Hare v. Denver Merch Mart ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
November 2, 2007
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
DA RRELL R. HA RE,
Plaintiff-Appellant, No. 06-1270
v. District of Colorado
DEN VER M ERCH AN DISE M AR T, (D.C. No. 04-CV-02416-PSF-M EH )
INC., DEN VER M ERCH ANDISE
M ART EM PLOYERS, INC., and
AM ERICA N REALTY INVESTO RS,
Defendants-Appellees.
OR D ER AND JUDGM ENT *
Before M U RPH Y, BROR BY, and M cCO NNELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-Appellant Darrell Hare was employed as the general manager of
the Denver M erchandise M art, Inc. (“the M art”) for nearly thirty years. Beginning
in 2001, his relationship with higher management began to break down. He was
terminated from his position as general manager on December 29, 2003, at the age
of 64. He brought this suit under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
(“ADEA”) and Colorado common law , alleging that his termination was the result
of illegal age discrimination and that he was discharged in violation of public
policy. Although the defendants provided substantial evidence that M r. Hare was
legitimately terminated for business reasons, that is not the question for this Court
on summary judgment. Employing the analytical structure of M cDonnell Douglas
v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973), as we must, we conclude that M r. Hare has
pointed to sufficient inconsistencies in the employer’s explanation for his
termination, that the case must go to a jury. W e therefore reverse the district
court’s grant of summary judgment on the A DEA claim, while affirming summary
judgment of the wrongful discharge claim.
I. Background
The Denver M erchandise M art is a trade show venue that provides
temporary space for events as well as permanent showrooms for the display of
wholesale merchandise. It is a subsidiary of A merican Realty Investors (“ARI”),
headquartered in D allas, Texas. M r. Hare was the general manager of the M art
until his termination on December 29, 2003. As general manager, M r. Hare
oversaw daily operations at the M art and paid employee wages and bonuses.
In 2001, ARI’s Asset M anager, John Cook, investigated the executive
bonus plan in place at the M art and concluded that it produced excessive
compensation for some company officials, including M r. Hare. M r. Cook found
that although M r. Hare’s base salary ranged between $155,000 to $210,000 per
-2-
year, M r. Hare’s total annual compensation including bonuses and other payments
was w ell over $300,000. He reported these findings to Gene Phillips, advisor to
the trust that is the controlling shareholder of ARI. ARI decided to implement a
revised bonus plan for 2002. In December 2001, M r. Cook informed Roger Klein,
the M art’s Controller, of the change and told him that bonus payments should not
be released without prior authorization. In spite of this directive, M r. Hare
issued, though he did not release, bonus checks in April 2002 for amounts that
would have been due under the prior plan. M r. Hare informed M r. Cook by letter,
with a legal memorandum attached to support his position, that he believed the
bonus payments were earned and vested and therefore required to be paid under
Colorado law. After considering the legal memorandum, M r. Cook directed first
quarter bonuses to be paid to all employees except M r. Hare and M r. Klein. M r.
Hare nonetheless released bonus checks to himself and M r. Klein contrary to M r.
Cook’s directive. M r. Cook did not immediately respond, but rather made clear
in a letter dated December 2, 2002 that executive bonuses would be eliminated as
of January 2003 and a new bonus program put in place.
On December 3, 2003, M r. Hare and M r. Klein attended a meeting in Dallas
with M r. Phillips, M r. Cook, and Karl Blaha to discuss the M art’s operations, the
budget, and the new bonus program for 2003. At the meeting, M r. Phillips
informed M r. Hare that there would be changes to the management agreement
between ARI and the M art, and M r. Cook presented the proposed bonus plan for
-3-
2003. M r. Hare was visibly upset by the discussion. M r. Phillips, himself 69
years old, then asked M r. Hare, “How old are you[?] 65, 66 years old[?]” App.
163. M r. Hare replied, “No.” Id. M r. Phillips asked, “W ell, how old are you?” to
which M r. Hare responded that he was 63, and M r. Phillips asked “How long do
you expect to continue to work?” Id. M r. Hare replied that he didn’t know, and
that he hadn’t thought about retiring because his daughter was in college and he
enjoyed working. M r. Phillips then commented that he would like M r. Hare to
assist in finding a successor to fill his position as general manager, “someone
younger to teach.” Id. Shortly thereafter M r. Hare and M r. Klein abruptly
walked out on the meeting.
