United States v. Chapple ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
October 18, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
__________________________
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 07-7015
v. (D.Ct. No. 04-CR-106-01-P)
(E.D. Okla.)
W ILLIAM M ITCH ELL CHA PPLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before TA CH A, Chief Circuit Judge, and BARRETT and BROR BY, Senior
Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
Appellant W illiam M itchell Chapple w as convicted by a jury of two counts
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
of m ailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). He
now appeals his concurrent thirty-three-month sentences, arguing imposition of a
variance six months higher than the advisory United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months is
substantively unreasonable under the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) sentencing factors. W e
exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and
affirm M r. Chapple’s concurrent sentences.
I. Factual and Procedural Background
The relevant facts are primarily outlined in this court’s previous decision
involving M r. Chapple’s initial appeal of his thirty-three-month sentence, which,
together w ith the record on appeal, we summarize as follows. See United States
v. Chapple, 198 Fed. Appx. 745 (10th Cir. Oct. 6, 2006) (unpublished op.).
Between October 1 and October 4, 2004, two manila envelopes containing a white
powdery substance w ere mailed from two different states to the same business
located in M uskogee, Oklahoma. Id. at 747. An employee who handled the first
envelope, postmarked from Colorado Springs, Colorado, noticed it was leaking a
powder and summoned the postal carrier, who, at the suggestion of the United
States Postal Service, contacted the M uskogee Police Department, which, in turn,
sent police officers to collect the envelope and submit it to the Oklahoma
Department of Health laboratory for analysis. Id.-2-
A few days later, employees at the M uskogee Post Office intercepted the
second manila envelope, which was mailed from Syracuse, Kansas, and addressed
to the same business. Id. Because the postal employees believed the envelope
contained an unknown substance, a postal inspector transported it to the same
Oklahoma lab for analysis. Id. Ultimately, the lab determined both envelopes
contained non-biohazardous powders. Id.The postal inspector investigating the matter interviewed the owner of the
business, Christine Cannarsa, who believed the sender was M r. Chapple, a former
classm ate w ho had been stalking her for approximately eighteen months to two
years in an attempt to establish a romantic relationship with her. Id. She advised
she previously filed reports with the M uskogee Police Department and hired an
attorney, who advised M r. Chapple to stop sending communications to M s.
Cannarsa. Id. W hen the inspector interview ed M r. Chapple, he confessed to
sending the envelopes and explained he intended the powder, obtained from a
broken road flare, to scare M s. Cannarsa. Id.Following his arrest, M r. Chapple was convicted by a jury of two counts of
mailing a threatening communication in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). Id. The
probation officer preparing the presentence report interviewed M s. Cannarsa and
the employee who handled the first envelope. M s. Cannarsa described M r.
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Chapple’s contact toward her for the prior eighteen months, which included
correspondence he sent her that could be characterized as love letters and poems;
however, one particular letter made a troubling statement indicating that everyone
he had loved was now dead, which greatly bothered her. M s. Cannarsa explained
that while she was initially afraid of M r. Chapple, she became terrified after the
first suspect envelope arrived, and she outlined in great detail the negative
impacts on her life caused by his mailings and having to testify against him at
trial, as well as the various safety and other measures she had taken – all of which
affected her personally and professionally. 1
M s. Cannarsa’s employee told the probation officer she was extremely
fearful for her health until identification of the envelope’s contents. She also
detailed the effect M r. Chapple’s actions had on her with respect to her fears for
her personal safety and possible retribution against her after she testified against
him.
In preparing the presentence report, the probation officer calculated the
Guidelines sentencing range and recommended increasing the base level of twelve
1
Because M r. Chapple does not claim the district court erred in
considering the psychological and other negative impacts the mailings had on M s.
Cannarsa for the purpose of imposing a variance under § 3553(a), we decline to
outline them here, other than to note they were substantial and continuing.
