United States v. Hernandez ( 2007 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
December 11, 2007
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 07-6006
v. (D.C. No. 06-CR-172-1-R)
(W.D. Okla.)
ROSALIO O. HERNANDEZ,
also known as Chalio,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TYMKOVICH, BALDOCK, and EBEL, Circuit Judges.
A federal grand jury sitting in the Western District of Oklahoma returned a
three-count indictment against Rosalio O. Hernandez on federal drug trafficking
charges. Count 1 alleged that, from December 2001 through April 20, 2006,
Mr. Hernandez conspired with Jesus Adolfo Tinajero-Porras (Tinajero) and other
persons to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 100 kilograms or
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
more of marijuana in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. 1 Count 2
alleged that, on or about July 4, 2002, Mr. Hernandez knowingly and intentionally
distributed approximately fifteen pounds of marijuana to a cooperating witness in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). Count 3 alleged that, on or about January 23,
2005, Mr. Hernandez used a telephone to facilitate the distribution of controlled
substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
Mr. Tinajero was separately indicted on eleven counts of violating the
federal drug trafficking laws. The cases against Mr. Hernandez and Mr. Tinajero
were consolidated for purposes of trial and tried jointly before a jury in
September 2006. 2
At the conclusion of trial, the jury found Mr. Hernandez guilty of Count 1,
the conspiracy charge. It additionally made a specific factual finding that 100
kilograms or more of marijuana was involved in the conspiracy. 3 R., Vol. 1, Doc.
46. The jury found Mr. Hernandez not guilty of Count 2, the distribution charge,
but guilty of Count 3, the telephone facilitation charge. Id. In January 2007, the
district court sentenced Mr. Hernandez to a term of imprisonment of sixty-three
1
In Count 1, Mr. Hernandez was also charged with conspiring to distribute
five kilograms or more of cocaine. With the agreement of the government and
before the case was submitted to the jury, the district court struck the cocaine
allegations from the indictment and verdict form.
2
The charges against Mr. Tinajero are not at issue in this appeal.
3
We note that one kilogram equals 2.2 pounds and that 100 kilograms
therefore equals 220 pounds.
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months on Count 1 and forty-eight months on Count 3, with the sentences to be
served concurrently. Id., Doc. 52 at 2. The district court calculated
Mr. Hernandez’s sentences based on the United States Sentencing Guidelines
(Guidelines), which the court recognized are “only advisory now,” id., Vol. 5
at 16, in light of the United States Supreme Court’s decision in United States v.
Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
Mr. Hernandez is now appealing (1) his conviction and sentence on Count
1, the conspiracy charge, arguing insufficient evidence was presented to support
the jury’s verdict, and (2) the district court’s sentencing decision. Exercising
jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I. Background.
A. Evidence at Trial.
In their respective briefs, the parties have thoroughly summarized the
evidence that was presented at trial pertaining to the charges against
Mr. Hernandez, and we see no need to duplicate their efforts here. In addition,
we note that Mr. Hernandez’s challenges to the sufficiency of the evidence are
narrowly focused on a single drug transaction that occurred in December 2001.
In his brief, Mr. Hernandez has summarized the evidence presented at trial
pertaining to that transaction as follows:
Defendant’s only other alleged involvement in the conspiracy
was based on evidence Tinajero used a cellular phone subscribed to
Defendant to arrange for the transportation of marijuana by Angel
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Henry Sosa in December, 2001. On December 12, 2001, Angel
Henry Sosa was arrested in Texas, with 1,986 pounds of marijuana.
Sosa testified that Tinajero asked him to transport the marijuana
during a telephone conversation. Sosa also testified that he had
obtained marijuana from Tinajero in Oklahoma City, but he never
mentioned [Defendant]. Sosa provided authorities the telephone
number used by Tinajero during their December, 2001,
conversations, and that telephone number proved to have been
subscribed in [Defendant’s] name, date of birth and social security
number.
Aplt. Br. at 7.
At sentencing, relying on the Sosa/Tinajero transaction in December 2001,
the district court found Mr. Hernandez accountable for 1,986 pounds or 902.7
kilograms of marijuana, and this additional drug quantity increased the base
offense level for the conspiracy conviction from 26 to 30. 4 The court also granted
a two level adjustment for Mr. Hernandez’s voluntary debriefings, and a two level
adjustment for minor role in the offense, resulting in a total adjusted offense level
of 26. Given that Mr. Hernandez had no prior criminal convictions and thus a
Criminal History Category of I, the Guidelines provided a sentencing range of
sixty-three to seventy-eight months for the conspiracy conviction, and the district
court imposed a sentence of sixty-three months.