A few days later Oscar Cashwell, a top-level liaison to M r. Phillips, called
M r. Hare and expressed his concern that M r. Hare had left the D ecember 3
meeting angrily. M r. Hare’s notes of the phone call record that M r. Cashwell
started the conversation by noting, “[y]ou are starting to get old like I am,” and
suggested that M r. Hare enter a consulting agreement with the M art while M r.
Hare picked a replacement and trained him. Id. These comments by M r. Phillips
and the follow-up phone call by M r. Cashwell were the only age-related remarks
made by ARI’s management to M r. H are.
In January 2003, M r. Klein resigned from his position as Controller of the
M art and M r. Hare resigned his corporate positions as President, Officer and
Director of D enver M erchandise M art, Inc., Denver M erchandise M art Employers,
-4-
Inc., and Valley Corporation. 1 M r. Cook and M r. Phillips testified that they
believed that M r. H are would soon also resign his position as general manager.
App. 267, 324. As a result, M r. Phillips directed the head of ARI’s human
resources department to search for a replacement. Believing that the M art might
soon be left without a general manager, M r. Cook began to take a more active role
in management of the M art.
In July 2003, Lisa Fogg joined the M art’s management team to replace M r.
Klein. As the M art’s new Controller, M s. Fogg investigated the M art’s
accounting and reported to M r. Cook that M r. Hare had taken payroll advances
and made vacation payouts to himself that may have violated the M art’s employee
policies. She also reported that many of the M art’s employees were intimidated
by M r. Hare and that M r. Hare arrived for work late and left early. M r. Cook
testified that although he had until mid-2003 considered M r. Hare to be a very
good manager, he learned from M s. Fogg and his own investigation that in fact
M r. Hare “did not exhibit positive management skills, and he did not take an
active role in managing the M art . . . the actual manager of the M art operation for
years had been Roger K lein. . . .” App. 159.
During the fall of 2003, M r. Cook, M r. Blaha, and M r. Phillips decided to
terminate M r. Hare, and on December 28, 2003, M r. Blaha and ARI’s head of
1
Denver M erchandise M art Employers, Inc. is a separate entity that
manages the M art’s payroll. The Valley Corporation holds the M art’s liquor
license.
-5-
hum an resources traveled to D enver to inform Mr. Hare of his termination. No
one directly replaced M r. Hare, and the position of general manager was formally
eliminated. M r. Cook assumed the responsibilities of general manager of the
M art, which he performed during two days each week in D enver.
The reasons for the decision to terminate M r. Hare are disputed, as is the
degree of involvement by M r. Phillips in the termination decision. M r. Hare
claims that he was terminated because of his age and in retaliation for his
decision to make bonus payments to himself and the M art’s employees in April
2002. M r. Hare also claims that M r. Phillips was the de facto final decision
maker at ARI and was an active participant in the decision to terminate him. The
Defendants respond that M r. Hare’s termination was based on his poor
performance as general manager of the M art and (or possibly or) because M r.
Cook determined that the position could be eliminated. The D efendants also
claim that M r. Phillips held merely an advisory role in the decision to terminate
M r. H are.
M r. Hare filed suit in the District Court of Colorado under the ADEA, 29
U.S.C. § 621, et seq., and for violation of Colorado common law prohibiting an
employer from discharging an employee in violation of public policy. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on both
claims. Hare v. Denver M erchandise M art, Inc., No. 04-cv-02416-PSF-DES,
2006 W L 1517730, at *13 (D. Colo. M ay 31, 2006). The district court found that
-6-
M r. Hare had failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA and that even
if he had satisfied the burden of demonstrating a prima facie case, he failed to
provide evidence that the defendants’ reasons for firing him were pretextual. The
district court granted summary judgment on M r. Hare’s common law wrongful
discharge claim because he failed to provide evidence of a causal connection
betw een his refusal to withhold bonuses and his termination twenty months later.
W e reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment on M r. Hare’s AD EA
claim, and affirm summary judgment on his wrongful discharge claim.