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with a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3D1.4(a). 2 Thus, the presentence
report assigned M r. Chapple a total offense level of fourteen, which, together w ith
his criminal history category of IV, resulted in a Guidelines range of twenty-
seven to thirty-three months imprisonment. Id. at 747-48. W hile M r. Chapple
objected to certain dates provided in the presentence report, he did not otherwise
object to the facts presented, including those regarding his prior conduct toward
M s. Cannarsa or the effect of the instant mailings on her or her employee.
Following a sentencing hearing, the district court imposed a term of imprisonment
of thirty-three months for each count, to run concurrently. Id. at 748.
On appeal, this court remanded with instructions to vacate M r. Chapple’s
sentence and resentence him, after determining the district court improperly
applied the two-level enhancement. Id. at 751. W e rejected the government’s
argument that two direct victims existed for the purpose of considering the counts
separately for application of the § 3D1.4(a) enhancement; instead, we identified
M s. Cannarsa as the intended recipient and direct victim and determined her
employee was an indirect or secondary victim who could not be considered under
the contested Guideline, § 3D1.2. Id. at 750-51.
2
The probation officer recommended this increase after determining the
offense level for mailing a threatening comm unication was twelve, concluding the
tw o m ailings should be grouped separately, and then relying on U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.4(a) to apply a two-level upward adjustment, for a combined offense level
of fourteen. See Chapple, 198 Fed. Appx. at 747-48.
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Following our remand, the district court provided notice to the parties it
was considering imposing a variance above the amended advisory Guidelines
range of twenty-one to twenty-seven months imprisonment. It explained a
variance was necessary in light of the serious nature of the crime and the
psychological trauma to the direct and indirect victims, and in light of the current
atmosphere of heightened vigilance placing all citizens on notice of terrorist
activity. M r. Chapple contested the proposed variance, after which the
government filed a response in support of a variance.
At a sentencing hearing held February 12, 2007, and after allowing the
parties an opportunity to present argument, the district court imposed a sentence
of thirty-three months on each count, to run concurrently. In “formulating the
sentence imposed,” it explained it had considered the amended advisory
Guidelines calculations together with the nature and circumstances of the case,
including the fact M r. Chapple had extensively stalked and terrorized M s.
C annarsa, culminating in the mailing of two envelopes containing an unknown
powder resembling a biohazardous substance meant to instill fear and terror in the
mind of the recipient. It also noted the Guidelines failed to consider the impact
of M r. Chapple’s actions on the indirect victims, including the employee who
received the initial envelope, the postal worker who delivered that envelope, the
law enforcement officers who responded, and the lab technicians, each of whom
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went through a period of unknowing and likely psychological anguish after
contact with the substance until finding out it was not harmful. It also pointed
out M r. Chapple took “advantage of a point in time that the citizens of this nation
were already functioning on a heightened fear of terrorist activity.” Finally, it
noted it considered the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and concluded
the sentence reflected the seriousness of the offense, promoted respect for the
law , provided just punishment for the offense, afforded adequate deterrence to
criminal conduct, protected the public from further crimes by M r. Chapple, and
provided correctional treatment in the most effective manner.
II. Discussion
M r. Chapple now appeals his sentence, arguing it is unreasonable because
the district court improperly applied a six-month variance above the advisory
Guidelines range. In support, he discredits each of the reasons for the variance,
suggesting the district court erred in: 1) concluding he stalked and terrorized the
victim based merely on love letters and poems sent to her, which is non-criminal
and irrelevant conduct; 2) considering his prior stalking conduct tow ard M s.