4
See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(c)(7) (Nov. 1, 2006)
(providing a base offense level of 26 for drug conspiracies involving “[a]t least
100 KG but less than 400 KG of Marihuana”); id., § 2D1.1(c)(5) (providing a
base offense level of 30 for drug conspiracies involving “[a]t least 700 KG but
less than 1,000 KG of Marihuana”).
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B. Arguments on Appeal.
In this appeal, Mr. Hernandez has summarized his challenges to the
sufficiency of the evidence as follows:
Defendant Hernandez submits that his participation in [the]
1,986 pound marijuana offense in December 2001, based on
Tinajero’s use of [a] telephone subscribed to [Defendant] to facilitate
that offense, were overly conjectural, and did not prove his
participation in that conspiracy either beyond a reasonable doubt or
by a preponderance of the evidence.
....
. . . [T]he facts in this case do not support a finding beyond a
reasonable doubt that Defendant had anything to do with the . . .
1,986 pound marijuana offense in 2001, apart from Tinajero’s use of
his telephone, and, therefore, that he conspired to possess and
distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana. Even if the evidence
did support his conviction of conspiring to possess 100 kilograms of
marijuana without the 1,986 pounds of marijuana, it did not prove by
a preponderance of the evidence that the 1,986 pound possession was
foreseeable to him. He respectfully applies to this Court for remand
for resentencing.
Aplt. Br. at 8-9, 16.
As set forth below, we agree with the government that there was sufficient
evidence presented at trial to support both Mr. Hernandez’s conspiracy conviction
and his sentence.
II. Analysis.
A. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support the Jury’s Verdict.
“Whether the government presented sufficient evidence to support a
conviction is a legal question we review de novo.” United States v. Dunmire, 403
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F.3d 722, 724 (10th Cir. 2005). “In undertaking our review, we consider the
record in the light most favorable to the government to determine whether a
reasonable jury could find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, based on the direct
and circumstantial evidence, together with the reasonable inferences to be drawn
therefrom.” Id. (quotation omitted). Thus, “[w]e may reverse only if no rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.” United States v. Brown, 400 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2005)
(quotations omitted). This is a “restrictive standard of review,” and it “provides
us with very little leeway.” United States v. Evans, 970 F.2d 663, 671 (10th Cir.
1992).
As noted above, the jury found Mr. Hernandez guilty of conspiring with
Mr. Tinajero to distribute 100 kilograms or more of marijuana in violation of 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846. To prove the drug trafficking conspiracy alleged in
this case, the government was required to prove that: “(1) [Mr. Hernandez]
agreed with [one] or more persons to import and possess with intent to distribute
100 kilograms or more of marijuana, (2) [Mr. Hernandez] knew at least the
essential objectives of the conspirac[y], (3) [Mr. Hernandez] knowingly and
voluntarily became a part of the conspirac[y], and (4) interdependence existed
among the alleged coconspirators.” United States v. Arras, 373 F.3d 1071, 1074
(10th Cir. 2004). “By necessity, the government may establish these elements by
direct or circumstantial evidence.” Evans, 970 F.2d at 668. But as we have
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repeatedly emphasized in our decisions in this area, “we cannot sustain a
conspiracy conviction if the evidence does no more than create a suspicion of
guilt or amounts to a conviction resulting from piling inference on top of
inference.” United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 741 (10th Cir. 1991).
Assuming membership in the conspiracy is proven, however, the
government need not produce “evidence of direct participation in the commission
of [each] substantive offense or other evidence from which participation might
fairly be inferred.” Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 646 (1946)
(rejecting holding in United States v. Sall, 116 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1940)). To the
contrary, as the district court instructed the jury in this case, the doctrine of
vicarious liability plays a critical role in the context of conspiracy cases. The
court’s vicarious liability instruction read as follows, and we note that
Mr. Hernandez did not object to the instruction:
Every conspirator is guilty of the illegal acts that are done as
part of and in furtherance of the conspiracy even though those acts
are done solely by coconspirators. If you are satisfied beyond a
reasonable doubt that, at the time an alleged offense was committed,
a Defendant had entered into and continued to be a member of an
unlawful conspiracy as I have defined that for you; and if you further
find beyond a reasonable doubt that a coconspirator of the
Defendant committed the offense while the conspiracy continued to
exist and in furtherance of that unlawful conspiracy or as an object of
that conspiracy, then you may find the Defendant guilty of that
offense even though he was not the person who actually committed
or personally aided and abetted in the commission of the offense.
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R., Vol. 1, Doc. 47 at 51; see also id. at 37 (jury instruction stating that “[o]nce a
person becomes a member of a conspiracy, he is held legally responsible for the
acts of the other members done in furtherance of the conspiracy, even though he
was not present or aware that the acts were being committed”); Evans, 970 F.2d at678 n.20 (“Under Pinkerton, a defendant is liable for any crimes committed by a
coconspirator if those crimes (1) were within the scope of the conspiracy or
(2) were reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the
unlawful agreement.”) (citing 328 U.S. at 646-48).