II. ADEA Claim
Under the ADEA, an employer cannot “discharge any individual . . .
because of such individual's age.” 29 U.S.C. § 623(a)(1). Thus, a plaintiff suing
under the ADEA must prove that the challenged employment action was
motivated, at least in part, by his age. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods.,
Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 141 (2000). The plaintiff may carry this burden either by
presenting direct evidence of the employer's discriminatory intent or by
presenting circumstantial evidence creating an inference of a discriminatory
motive using the tripartite M cDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis.
M cDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973); see Munoz v. St. M ary-
Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000) (applying the M cDonnell
Douglas framew ork to an ADEA claim). M r. Hare provides only circumstantial
evidence of alleged age discrimination.
-7-
Under the M cDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framew ork, the plaintiff
must first establish a prima facie case by showing that (1) he belonged to a
protected class; (2) he was qualified for the position; (3) he was discharged; and
(4) the position was not eliminated after his discharge. Kendrick v. Penske
Transp. Servs., Inc., 220 F.3d 1220, 1229 (10th Cir. 2000). If the plaintiff cannot
show that his position was not eliminated, the plaintiff may provide other
evidence that the termination occurred under circumstances that give rise to an
inference of unlawful discrimination. Plotke v. White, 405 F.3d 1092, 1100 (10th
Cir. 2005). In this Circuit “the fourth element of a prim a facie case is a flexible
one that can be satisfied differently in varying scenarios.” Id. at 1100.
If the plaintiff successfully makes a prima facie showing, the employer
must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment
action. Id. at 1099. The burden then shifts back to the employee to demonstrate
that the proffered reasons are pretextual. Id. To survive summary judgment, M r.
Hare need only show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he
has satisfied each element of the M cDonnell Douglas framework.
1. Prima Facie Case
The defendants do not dispute that M r. Hare has satisfied the first three
elements of the prima facie test, but contend that M r. Hare’s position was
eliminated by his discharge and therefore that M r. Hare fails to satisfy the fourth
elem ent. M r. H are claims that his position was not eliminated, and makes two
-8-
independent arguments in support. First, he alleges that he was essentially
replaced by M r. Cook. However, there is no evidence in the record showing that
M r. Cook gave up his former duties to take over M r. Hare’s position as general
manager. Second, M r. Hare claims that although the title of general manager was
eliminated, the duties of the general manager were simply reassigned to other
employees. This argument fails as a legal matter. To reassign the responsibilities
of a position to a number of other individuals is to eliminate the position. Furr v.
Seagate Tech., Inc., 82 F.3d 980, 988 (10th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he test for position
elimination is not whether the responsibilities were still performed, but rather
whether the responsibilities still constituted a single, distinct position.”).
Therefore M r. Hare does not provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether his position was eliminated after his discharge.
M r. Hare can still satisfy the fourth element of the prima facie test and
survive summary judgment if he can demonstrate that his termination occurred
“under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful discrimination.”
Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1100 (internal quotation marks omitted). The plaintiff is
required, however, to proffer evidence that his discharge did not result from the
most common legitimate reasons that an employer might terminate an employee,
including elimination of his position. Penske, 220 F.3d at 1226–27. W e have
found that a plaintiff may establish a prima facie case even though his position
w as elim inated w hen there is a general reduction in force and the plaintiff shows
-9-
that he was treated less favorably than similarly situated employees, Ingels v.
Thiokol Corp., 42 F.3d 616, 621 (10th Cir. 1994), or if the defendant does not
claim that the plaintiff’s termination was based on elimination of his position.
Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1100. A plaintiff can also show circumstances w hich give rise
to an inference of unlawful discrimination by proffering
actions or remarks made by decisionmakers that could be viewed as
reflecting a discriminatory animus, preferential treatment given to
employees outside the protected class, in a corporate downsizing, the
systematic transfer of a discharged employee's duties to other
employees, or a pattern of recommending the plaintiff for positions
for w hich she is not qualified [or over-qualified] and failure to
surface plaintiff's name for positions for which she is well-qualified.
A plaintiff might also rely upon the fact that the defendant, following
plaintiff's termination, continued to seek applicants to fill the
position, or, more generally, upon the timing or sequence of events
leading to plaintiff's termination.
