Schwartz v. Neal , 228 F. App'x 814 ( 2007 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
April 5, 2007
FO R TH E TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
RO BERT SCHW AR TZ,
Petitioner - A ppellant,
No. 06-1396
v. (D.C. No. 03-CV -1423-ZLW -CB S)
(D. Colorado)
DONICE NEAL, W arden of the
Arrowhead Correctional Facility;
A TTO RN EY G EN ER AL O F THE
STA TE OF C OLO RA D O ,
Respondents - Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before K ELLY, BRISCO E, and G O RSUCH , Circuit Judges.
Robert Schwartz, a state prisoner proceeding pro se, appeals the district
court orders denying his motion to reopen his prior 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition on
the non-adjudicated claims and denying his motion to reconsider. W e vacate the
district court orders, construe Petitioner Schwartz’s notice of appeal and appellate
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
brief as an implied application for authorization to file another § 2254 petition,
and deny authorization.
In 1993, Petitioner Schwartz pleaded guilty in state court to three counts of
sexual assault on a child by one in a position of trust, and three counts of
aggravated incest. He was sentenced to thirty years’ imprisonment. On direct
appeal, his sentence was affirmed.
In 2003, he filed his first § 2254 petition for purposes of the A ntiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA ”) raising thirteen claims, such as the
denial of effective assistance of trial and appellate counsel, and the
involuntariness of his guilty plea because the trial court failed to give him a
proper Colo. R. Crim. R. 11 advisement, he was under the influence of drugs at
the time of his plea, the trial court erred by allowing an amendment to the
charges, he was improperly charged as one in a position of trust, and the charging
statutes were inadequate. The magistrate judge issued a recommendation finding
that none of Petitioner’s claims constituted a basis for habeas relief. The district
court adopted the magistrate judge’s recommendation and denied the § 2254
petition. In so doing, the district court rejected Petitioner’s constitutional
challenge to his sentence and denied his remaining twelve claims based on state
procedural default grounds. See Schwartz v. Neal, No. 03-CV-1423 (D. Colo.
Aug. 15, 2005) (unpublished). On appeal, this court denied a certificate of
appealability and dismissed. See Schwartz v. Neal, No. 05-1418 (10th Cir. M ay
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18, 2006) (unpublished order).
On July 21, 2006, approximately eleven months after the district court
denied his first § 2254 petition, Petitioner Schwartz filed a motion under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 60(b) to reopen. Petitioner sought the district court to consider issues that
he claimed were not previously considered or adjudicated by the district court
during his first § 2254 petition. In particular, he argued that he did not receive
effective assistance of appellate or post-conviction counsel, and that he was not
charged with, adjudged of, or pleaded guilty to sexual assault on a child by one in
a position of trust or to aggravated incest. In a July 27, 2006 Order, the district
court denied Petitioner’s motion to reopen. In an August 17, 2006 Order, the
court denied his motion to reconsider. This appeal followed. 1
A post-judgment motion must be treated as a second or successive petition
and certified by an appellate panel if it asserts or reasserts a substantive claim to
set aside a movant’s criminal conviction. See Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524,
530-31 (2005) (deciding the extent to which a Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion filed
1
On July 27, 2006, Robert Schwartz filed a second § 2254 petition in the
district court, which was assigned No. 06-CV-1456. Lacking subject matter
jurisdiction, the district court transferred the second § 2254 petition to this court
pursuant to Coleman v. United States, 106 F.3d 339, 341 (10th Cir. 1997)
(requiring transfer by district court of unauthorized second or successive petitions
to this court). After transfer, Schwartz filed a motion for authorization to file a
second or successive § 2254 petition, which was denied for failing to satisfy
either of the AEDPA criteria in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). See Schwartz v. Keith,
No. 06-1411 (10th Cir. Nov. 13, 2006) (unpublished order).
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in a § 2254 proceeding should be considered a second or successive habeas
petition); see also Spitznas v. Boone, 464 F.3d 1213, 1215 (10th Cir. 2006)
(“[u]nder Gonzalez, a 60(b) motion is a second or successive petition if it in
substance or effect asserts or reasserts a federal basis for relief from the
petitioner’s underlying conviction.”).
Petitioner Schwartz’s motion to reopen constituted an unauthorized second
or successive § 2254 petition under the AEDPA . The motion did not attack the
integrity of the first § 2254 proceedings, but rather asserted substantive claims
challenging the 1993 criminal conviction. Consequently, Petitioner was required
to comply with the relevant provisions of the AEDPA and obtain prior
authorization from this court before filing his unauthorized § 2254 petition in the
district court on July 21, 2006. He failed to obtain this authorization. See 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). Therefore, the district court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction, and the orders denying the unauthorized § 2254 petition and the
motion to reconsider must be vacated.
Nonetheless, we will construe Petitioner’s notice of appeal and appellate
brief as an implied application under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A) for authorization
to file a second or successive § 2254 petition. Petitioner reasserts on appeal the
claims raised in his motion to reopen as w ell as such claims that: issues raised in
his state court post-conviction proceedings and in his first § 2254 petition were
never ruled upon by state or federal courts on the merits; his right to self
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representation was denied because his pro se pleadings and filings were not
considered and ruled on by the courts; the district court’s dismissal with prejudice
of his first § 2254 petition violated his due process and equal protection rights;
and he is entitled to another advisement under Colo. R. Crim. P. 11.
W e have thoroughly reviewed the implied application and conclude that
Petitioner Schwartz has failed to make the prima facie showing required by either
of the AEDPA criteria in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2). Petitioner’s claims are not
based on a new rule of constitutional law made retroactive to cases on collateral
review by the United States Supreme Court that was previously unavailable, id. §
2244(b)(2)(A), or on facts previously undiscoverable through the exercise of due
diligence that would establish by clear and convincing evidence that he was not
guilty of the offenses, id. § 2244(b)(2)(B).
Finally, contrary to Petitioner’s assertions, the twelve claims raised in his
first § 2254 petition that were denied based on state procedural default grounds
“constitute[d] a disposition on the merits and thus render[ed] a subsequent § 2254
petition or § 2255 motion ‘second or successive’ for purposes of the AEDPA .”
Carter v. United States, 150 F.3d 202, 205-06 (2nd Cir. 1998) (per curiam); see
Henderson v. Lam pert, 396 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 126 S.Ct. 199(2005) (same); cf. Hawkins v. Evans, 64 F.3d 543, 547 (10th cir. 1995)
(concluding, pre-AEDPA, that denial of claim due to procedural default is a
determination on the merits in evaluating whether a second habeas petition is
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successive).
Accordingly, the district court orders are VACATED. The implied
application for authorization to file a second or successive § 2254 petition is
DENIED. The motion to proceed in form a pauperis is GR ANTED . The
mandate shall issue forthwith.
Entered for the Court
Per Curiam
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