As the government has pointed out in its brief, Mr. Hernandez “does not
attack the conviction for conspiracy itself.” Aplee. Br. at 6. Instead, he is
attacking only “the jury’s finding that the conspiracy involved 100 kilograms or
more of marijuana, a finding that subjects [him] to a statutory penalty of not less
than 5 years nor more than 40 years of imprisonment under 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B)(vii).” Aplee. Br. at 6. Having carefully reviewed the evidence put
forth by the government at trial, we conclude the jury’s finding that the
conspiracy involved 100 kilograms or more of marijuana was supported by the
evidence.
To begin with, Brian Long testified at trial that, from 2000 through 2004,
he purchased large quantities of marijuana from Mr. Tinajero on a weekly basis
and then distributed the marijuana to third persons. R., Vol. 3 at 237-45. In
addition, Mr. Long identified Mr. Hernandez as a person he met through
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Mr. Tinajero, and he testified that Mr. Hernandez delivered marijuana to him on
behalf of Mr. Tinajero. Id. at 252-53. Specifically, Mr. Long testified that
Mr. Hernandez delivered approximately three to fifteen pounds of marijuana to
him at a time, three or four times a month from early 2000 to the latter part of
2002. Id. at 253. Even viewing this testimony conservatively (i.e., assuming it
involved only eight months in 2000 and eight months in 2002 for a total of
twenty-eight months, and that a total of only nine pounds of marijuana was being
delivered each month, for a total of 252 pounds or 114.5 kilograms), this evidence
was sufficient to establish that Mr. Hernandez was part of a drug distribution
conspiracy involving 100 kilograms or more of marijuana.
As noted by the government, Mr. Long also “testified that [Mr. Hernandez]
delivered the fifteen pounds of marijuana for Tinajero and that Long paid
[Mr. Hernandez] $500 per pound for a total of $7,500 in cash at delivery,” and
“[t]his transaction was the subject of Count 2 of the Indictment, on which the jury
returned a verdict of not guilty.” Aplee. Br. at 9. Although the not guilty verdict
on Count 2 indicates the jury found that Mr. Long’s testimony regarding this
specific transaction was not credible, the not guilty verdict on Count 2 does not
necessarily undercut the remainder of Mr. Long’s testimony regarding the total
amounts of marijuana that Mr. Hernandez delivered to him. Indeed, in reviewing
for sufficiency of the evidence, “[c]redibility choices are resolved in favor of the
jury’s verdict.” Horn, 946 F.2d at 741. As a result, viewing the evidence in the
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light most favorable to the government, as we are required to do, we must assume
the jury found that the remainder of Mr. Long’s testimony was credible. 5
This is an important point because Mr. Long’s testimony not only provided
direct evidence of Mr. Hernandez’s participation in a drug distribution conspiracy
involving in excess of 100 kilograms of marijuana, but his testimony also linked
Mr. Hernandez to the conspiracy as of December 2001 and thus the time of the
transaction involving the 1,986 pounds of marijuana. Consequently, based on
Mr. Long’s testimony, and given the additional evidence showing that
Mr. Tinajero used a telephone that had been subscribed in Mr. Hernandez’s name
to coordinate the transaction involving the 1,986 pounds of marijuana, the jury
could reasonably have found that: (1) Mr. Hernandez was knowingly involved
with Mr. Tinajero in a large-scale drug distribution conspiracy in December 2001;
and (2) he is therefore vicariously liable for the transaction involving the 1,986
pounds of marijuana even if he did not participate in that transaction.
5
Because “all reasonable inferences and credibility choices must be made in
support of the jury’s verdict,” Evans, 970 F.2d at 671 (quotation omitted), we will
not assume, as the government does in its brief, that the jury’s not guilty verdict
on Count 2 means “it is likely that [the jury] discounted Long’s testimony in
calculating quantity also,” Aplee. Br. at 13. In fact, we note that Mr. Hernandez’s
counsel was able to elicit testimony from Mr. Long that provided a specific
reason for the jury not to believe his testimony regarding the fifteen-pound
transaction, namely that Mr. Long had failed to mention the transaction in his
initial discussions with the police as a cooperating witness. R., Vol. 3 at 264-68.
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Accordingly, we conclude that the evidence concerning the marijuana
transactions in which Mr. Hernandez was directly involved (i.e., Mr. Long and the
114.5 kilograms), or, alternatively, the evidence concerning the transaction for
which he could be found vicariously liable (i.e., the December 2001 transaction
and the 1,986 pounds or 902.7 kilograms), provided a sufficient evidentiary basis
for the government to meet the 100-kilogram threshold.