Id. (emphasis added)(internal quotation marks and alterations omitted)
M r. Hare points to the age-related remarks made by M r. Phillips and M r.
Cashwell to show circumstances that give rise to an inference of discrimination.
For actions or remarks to support such an inference of discriminatory intent, the
plaintiff must demonstrate a nexus between the actions or remarks and the
decision to terminate. Id. To show a nexus, the remarks must be made by
someone involved in the decision to terminate the plaintiff. M r. Cook testified
that M r. Phillips ultimately made the decision to terminate M r. Hare, showing a
genuine issue of material fact as to w hether M r. Phillips was a primary
decisionmaker in M r. Hare’s termination.
-10-
Another element necessary to establish a nexus is temporal connection
between the remarks and the decision to terminate. The district court did not
find M r. Phillips’ statements at the D ecember 2002 meeting and M r. Cashwell’s
follow up phone call to be sufficient evidence of discriminatory intent because
they were made more than a year prior to M r. Hare’s termination. W e agree that
because of the temporal distance, without more, the remarks would not be
sufficient to support an inference of discrimination. 2 However, ARI began
searching for a replacement for M r. Hare in January 2003, less than a month after
the comments were made. App. 310. ARI had also suspended the bonus program
that made up more than half of M r. Hare’s yearly compensation prior to the
meeting, and did not establish a new bonus plan for 2003. The temporal nexus
between the age-related remarks and these more immediate actions by ARI is
relatively close and sufficient to support an inference of discriminatory motive
that satisfies the burden of describing a prima facie case. See Butler v. City of
Prairie Vill., KA, 172 F.3d 736, 749 (10th Cir. 1999) (finding that a decline in
work evaluations leading up to discharge may contribute to an inference of
discriminatory intent); M arx v. Schnuck M kts., Inc., 76 F.3d 324, 329 (10th Cir.
2
The Defendants cite cases in their brief that address the temporal
proximity necessary to support the causation prong of a prima facie case on a
motion to dismiss when bringing a retaliation claim. Although informative, those
cases are not entirely persuasive here because M r. Hare need not show causation
to establish a prima facie case under the ADEA. M r. Hare need only show that
the circumstances of his termination give rise to an inference of discrimination.
-11-
1996) (“[A] pattern of retaliatory conduct [that] begins soon after the filing of the
FLSA complaint and only culminates later in actual discharge” is sufficient to
support an inference of retaliatory motive); Ostrowski v. Atlantic M ut. Ins. Cos.,
968 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1992) (stating that allegedly discriminatory statements may
be sufficient to present a prima facie case under M cDonnell Douglas).
The burden on M r. Hare to establish a prima facie case under the
M cDonnell Douglas framework is not onerous, Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1099, and the
“nonmovant is only required to bring forth evidence tending to establish or show
the material fact at issue.” Riggs v. AirTran Airways, Inc., 497 F.3d 1108, 1116
(10th Cir. 2007). W e acknowledge that a reasonable jury could interpret M r.
Phillips’ retirement questions as a matter of succession planning rather than a
reflection of age-related animus, as the district court did, but on summary
judgment all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the party opposing
the motion. The burden of establishing a prima facie case is “one of production,
not persuasion and involves no credibility assessment.” Plotke, 405 F.3d at 1101.
W hatever may be the most persuasive interpretation, M r. Phillips’ age-related
statements are evidence that he, as the de facto head of the ARI management
chain of command, was interested in replacing M r. Hare with a younger employee
and M r. Hare’s termination was motivated at least in part by age.
-12-
2. Pretext
In response to M r. Hare’s prima facie case, the defendants successfully
articulate a nondiscriminatory reason for M r. Hare’s termination. In fact, the
testimony of M r. Phillips, M r. Cook, M r. Blaha, and M ichael Lane provides
numerous legitimate reasons why M r. Hare was terminated, including that: M r.