Cannarsa, which is unrelated to the offense charged; 3) failing to explain why the
psychological harm to M s. Cannarsa’s employee justified a variance; 4)
considering harm to the other indirect victims, which was unsupported by any
proof; 5) considering the fact his crime involved two mailings, which is
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insufficient under the Guidelines for a “variance”; and 6) concluding he took
advantage of the country’s fear of terrorism, which he claims is irrelevant since
the mailings “occurred three years after 9-11.” W hile M r. Chapple acknowledges
he did not preserve a vindictiveness claim in district court, he submits the record
supports a presumption of vindictiveness, as well as actual vindictiveness, given
the district court gave him the same thirty-three-month sentence originally
imposed. 3
In considering M r. Chapple’s sentence on appeal, “we review a district
court’s sentence for abuse of discretion, asking whether it is reasonable under the
§ 3553(a) factors.” United States v. Garcia-Lara, ___ F.3d ___, ___, 2007 W L
2380991, at *1 (10th Cir. Aug. 22, 2007) (slip op.). W e employ an abuse of
discretion standard by reviewing a district court’s factual findings for clear error.
Id. at *2. The § 3553(a) factors which guide the reasonableness inquiry “include
the nature of the offense and characteristics of the defendant, as well as the need
for the sentence to reflect the seriousness of the crime, to provide adequate
deterrence, to protect the public, and to provide the defendant with needed
training or treatment ....” United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir.
2006) (per curiam). W hile we defer to the district court’s application of these
3
M r. Chapple does not contend, and the record does not demonstrate,
reasonable notice of the variance was not provided. He also does not contest the
method of calculation, but only the substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
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factors, we will not exercise deference if it commits legal error, such as giving
one factor too much weight, disregarding another, or ignoring or misinterpreting
applicable reasonableness case law. See G arcia-Lara, 2007 W L 2380991, at *2.
Thus, we defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion within the bounds of
reasonableness. Id.The Supreme Court, in Rita v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 127 S. Ct. 2456(2007), made clear a sentence falling outside the Guidelines range, like the one at
issue here, is not per se entitled to a “presumption of unreasonableness.” Id. at
2467; Garcia-Lara, 2007 W L 2380991, at *3. Rather, a court may, in its
discretion, conclude a non-Guidelines sentence best serves the purpose of the
§ 3553(a) sentencing factors. Garcia-Lara, 2007 W L 2380991, at *4. But if it
disregards or gives too little weight to the Guidelines factors, it must find
reasonable justification for doing so under those factors. Id. “The farther the
court diverges from the advisory guideline range, the more compelling the reasons
for the divergence must be.” Id. (quotation marks, alterations, and citation
omitted). On the other hand, a lesser but still “significant” variance needs only
“sufficient explanation and justification ....” Id. “To assess the magnitude of a
variance, we look to the difference between the advisory Guidelines range and the
sentence imposed in terms of both percentage and absolute number of months.”
Id.
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W e begin by assessing the magnitude of the complained-of variance. Here,
the variance is six months above the Guidelines range of twenty-one to twenty-
seven m onths, which constitutes a twenty-two-percent increase above the highest
Guidelines range of twenty-seven months. Even under the increased scrutiny
given lesser but still significant variances, we believe the sentence imposed was
reasonable based on the sufficient explanation and justification provided by the
district court in conjunction with the § 3553(a) factors.
First, in regard to the district court’s consideration of M r. Chapple’s prior
conduct in stalking and terrorizing M s. Cannarsa, it did so in determining the
nature of the offense under § 3553(a). W hile M r. Chapple implies no evidence
supports the district court’s conclusion he stalked M s. Cannarsa, he did not object
to the facts presented in the presentence report. “It is well established that the
sentencing court is entitled to rely on uncontested facts contained in the
[presentence report] for certain sentencing purposes,” including to draw
conclusions about the nature of the offense and the defendant’s characteristics
relevant to the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). United States v. M ateo,
471 F.3d 1162, 1166-67 (10th Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 2890 (2007). In
addition, while M r. Chapple asserts the district court determined he stalked and
terrorized M s. Cannarsa based merely on love letters and poems, it is clear its
conclusion was based on the totality of his conduct, which resulted in her fearing
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for her personal safety even before the mailing of the two threatening envelopes
occurred. Indeed, this court previously determined “it is undisputed that M s.
Cannarsa was the person Chapple had been stalking and who Chapple was seeking
to threaten [or] intimidate.” Chapple, 198 Fed. Appx. at 750. To now argue no
evidence established he stalked M s. Cannarsa is extremely unpersuasive. M s.
