony does not run afoul of Rule 404(b).
Even if evidence is admissible under Rule 404(b), Rule 403 allows judges
to exclude evidence when the probative value of that evidence is “substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issue, or
misleading the jury.” Fed. R. Evid. 403. Evidence is unfairly prejudicial when it
has the capacity “to lure the factfinder into declaring guilt on a ground different
from proof specific to the offense charged.” Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S.
172, 180 (1997). In considering whether evidence is unfairly prejudicial, a court
must consider the availability of alternative probative evidence. Id. at 184–85.
Officer Dorsett’s testimony that M r. Ashlock shot his firearm did not create
a risk of luring the factfinder into declaring guilt on different grounds than the
crime charged. Possessing a firearm is intrinsic to shooting a firearm. The jury
thus properly convicted M r. Ashlock of possessing a firearm if it believed Officer
Dorsett’s testimony. Even if we thought the evidence created a small risk of
unfairness, the potential alternative evidence does not have the same probative
value as Officer D orsett’s testimony regarding M r. A shlock’s use of the firearm.
W ithout the testimony, the government’s case rested only on M r. Ashlock’s
constructive possession of the firearm at the time of the arrest. Because Officer
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Dorsett’s testimony was highly probative and went directly to the crime
charged— actual possession of a firearm— it was not unfairly prejudicial to M r.
Ashlock. The district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the
testimony.
IV.
Finally, M r. Ashlock argues that his conviction stemmed from juror bias,
and that the trial court should either have declared a mistrial or granted a hearing
to determine whether juror bias existed. His claim rests on an acquaintance
relationship between one of the jurors and the police officer who testified at trial
regarding the functionality of the firearm. The juror in question did not recognize
the name of the officer on the witness list provided by the court. Upon seeing the
officer testify, the juror recognized him as the father of one of his daughter’s
softball teammates. The officer also recognized the juror. Both notified the court
in a timely manner. After this information was disclosed, M r. Ashlock filed a
M otion for Order Declaring a M istrial, which the court denied.
W e review the district court’s refusal to grant a mistrial based on juror bias
for abuse of discretion. United States v. Lawrence, 405 F.3d 888, 903 (10th Cir.
2005). The appropriate test for determining whether potential juror bias tainted
the fairness of a trial “is whether actual bias existed or whether the circumstances
compel an imputation of inherent bias to the juror as a matter of law such that the
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misconduct has prejudiced the defendant to the extent that he has not received a
fair trial.” Id. In this case, the district court determined that the “limited
familiarity” between the witness and the juror did not indicate actual bias or
create a circumstance that compelled an imputation of inherent bias. The district
court recognized that neither the witness nor the juror intentionally concealed
their relationship. Based on the record, we find this determination to be a
permissible exercise of the district court’s discretion.
V.
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of
Kansas is AFFIRM ED.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
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