Hare’s responsibilities could be managed from Dallas at lower cost, he did not
maximize the M art’s earning potential, he kept short working hours and was not
actively involved in day-to-day operations at the M art, he displayed an
insubordinate attitude towards ARI’s Dallas management, and he employed an
intimidating and ineffective management style. Because the defendants have
satisfied their burden under M cDonnell Douglas, M r. Hare “can avoid summary
judgment only if he is able to show that a genuine dispute of material fact exists
as to whether the defendant’s articulated reason[s] [are] pretextual.” M unoz v. St.
M ary-Corwin Hosp., 221 F.3d 1160, 1165 (10th Cir. 2000) (internal quotes
omitted).
“Pretext can be shown by such w eaknesses, implausibilities,
inconsistencies, incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered
legitimate reasons for its action that a reasonable fact finder could rationally find
them unw orthy of credence . . . .” Hardy v. S.F. Phosphates Ltd. Co., 185 F.3d
1076, 1080 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotes and alterations omitted). The inquiry
goes to the subjective belief of those making the termination decision; “[t]he
-13-
relevant inquiry is not whether the employer's proffered reasons were wise, fair or
correct, but whether it honestly believed those reasons and acted in good faith
upon those beliefs.” Rivera v. City and County of Denver, 365 F.3d 912, 924–25
(10th Cir. 2004) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
M r. Hare successfully shows pretext by pointing to an apparent
contradiction in the testimony of those involved in the decision to terminate him.
The following is an excerpt from M r. Blaha’s deposition regarding his
understanding as to why M r. Hare was terminated:
Q: W hy was [M r. Hare] terminated?
A: Because we decided to eliminate the position, that the position
was not necessary, that we could run the property out of–out of
Dallas.
Q: That decision wasn’t based on the fact that M r. Hare was
incompetent or anything, was it?
A: No.
Q: Had nothing to do with M r. Hare’s performance at all, did it?
...
A: No.
App. 277. Yet M r. Phillips states directly in his testimony that M r. Hare was
terminated because of his performance. M r. Cook states in his deposition that M r.
Hare was terminated because “[h]e wasn’t doing anything. He was completely
noneffective in his position . . . he was not participating in the process of
managing revenue to a higher achievement or managing expenses to a lower
level.” App. 271. M r. Lane states that “he was going to be terminated because he
wasn’t working.” A pp. 307. None of these statements can be squared with M r.
-14-
Blaha’s testimony that M r. Hare was not terminated for any reason relating to his
performance. A reasonable jury could conclude that the inconsistency in these
statements are evidence that all of the reasons proffered are merely pretextual.
To be sure, individual participants in a collective termination decision
might well provide a variety of reasons for the termination of an employee. The
mere variety in the reasons would not alone undermine their credibility. Each
individual may consider a different reason to be the essential factor in a decision
to terminate. E.g., Villiarimo v. Aloha Island Air, Inc., 281 F.3d 1054, 1063 (9th
Cir. 2002) (upholding grant of summary judgment to employer when employee
was fired for two different, but consistent, reasons); Johnson v. Nordstrom, Inc.,
260 F.3d 727, 733–34 (7th Cir. 2001) (finding no pretext when the employer's
reasons for termination were neither inconsistent nor conflicting); Nidds v.
Schindler Elevator Corp., 113 F.3d 912, 918 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that
different justifications for an adverse action are not sufficient to defeat summary
judgment when those reasons are “not incompatible”). However, the reasons
stated by the ARI management team were not only different but mutually
inconsistent. Under the M cDonnell Douglas framework, contradictions of this
sort are sufficient to establish pretext for purpose of summary judgment. Randle
v. City of Aurora, 69 F.3d 441, 452 (10th Cir. 1995) (stating that the plaintiff
need not provide direct evidence of discriminatory motive to survive summary
judgment).
-15-
Furthermore, the district court erroneously required M r. Hare to provide not
only evidence that the defendants’ proffered reasons for discharging M r. Hare
were pretextual, but additional evidence to show that age discrimination was the
real reason, citing M acD onald v. E. Wyo. M ental Health Ctr., 941 F.2d 1115,
1122 (10th Cir. 1991) (“W hile the M acDonalds may have created a genuine issue
as to whether the proffered reasons were the real reasons for their discharge, they
have offered no credible evidence that the real reason was age discrimination.”).
