Jones v. Hernandez ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
December 6, 2007
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
ANNETTE APODACA JONES,
individually and on behalf of all
similarly situated individuals, No. 07-2042
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. District of New Mexico
JUAN HERNANDEZ, individually (D.C. No. CIV-05-929 BB/ACT )
and in his official capacity, BRIAN D.
HAINES, individually and in his
official capacity, ARTURO
RODRIGUEZ, individually and in his
official capacity, VICKI LUSK,
individually and in her official
capacity, and THE BOARD OF
COUNTY COMMISSIONERS FOR
DOÑA ANA COUNTY,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRISCOE, McKAY, and McCONNELL, Circuit Judges.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination
of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). This case is
therefore submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not
binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10 th Cir. R. 32.1.
Appellant Annette Apodaca Jones filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983alleging that her denial of a promotion violated due process. The district court
granted motions for dismissal as to one defendant and summary judgment for the
remaining defendants, holding that because promotion decisions were based on
subjective factors, Ms. Jones did not have a constitutionally protected property
right in a promotion. Ms. Jones argues on appeal that the district court erred in
determining that there was no material issue of fact remaining to be resolved.
We previously issued an order to show cause whether we had jurisdiction to
hear an appeal from the denial of summary judgment, as an additional, unresolved
claim remained before the district court. However, this claim has since been
dismissed, and the district court’s order is now final. We therefore take
jurisdiction, reverse the orders of dismissal and summary judgment, and remand
for further proceedings.
I. Background
In 2001 Ms. Jones sought a position as the Records Supervisor for the
Sheriff’s Department of Doña Ana County, New Mexico. The County used a
competitive interview process to select the Records Supervisor. In the interview,
panel members asked the aspirants preselected questions and then numerically
scored their answers by comparing them to a provided “best” answer. Ms. Jones
received the second highest score; the County gave the position to the highest
scoring applicant.
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According to evidence submitted by Ms. Jones, 1 however, the process was
rigged. She states that some four years after her unsuccessful application to
become Records Supervisor, she was cleaning out the desk of the successful
applicant, who had left the office, when she discovered an envelope containing
both the questions and “best” answers for the 2001 interview.
Current and former employees subsequently disclosed that the questions,
answers, and grading information for interviews were routinely provided to
applicants favored by Sheriff Hernandez, with his knowledge and consent. These
applicants used the information to obtain the highest scores on both written exams
and oral interviews. Sheriff Hernandez always hired the highest scoring
applicants. In at least one instance, an applicant’s answers to the interview
questions matched the provided answers word-for-word, earning the highest
interview score for that applicant from among all the applicants that met that
panel.
1
As the district court noted, Ms. Jones submitted testimony in the form of a
document that was notarized, but that does not indicate she swore an oath to its
truthfulness. Such a submission is not admissible for purposes of summary
judgment. See 28 U.S.C. § 1746. Rather than giving Ms. Jones the opportunity to
correct this mistake, the district court granted summary judgment on the ground
that, even if it accepted Ms. Jones’ purported affidavit, it would not rule
differently. Accordingly, we treat the submission as if it were an affidavit on the
understanding that, on remand, if she does not submit evidence in proper form the
district court may revisit its ruling on summary judgment. The same also applies
to the unsworn “affidavit” of Robert L. Jones.
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Ms. Jones filed suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Sheriff Hernandez and
four other county officials, claiming violations of her procedural and substantive
due process rights and a breach of contract. Sheriff Hernandez, but not the other
defendants, moved to dismiss Ms. Jones’ suit on the basis of qualified immunity
and other grounds. In an order dated February 8, 2006, the district court
dismissed Ms. Jones’ due process claim against Sheriff Hernandez on the ground
that her complaint did not demonstrate a binding mutual understanding that she
would receive a promotion if she met certain conditions, which is a prerequisite to
the recognition of a property interest under the Due Process Clause. On March
20, 2006, Ms. Jones filed a motion to compel the County to release detailed
information regarding the interview and testing process. The court granted this
motion on April 4, 2006. The next day the remaining defendants filed a motion
for summary judgment based on the law of the case, arguing that the same
deficiencies in the complaint that led to the dismissal of Ms. Jones’ claims against
Sheriff Hernandez compelled summary judgment in their favor. They also sought
a stay of discovery based on qualified immunity. The court granted their motion
for a stay pending resolution of their motion for summary judgment. The court
then granted summary judgment in favor of the remaining defendants on all
claims. Ms. Jones appeals this decision.
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II. Discussion
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Kaul v.
Stephan, 83 F.3d 1208, 1212 (10th Cir. 1996). When defendants in a § 1983 suit
assert qualified immunity, the court must determine whether, taken in the light
most favorable to the party asserting the injury, the evidence shows that the
defendant’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and if so, “whether the law
clearly established that the officer's conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of
the case.” Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
A state may not deprive a person of property without due process of law.
