Steward v. Workman ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
March 25, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
LELAND WAYNE STEWARD,
Petitioner - Appellant, No. 07-7079
v. (E. D. Oklahoma)
RANDALL G. WORKMAN, Warden, (D.C. No. 04-cv-00350-FHS-KEW)
Lexington Assessment and Reception
Center,
Respondent - Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before LUCERO, HARTZ, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
Leland Wayne Steward was convicted by a jury on four counts of felony
murder in Oklahoma state court after he set fire to his trailer house, killing his
wife, Amanda Steward, and their three children. On each count he was sentenced
to life in prison without the possibility of parole. The Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals (OCCA) affirmed all four convictions on direct appeal. He then
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is
not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata,
and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma a
pro se application under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied. He
now seeks a certificate of appealability (COA) to appeal that denial. See id.§ 2253(c) (requiring COA to appeal denial of application). Liberally construed,
see Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972) (per curiam), the application
raises four issues: (1) that his convictions were not supported by the evidence at
trial; (2) that the trial court erred in admitting other-crimes evidence; (3) that the
trial court erred in admitting hearsay; and (4) that the trial court erred in
admitting his involuntary statement to the police. We deny his request for a COA
and dismiss this appeal.
“A certificate of appealability may issue . . . only if the applicant has made
a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). This standard requires “a demonstration that . . . includes showing
that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the
petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues
presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted). In other
words, an applicant must show that the district court’s resolution of the
constitutional claim was either “debatable or wrong.” Id. In determining whether
to issue a COA, a “full consideration of the factual or legal bases adduced in
support of the claims” is not required. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 336
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(2003). Instead, the decision must be based on “an overview of the claims in the
habeas petition and a general assessment of their merits.” Id.In addition, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA)
establishes deferential standards of review for state-court factual findings and
legal conclusions. “AEDPA . . . mandates that state court factual findings are
presumptively correct and may be rebutted only by ‘clear and convincing
evidence.’” Saiz v. Ortiz, 392 F.3d 1166, 1175 (10th Cir. 2004) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)). If the federal claim was adjudicated on the merits in the
state court,
we may only grant federal habeas relief if the habeas petitioner can
establish that the state court decision “was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States,” or “was
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the
evidence presented in the State court proceeding.”
Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1) and (2)). As we have stated:
Under the “contrary to” clause, we grant relief only if the state court
arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court
on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently
than the [Supreme] Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable
facts. Under the “unreasonable application” clause, relief is provided
only if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle
from the Supreme Court’s decisions but unreasonably applies that
principle to the facts of the prisoner's case. Thus we may not issue a
habeas writ simply because we conclude in our independent judgment
that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established
federal law erroneously or incorrectly. Rather, that application must
also be unreasonable.
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Gipson v. Jordan, 376 F.3d 1193, 1196 (10th Cir. 2004) (brackets, citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Where, as here, the claims were adjudicated
on the merits in the state court, “AEDPA’s deferential treatment of state court
decisions must be incorporated into our consideration of a habeas petitioner’s
request for COA.” Dockins v. Hines, 374 F.3d 935, 938 (10th Cir .2004).
Mr. Steward first contends that his convictions were not supported by the
evidence at trial. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, “the relevant
question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of
the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319,
(1979). Mr. Steward argues that the prosecution failed to prove that the fire was
arson and that he was responsible. He also raised this issue in his direct appeal to
the OCCA, which recited the evidence at length and rejected his argument. See
Op., Steward v. State, No. F-2002-1238 (Okla. Crim. App. Oct. 24, 2003)
(Steward I) at 1–10. Mr. Steward has failed to challenge, much less rebut by
clear and convincing evidence, the recitation of evidence by the OCCA.
Therefore, we accept its statement of facts as correct. See § 2254(e)(1). And no
reasonable jurist could debate that, based on that evidence, the conclusion was not
an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law.
Next, Mr. Steward contends that the trial court erred in admitting testimony
from several witnesses that he had told them that he had been an arsonist for hire
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in Missouri and knew how to start untraceable fires. He states that this was
inadmissible other-crimes evidence. For support, he cites primarily to cases
addressing Oklahoma rules of evidence. But we will not set aside a conviction
for violations of state evidence rules. See Bullock v. Carver, 297 F.3d 1036, 1055
(10th Cir. 2002) (“a state court’s misapplication of its own evidentiary rules . . .
is insufficient to grant habeas relief.”). We will grant Mr. Steward relief only if
he can show that admission of the evidence denied him a fair trial. See id. He
has not made that showing. The OCCA explained that the evidence was relevant
to motive, intent, preparation, and/or absence of mistake. See Steward I at 12–13.
No reasonable jurist could debate that the OCCA decision was an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.
Mr. Steward also complains that a prosecution witness testified that
Amanda had told him that “[i]f it gets too bad . . . I just go in the house and take
the kids and get in the bathroom and lock the door,” Steward I at 14. When
rescue workers arrived at the ruins of the trailer house, they found Amanda and
two of the children’s bodies barricaded in the bathroom and the third child’s body
just outside the bathroom door. Mr. Steward claims that the court’s admission of
Amanda’s statement violated his Sixth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. We
presume that he is referring to the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause,
which guarantees a criminal defendant “the right . . . to be confronted with the
witnesses against him.” U.S. Const. amend. VI. But the Confrontation Clause
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restricts the admissibility of a hearsay statement only if the statement is
testimonial. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). The Supreme
Court in Crawford did not precisely define testimonial, but it indicated “that the
term encompasses formal statements to government officers, including at least
statements during police interrogation and prior testimony.” United States v.
Faulkner, 439 F.3d 1221, 1225 (10th Cir. 2006). Amanda’s statement was wholly
different; rather than a statement made for the purposes of prosecution, the
statement appears to have been a statement to a friend meant to allay concern for
her safety following an argument that Amanda had with Mr. Steward. See
Steward I at 14. No reasonable jurist could debate that the OCCA decision
affirming admission of the evidence was not an unreasonable application of
clearly established federal law.
Finally, Mr. Steward claims that the trial court erred in admitting
statements that he had made to the police. He claims that the statements were
involuntary and that he had not intelligently waived his constitutional rights. The
OCCA held that the State had proved in a pretrial hearing that Mr. Steward had
knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights before speaking with the
police. No reasonable jurist could debate that this ruling was not an unreasonable
application of clearly established federal law.
Because no reasonable jurist could debate the correctness of the district
court’s ruling, we DENY Mr. Steward’s request for a COA and DISMISS this
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appeal. We grant Mr. Steward’s application to proceed in forma pauperis. We
grant Mr. Steward’s motion for leave to file a supplemental brief.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Harris L Hartz
Circuit Judge
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