Hare, 2006 W L 1517730, at *13. M acDonald is no longer good law. The
holding was implicitly overturned by this Court in Randle, 69 F.3d 441, which
stated that discriminatory animus may be inferred from the simple showing of
pretext. The rule was confirmed by the Supreme Court in Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 147–49 (2000). The current standard for
an age-discrimination claim to survive summary judgment does not necessarily
require a plaintiff to provide any evidence that the real reason for his termination
was age-related. The Court noted in Reeves that the showing of a prima facie
case, “combined with sufficient evidence to find that the employer’s asserted
justification is false . . . will [not] always be adequate” to avoid summary
judgment. Id. at 148. Yet, the exceptions described in Reeves impose a heavy
evidentiary burden on employers in showing an alternative source for the
discrepancies in their reasons. Id.-16-
For instance, an employer would be entitled to judgment as a matter
of law if the record conclusively revealed some other,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employer’s decision, or if the
plaintiff created only a weak issue of fact as to whether the
employer’s reason w as untrue and there was abundant and
uncontroverted independent evidence that no discrimination had
occurred.
Id. (emphasis added). Because the Defendants are unable to provide “abundant
and uncontroverted” evidence that no discrimination occurred, M r. Hare’s
showing of inconsistencies in the D efendant’s reasons for discharging him are
sufficient to satisfy his burden of production and survive summary judgment.
III. W rongful Discharge
M r. Hare also claims that he was wrongfully discharged in violation of
public policy under Colorado common law . He argues that ARI’s decision not to
permit him to pay out bonuses under the old plan to himself and M r. Klein was
somehow illegal and therefore that it violated Colorado public policy to fire him
for refusing to carry it out. To survive summary judgment on this claim, M r.
Hare must show that (1) his employer directed him to perform an illegal act as
part of his w ork related duties; (2) the act directed by his employer w ould violate
a specific statute relating to public health, safety or welfare; (3) he was
terminated as a result of refusing to perform the act directed; and (4) his employer
was aware or reasonably should have been aware that M r. Hare’s refusal to
comply with the directive was based on his reasonable belief that the act was
illegal, contrary to clearly expressed statutory policy relating to M r. Hare’s duty
-17-
as a citizen, or violative of M r. H are’s legal right or privilege as a worker. Roe v.
Cheyenne M t. Conf. Resport, 124 F.3d 1221, 1235 (10th Cir. 1997) (citing M artin
M arietta Corp. v. Lorenz, 823 P.2d 100, 109 (Colo. 1992)).
W e are skeptical that M r. Hare has established any of the elements
necessary to describe a wrongful discharge claim under Colorado common law.
Because failure to show a genuine dispute of material fact as to one of the
elements is fatal to M r. Hare’s claim, we shall focus only on the issue of
causation.
As the district court held, a reasonable jury could not find on this record
that there was a causal connection between M r. Hare’s refusal to follow
management’s directive not to pay bonuses and his termination twenty months
later. The temporal distance between the two events, without more, cannot
support an inference of causation. See Miller v. Auto. Club of N.M ., Inc., 420
F.3d 1098, 1121 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding a six month window between protected
activity and adverse action insufficient to satisfy causal connection); Connor v.
Schnuck M kts, Inc., 121 F.3d 1390, 1395 (10th Cir. 1997) (finding four month
time lag between protected activity and termination insufficient by itself to justify
an inference of causation). Although M r. Hare claims that documentation of the
bonus dispute was reviewed at the time of his termination, nothing in the record
supports such a conclusion. The head of ARI’s human resources, M r. Lane, only
testifies that documentation of the dispute between M r. Hare and M r. Cook
-18-
regarding bonuses w as copied to him as the head of human resources. M r.
Phillips mentions M r. Hare’s “insubordinate attitude” as one of the reasons for
M r. Hare’s termination, but there is no evidence to support the conclusion that
M r. Phillips was specifically referring to the bonuses incident. App. 318.
Therefore we affirm the grant of summary judgment for the defendants by the
district court.
IV.
W e AFFIRM the grant of summary judgment on the wrongful discharge
claim, REVERSE the grant of summary judgment on the ADEA claim, and
R EM A N D for further proceedings consistent w ith this opinion.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
-19-