U.S. Const. amend. XIV, §1. Whether state law creates a right that “constitutes a
property interest for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment . . . is ultimately [a
question] of federal constitutional law.” Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales,
545 U.S. 748, 757 (2005). An interest in a promotion “is a ‘property’ interest for
due process purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings
that support [the] claim of entitlement . . . .” Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593,
601 (1972). A hiring process that allows for discretion and subjectivity cannot
create a mutually explicit understanding. Nunez v. City of Los Angeles, 147 F.3d
867, 873 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1998). Conversely, a hiring process that imposes
“significant limitation on the discretion of the decision maker” can create a
mutually explicit understanding that gives rise to a protected property right.
Goodisman v. Lytle, 724 F.2d 818, 820 (9th Cir. 1984). State law or settled
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hiring practices can create mutually explicit understandings. Clinger v. New
Mexico Highlands Univ. Bd. of Regents, 215 F.3d 1162, 1167 (10th Cir. 2000);
Lovato v. City of Albuquerque, 742 P.2d 499, 502; 106 N.M. 287, 290 (N.M.
1987).
A. Did the Sheriff Have Discretion?
Doña Ana County’s merit system ordinance governs the process of filling
the position of Records Supervisor in the Sheriff’s Department. On its face, it
allows for discretion in the hiring process. Under the ordinance, selection by the
interview panel confers only a “panel recommended” status to the highest scoring
applicant, following which the Sheriff may choose whether or not to hire the
applicant.
Settled hiring practices, however, can reveal that discretion is illusory.
Perry, 408 U.S. at 599-600. According to Vicki Lusk, the employee at the
county’s Human Resources Department responsible for the testing and
interviewing process, the County always gave jobs to the applicants with the
highest numerical scores. This practice was so settled that the Sheriff, who is
vested with discretion to accept or reject the recommendation of the interview
panel, nevertheless provided favored applicants with the interview questions and
answers in an effort to ensure they obtained the highest scores. Even in cases
where scores were separated by only hundredths of a point, the Sheriff offered the
job to the highest scoring applicant even if he or she was not the “favorite.” A
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reasonable jury could infer from this evidence that the County’s settled practice
was always to extend the job offer to the highest scoring applicant and that this
settled practice overrides the discretionary provisions of the County’s merit
system ordinance.
Ms. Jones was not the highest scoring applicant for the 2001 Records
Supervisor position, but she was the second highest. Her claim to a property
interest in the 2001 promotion rests on the theory that the County, aware of the
cheating, should have disqualified the cheater and hired her. Her claim has merit,
as Doña Ana County’s policies required the disqualification of any job applicant
who had access to the questions and answers.
B. Did the Interview Panel Have Discretion?
In response, the defendants argue that the scoring during the interview
stage of the process was discretionary. They maintain that the interview panel
members had discretion in scoring the applicants, and that this discretion, as a
matter of law, precludes a finding that an applicant has a property interest in
promotion. See Goodisman, 724 F.2d at 820 (holding that no property interest is
created when hiring procedures do not impose “significant limitation on the
discretion of the decision maker”).
One Sheriff’s Department employee provided evidence that the oral
interviews were scored by comparing responses to the “best” answers for selected
questions. From this, the district court inferred that scoring was subjective rather
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than objective, and therefore discretionary, because comparison to the “best”
answer rather than the “correct” answer made evaluation subjective. This is not
the only possible inference. A comparison of the applicant’s answer to the “best”
answer is common in grading, and need not carry any implication of subjectivity.
If an applicant on a driving test is asked how much following distance to allow on
the highway, it would not be subjective to give the highest score to the applicant
who gives the answer closest to one car length per every ten miles per hour. The
district court’s assumption that scoring based on “best” or “worst” is more
subjective than scoring based on “right” or “wrong” may sometimes be true, but
not always.
Moreover, Ms. Jones filed a motion to compel discovery regarding the
content of the interviewing process, including the questions and the model
answers. This evidence presumably would resolve whether the questions were
more subjective or objective in nature. After first granting that motion, the court
stayed discovery pending resolution of the defendants’ motion for summary
judgment and then granted summary judgment on the ground that there was no
disputed issue of material fact bearing on the issue.
This, we think, was premature. While a ruling on qualified immunity
“should be made early in the proceedings,” Saucier, 533 U.S. at 200, discovery as
to evidence central to the qualified immunity analysis must be allowed. See Fed.
R. Civ. P. 56(c) (summary judgment should only be entered when the evidence
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shows “no genuine issue as to any material fact”). On the record before the
district court, there was doubt as to whether the scoring protocol employed by the
interview panel was subjective or objective. The district court should not have
granted summary judgment while that factual dispute was still unresolved.
C. The Order Dismissing Claims Against Sheriff Hernandez
For the same reason, the court’s dismissal of Ms. Jones’ claims against
Sheriff Hernandez was erroneous. Ms. Jones has alleged and may be able to
prove that she had a property interest in promotion, based on a nondiscretionary
mode of selection. Ms. Jones’ claims against Sheriff Hernandez cannot be
resolved in his favor as a matter of law, but require factual development, along
with the claims against the other defendants.
III. Conclusion
The judgment of the United States District Court for the District of New
Mexico is REVERSED and the case is REMANDED for further proceedings.
Entered for the Court,
Michael W. McConnell
Circuit Judge
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