Cannarsa testified at trial, and while neither party furnished the transcript of that
testimony, it is evident the district court credited her testimony and did not rely
solely on the presentence report to conclude M r. Chapple stalked her.
In addition, the fact M r. Chapple was never previously arrested or
convicted for stalking M s. Cannarsa did not prevent the district court from
considering such prior conduct in conjunction with the § 3553(a) factors.
Instead, “conduct that is not formally charged or is not an element of the offense
of conviction may enter into the determination of the applicable guideline
sentencing range.” United States v. Allen, 488 F.3d 1244, 1255 (10th Cir. 2007)
(quotation marks and citation omitted). However, such conduct must relate to the
offense of the conviction. Id. Having already determined M r. Chapple “stalked”
M s. Cannarsa, whom he “was seeking to threaten [or] intimidate,” Chapple, 198
Fed. Appx. at 750, it is apparent his prior conduct culminated in the instant
offense, which he admitted w as intended to scare her. Thus, we disagree with M r.
Chapple’s contention that his prior conduct, in which he sent at least one
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worrisome letter to M s. Cannarsa, was not related to the instant offense of
sending threatening communications. Accordingly, the district court did not err
in considering such prior conduct as part of the nature of his offense. 4
Next, we note M r. Chapple does not argue in his appeal brief that the
district court erred in considering the psychological and other negative impacts
the mailings had on M s. Cannarsa for the purpose of imposing a variance under
§ 3553(a). As to her employee, we believe the uncontested facts in the
presentence report sufficiently establish the psychological and other negative
impacts the mailings had on her for the purpose of imposing a variance under
§ 3553(a). Like M s. Cannarsa, she testified at trial, and it is evident the district
court credited her testimony. While this court previously determined U.S.S.G.
§ 3D1.4(a) did not apply to M s. Cannarsa’s employee, an indirect victim, for the
purpose of applying the two-level upward departure, we did not preclude the
district court from considering the impact of M r. Chapple’s mailing on that same
employee under the § 3553(a) sentencing factors for the purpose of applying a
4
In inferring the district court erred in considering his prior stalking
conduct toward M s. Cannarsa, M r. Chapple summarily points out the Guidelines
already contemplate an upward departure for “extreme conduct” under § 5K2.8,
which the presentence report and district court did not consider. However, it is
clear M r. Chapple raised this issue prior to sentencing, and by failing to apply
§ 5K2.8, it is apparent the district court did not believe his conduct warranted
application of that Guideline, but instead considered such conduct as one of the
circumstances supporting a variance.
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variance. 5
As to the other individuals negatively affected by M r. Chapple’s mailings,
we recognize the threat of biohazardous terrorism reached its zenith in the fall of
2001 – three years before his mailings occurred. 6 However, a number of cases
since 2001 establish a continuation of terror-related threats involving substances
meant to resemble anthrax or other biohazardous substances. 7 In addition, it is
self-evident that this country, since 2001, continues to experience a heightened
5
As part of his argument, M r. Chapple suggests the district court cannot
consider psychological injury to indirect victims because U.S.S.G. § 5K2.3 only
proscribes an upward departure for direct victims who suffer extreme
psychological injury. However, even if, as M r. Chapple contends, § 5K2.3 does
not apply to indirect victims, the district court was not prevented from
considering harm to them in the form of a variance under § 3553(a).
6
See, e.g., Stevens v. Battelle M em’l Inst., 488 F.3d 896, 898 (11th Cir.
2007) (pointing out in the fall of 2001 an unknown individual or group mailed
letters containing anthrax to recipients in Florida, New York, and W ashington,
D.C.); Hatfill v. The New York Times Co., 427 F.3d 253, 254 (4th Cir. 2005) (per
curiam) (explaining “[i]n the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, the nation
was alerted to the fact that someone was sending letters laced with anthrax
through the mails. The letters were not simply directed at public officials but
apparently at private individuals as well. Those who handled mail on a regular
basis were concerned for their safety, and even ordinary residents w ere advised to
take special precautions when opening their mail.”).