B. The District Court’s Sentencing Decision.
As we have discussed in a number of recent published decisions, the
Supreme Court established a new appellate-level standard of review for federal
sentences in Booker:
In United States v. Booker, . . . the Supreme Court held that
the mandatory application of the Guidelines to judge-found facts
(other than a prior conviction) violates the Sixth Amendment. 125 S.
Ct. at 749-50. Rather than declare the Guidelines unconstitutional,
however, the Court excised the provision of the federal sentencing
statute that made the Guidelines mandatory, 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1),
effectively making the Guidelines advisory. The Court also excised
18 U.S.C. § 3742(e), which set forth the standard of review on
appeal, and held that the proper standard of review for sentences
imposed post-Booker is “reasonableness.”
United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1053 (10th Cir. 2006) (per curiam).
In light of Booker, “[w]e will set aside [Mr. Hernandez’s] sentence only if
it is procedurally or substantively unreasonable.” United States v. Geiner, 498
F.3d 1104, 1107 (10th Cir. 2007). We recently described these two concepts as
follows:
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A procedurally reasonable sentence reflects the sentencing court’s
calculation of the applicable advisory Guidelines range and its
application of the § 3553(a) factors. See United States v. Atencio,
476 F.3d 1099, 1102 (10th Cir. 2007). In addition, to impose a
procedurally reasonable sentence, the sentencing court must “afford
defendants their rights under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure.” Id. A sentence is substantively reasonable when it
“reflects the gravity of the crime and the § 3553(a) factors as applied
to the case.” Id.
Moreover, although the Guidelines are now advisory, we
accord a properly calculated Guidelines sentence a presumption of
substantive reasonableness, see [Kristl, 437 F.3d at 1054-55], an
approach the Supreme Court recently upheld as constitutional, Rita v.
United States, __ U.S. __, 127 S. Ct. 2456 . . . (2007). . . .
. . . With this in mind, we first determine whether the District
Court correctly applied the Guidelines, reviewing the court’s findings
of fact for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo.
Geiner, 498 F.3d at 1107-08.
Mr. Hernandez challenges the procedural reasonableness of his sentence for
the conspiracy conviction. He argues insufficient evidence existed to support the
district court’s factual finding that he was responsible for the transaction that
occurred in December 2001 involving the 902.7 kilograms of marijuana and
therefore had a base offense level of thirty under the Guidelines. See U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 2D1.1(a)(3) and (c)(5) (Nov. 1, 2006) (providing
a base offense level of thirty for drug conspiracies involving “[a]t least 700 KG
but less than 1,000 KG of Marihuana”). This is his sole challenge to his sentence,
and thus we do not need to address any other procedural issues or the question of
substantive reasonableness.
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It is well established that, “[u]pon [his] conviction of conspiracy to possess
with intent to distribute [marijuana], [Mr. Hernandez] was accountable for that
drug quantity which was within the scope of the agreement and reasonably
foreseeable to [him].” United States v. Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d 1070, 1078 (10th
Cir. 1994). Moreover, Mr. Hernandez “may be sentenced on the basis of
[marijuana] possessed by another coconspirator, so long as the amount is within
the scope of the conspiracy and foreseeable by [Mr. Hernandez].” Id. This
principle is explicitly recognized in the Guidelines under the rubric of “Relevant
Conduct,” as the Guidelines provide that, “in the case of a jointly undertaken
criminal activity,” a defendant’s base offense level “shall be determined on the
basis of . . . all reasonably foreseeable acts and omissions of others in furtherance
of the jointly undertaken criminal activity.” U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 1B1.3(a)(1)(B) (Nov. 1, 2006).
The district court’s “assessment of the drug quantity attributable to
[Mr. Hernandez] is a fact finding determined by a preponderance of the evidence
which we review for clear error.” Arias-Santos, 39 F.3d at 1078. Here, the court
concluded that the transaction involving the 902.7 kilograms of marijuana was
relevant conduct for purposes of sentencing Mr. Hernandez, finding that the
transaction was “reasonably foreseeable, . . . particularly since his own telephone
[was] being used in the transaction.” R., Vol. 5 at 8. As the court explained,
“[Mr. Hernandez] was convicted of the conspiracy and being a co-conspirator
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with Mr. Tinajero and I think this transaction would certainly fall within the
scope of that conspiracy and would be foreseeable.” Id. at 8-9. As set forth
above, the evidence at trial (i.e., the testimony of Brian Long regarding
Mr. Hernandez’s monthly marijuana deliveries from early 2000 to the latter part
of 2002) showed that, in December 2001, Mr. Hernandez was an active
participant along with Mr. Tinajero in a large-scale drug distribution conspiracy.
Thus, we have no difficulty concluding that the district court’s sentencing
decision was supported by a preponderance of the evidence and was not clearly
erroneous.
The judgment of the district court and Mr. Hernandez’s convictions and
sentences are AFFIRMED.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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