United States v. Minchey ( 2007 )

F IL E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
U N IT E D ST A T E S C O U R T O F A PP E A L S
August 31, 2007
T E N T H C IR C U IT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee, No. 06-4299
v. (D. of Utah)
K Y LE M IN CH EY , (D.C. No. 2:05-CR-546-DB)
Defendant-Appellant.
O R D E R A N D JU D G M E N T *
Before H E N R Y , T Y M K O V IC H , and H O L M E S, Circuit Judges. * *
Kyle M inchey pleaded guilty to one count of possession of stolen firearms
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). Based on an offense level of 21 and a criminal
history of VI, M inchey fell within a sentence range of 77–96 months pursuant to
the U nited States Sentencing Guidelines (USSG). M inchey sought a downward
departure based on “diminished capacity” under USSG §5K2.13. The district
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
court denied the motion and sentenced M inchey to a term of 86 months. M inchey
timely appealed (1) the denial of the downward departure and (2) the
reasonableness of his sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). W e AFFIRM .
I. Background
M inchey was indicted for possession of a firearm by a convicted felon in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and for knowing possession of a stolen firearm
in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(j). He pleaded guilty to the second count,
admitting that he possessed a M agnum revolver, a shotgun, and two rifles, which
he knew were stolen. At his change of plea hearing, M inchey requested a
psychological examination pending sentencing.
A Presentence R eport (PSR) was prepared which related the following: O n
M ay 15, 2005, police were called to investigate a residential burglary at the home
of M inchey’s parents-in-law. Four firearms, some cash, and a set of car keys had
been stolen. M inchey was subsequently stopped in the vehicle owned by his in-
laws and later told the officers where the firearms were hidden. The PSR
calculated a base offense level of 20 and four enhancements for involvement of
more than three firearms and a stolen firearm. After a downward adjustment for
acceptance of responsibility, the PSR arrived at a total offense level of 21,
yielding a guideline range of imprisonment of 77–96 months.
-2-
M inchey’s criminal history included adult convictions of 12 separate theft,
drug possession, and forgery-related offenses that yielded a criminal history
category of VI. Other charges for drug possession and receiving stolen property
were pending at the time. The PSR also noted that, three years before, M inchey
had been diagnosed by Salt Lake County Jail medical personnel as schizophrenic
and had taken medication for that condition as well as depression. The PSR
recommended M inchey be required to complete a substance abuse program as
well as to receive treatment for his mental illness. Finally, the PSR noted that the
maximum term of imprisonment for M inchey’s offense was ten years.
Before sentencing, M inchey filed a motion for a downward departure for
significantly reduced mental functioning in support of which he submitted the
results of a psychological examination. The report suggested that M inchey’s
“historical experiences of mental illness including paranoid schizophrenia
symptoms may have contributed to [his] perceived need to procure weapons as a
means of self-protection.” Supp. App. at 4. M inchey argued the report supported
a causal connection between his mental illness and his crime, thus entitling him to
a downward departure under § 5K2.13. The government objected to the motion at
sentencing based on its view that any mental illness on M inchey’s part
nevertheless did not cause him to comm it the crime. R. Vol. III at 4.
-3-
At sentencing, the district court denied M inchey’s motion to depart and
sentenced him to 86 months incarceration, within the suggested guideline range.
II. D iscussion
1. Denial of Downward D eparture
M inchey argues the district court erred in denying his motion for a
downward departure under USSG § 5K2.13, which allows a sentence below the
applicable guidelines range when the defendant has significantly reduced mental
capacity. 1 After considering family letters sent on M inchey’s behalf, the results
of a psychological examination, and the testimony of the parties at sentencing, the
district court denied M inchey’s motion to depart and sentenced him to 86 months
imprisonment. R. Vol. III at 3, 9.
W e lack jurisdiction to review a sentencing court’s refusal to depart
downward from the guidelines, absent a clear misunderstanding by the court of its
discretion to depart. See, e.g., United States v. Chavez-Diaz, 444 F.3d 1223, 1228
(10th Cir. 2006); United States v. Brown, 316 F.3d 1151, 1154 (10th Cir. 2003).
The only exception arises if the district court refuses to depart based on a false
belief that it lacks the authority to do so “for the entire class of circumstances
1
Section 5K2.13 allows “[a] sentence below the applicable guideline
range” if “(1) the defendant committed the offense while suffering from a
significantly reduced mental capacity; and (2) the significantly reduced mental
capacity contributed substantially to the commission of the offense.” USSG
§5K.13.