7
See, e.g., United States v. Evans, 478 F.3d 1332, 1336 (11th Cir. 2007),
cert. denied, __ S. Ct. __, 2007 W L 2064253 (Oct. 1, 2007) (No. 07-5316);
United States v. Dudley, 463 F.3d 1221, 1224 (11th Cir. 2006); United States v.
Davila, 461 F.3d 298, 299-300 (2d Cir. 2006), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 1485(2007); United States v. Scott, 441 F.3d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Guevara, 408 F.3d 252, 255 (5th Cir. 2005); United States v. Reynolds,
381 F.3d 404, 405 (5th Cir. 2004).
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fear of terrorist activity, and individuals who believe they have been in contact
with biohazardous substances, like anthrax, continue to fear for their personal
health and safety. W hile no evidence was presented establishing the impact of
M r. Chapple’s mailings on the other individuals who handled the envelopes, the
uncontested facts in the presentence report indicate the mail carrier, M uskogee
police officers, the postal inspector, postal workers, and employees with the
Oklahoma H ealth Department all came in contact with an envelope they knew was
leaking an unidentified substance. Therefore, it was not unreasonable for the
district court to make an inference that those who handled the envelopes likely
had concern for their physical safety and well-being until the substance was
identified as not harmful. After providing M r. Chapple notice of its intention to
consider this circumstance and an opportunity to present argument, it was
appropriate for the district court to consider it as part of the nature of M r.
Chapple’s offense for the purpose of determining whether the advisory Guidelines
sentencing range met the § 3553(a) factors.
W hile M r. Chapple generally complains the Guidelines preclude the district
court from considering the mailings separately or their impact on indirect victims,
this case does not involve an upward “departure” under the Guidelines, as did his
prior appeal. Rather, as the district court explained, it applied a “variance” under
§ 3553(a), due to the failure of the Guidelines to take into account the effect of
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both mailings on the indirect victims. In other words, having been precluded
from applying an upward “departure” based on the impact at least one mailing had
on an indirect victim, on remand the district court applied an upward “variance”
to take into account a circumstance which the Guidelines did not. As the district
court suggested, M r. Chapple’s offense of mailing threatening comm unications
did not impact only the intended recipient, M s. Cannarsa, but many more
individuals – a situation the Guidelines did not contemplate. Like the district
court, we believe M r. Chapple’s prior stalking conduct, together with the negative
impact his mailings had on M s. Cannarsa and the multiple other individuals who
handled the envelopes, is sufficient, for the purpose of applying a six-month
upward variance, to distinguish M r. Chapple’s offense from that of an ordinary
defendant who mails a threatening communication. W hile w e previously
determined M r. Chapple’s thirty-three-month sentence fell “clearly outside of the
national norm established by the Guidelines for the crimes of conviction,”
Chapple, 198 Fed. Appx. at 751 (quotation marks and citation omitted), we now
conclude a thirty-three-month sentence is reasonable based on the district court’s
sufficient explanation and justification in conjunction with § 3553(a).
Finally, as previously indicated, the district court stated a thirty-three-
month sentence w as reasonable after considering all of the sentencing factors
under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Thus, it does not appear it abused its discretion or
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otherwise impermissibly gave any one factor too much weight, disregarded
another factor, or ignored or misinterpreted applicable reasonableness case law.
W e defer to the district court’s exercise of discretion in imposing an upward six-
month variance, which we believe is within the bounds of reasonableness.
Garcia-Lara, 2007 W L 2380991, at *2. Based on this determination and the fact
M r. Chapple did not preserve a vindictiveness claim, we decline to address his
vindictiveness argument.
III. Conclusion
For these reasons, we A FFIRM M r. Chapple’s concurrent sentences.
Entered by the C ourt:
W ADE BRO RBY
United States Circuit Judge
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