-4-
proffered by the defendant.” United States v. Sheehan, 371 F.3d 1213, 1215–16
(10th Cir. 2004) (concluding we could review the denial of a departure under
USSG §5K2, but only because “the district court unambiguously stated it had no
discretion to depart . . . based on a defendant’s diminished capacity.”).
W hile the district court in this case did not elaborate on its rationale for
denying the motion to depart, it also never betrayed a false belief that it lacked
authority to depart for the “class of circumstances proffered,” namely mental
illness. It made clear, moreover, that the results of the psychological exam were
considered but exercised its discretion to deny the motion nevertheless. 2
2. Reasonableness of Sentence
M inchey also challenges the reasonableness of his sentence. In light of the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005), we
continue to have jurisdiction to review a sentence for reasonableness. Chavez-
Diaz, 444 F.3d at 1229.
W e review the district court’s sentence for reasonableness in light of the
sentencing factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. Kristl, 437
F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006). The district court has significant discretion in
2
Specifically, the court stated it “has reviewed the psychological
evaluation in connection with this sentencing and taken that into consideration as
well.” R. Vol. III at 3. In ruling on the motion, the court simply stated that it
“denies the motion for the downward departure.” Id. at 9.
-5-
sentencing, and our review for reasonableness, regardless of whether the sentence
falls inside or outside of the advisory guidelines, is a review for abuse of
discretion. Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2465 (2007); see also United
States v. Garcia-Lara, No. 06-3054, 2007 W L 2380991, at *4 (10th Cir. Aug. 22,
2007).
In this case, the district court sentenced M inchey within the guidelines
range and M inchey does not claim that the guidelines range itself was improperly
calculated. The binding precedent of our court is that “a sentence that is properly
calculated under the guidelines is entitled to a rebuttable presumption of
reasonableness.” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054. See also United States v. Ruiz-
Terrazas, 477 F.3d 1196, 1203 (10th Cir. 2007). The Supreme Court has recently
affirmed our application of the presumption of reasonableness to within-
guidelines sentences, holding that the presumption is permissible but not required.
Rita v. United States, 127 S. Ct. 2456, 2459 (2007).
Nevertheless, the presumption of reasonableness “is a deferential standard
that either the defendant or the government may rebut by demonstrating that the
sentence is unreasonable w hen view ed against the other factors delineated in
§ 3553(a).” Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054. These factors include “the nature of the
offense and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need for the sentence
to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to provide adequate deterrence, to protect
-6-
the public, and to provide the defendant with needed training or treatment.” Id. at
1053. M oreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized the district court’s duty to
show it has considered these factors in reaching the sentence imposed. Rita, 127
S. Ct. at 2468 (“The sentencing judge should set forth enough to satisfy the
appellate court that he has considered the parties’ arguments and has a reasoned
basis for exercising his ow n legal decisionmaking authority.”). But the Court also
made clear that a district judge is not required to give an exhaustive list of
reasons. Id. (“The law leaves much, in this respect, to the judge’s own
professional judgment.”).
In this case, M inchey does not challenge the fact that many of the § 3553(a)
factors weighed against him, including his excessive criminal history, the
seriousness of his offense, the need for the sentence to deter him from similar
conduct in the future, as well as his need for treatment for drug abuse and mental
health issues. Rather, he claims the district court “did not consider the mitigating
factors [namely, the results of his psychological examination] that M r. M inchey
presented at sentencing as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).” Aplt. Br. at 21–22.
He adds that it is “clear that the district court did not consider any of the
considerations raised in the downward departure motion independently in
determining the reasonableness of the sentence.” Id. at 23.
But the record belies this claim. At sentencing, the district court noted:
-7-
I have received a number of letters on the defendant’s behalf, from his
mother and from his ex-wife, and they are very thoughtful letters and
I appreciate receiving them. . . . I have also reviewed a psychological
examination in connection with this sentencing and taken that into
consideration as well.
R. Vol. III at 3 (emphasis added). The district court was thus explicit that it had
considered M inchey’s psychological profile in connection with its sentencing
decision. Additionally, the terms of the sentence imposed reflect the court’s
consideration of M inchey’s history of mental illness and drug abuse. Specifically,
the court ordered M inchey to participate in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation
program as well as a mental health treatment program. R. Vol. III at 9.
M inchey’s claims that the district court failed to consider his mitigating factors in
imposing his sentence are simply unfounded.
III. C onclusion
For the foregoing reasons, the district court’s sentence is AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M . Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
-8-