Christensen v. United States , 288 F. App'x 445 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
July 9, 2008
TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
WADE CHRISTENSEN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v. No. 07-4133
(D.C. No. 2:05-CV-55-DAK)
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA; (D. Utah)
FORSGREN ASSOCIATES, INC.; and
JAY DIGS INCORPORATED,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before McCONNELL, SEYMOUR, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges.
This is a civil case brought by Wade Christensen against the United States,
Forsgren Associates, Inc., and Jay Digs, Inc. Mr. Christensen contends he was
injured by the negligence of the three defendants because they failed to detect and
address the hazards created by a loop of exposed grounding wire on a section of
land on which the United States owns an easement. The district court granted
summary judgment for all three defendants, and Mr. Christensen appeals. We
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with F ED . R. A PP . P. 32.1 and 10 TH
C IR . R. 32.1.
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, and we affirm.
I
On April 6, 2003, Mr. Christensen was herding cattle when his horse
tripped over a nine-foot loop of exposed grounding wire that was attached to a
nearby power pole owned and maintained by the United States. Mr. Christensen
was thrown to the ground and tore an artery in his neck, allegedly causing him to
have a stroke resulting in injury and permanent damage.
The fall occurred on a section of the Grantsville Soil Conservation District
on which the United States owns an easement. In the six weeks prior to the
accident, Tooele County had been in the process of installing a water pipeline on
a thirty-foot wide easement it obtained from the United States near this area.
Defendant Forsgren Associates engineered the project, and defendant Jay Digs
Inc. installed the pipeline. The easement for the pipeline came within six feet of
the power pole that was connected to the wire over which Mr. Christensen’s horse
tripped. The construction activity may have come closer.
Mr. Christensen brought a negligence action against the United States
under the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b)(1), claiming that it failed
to maintain its easement and power pole in a safe condition. It also contended the
United States failed to use reasonable care to discover the loop of exposed
grounding wire prior to Mr. Christensen’s fall, and to remedy the hazardous
situation presented. In addition, Mr. Christensen brought claims against Forsgren
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Associates and Jay Digs for negligently causing the loop of grounding wire to
become exposed during the construction of the water pipeline, and/or for failing
to inspect for, report, or clean up any hazardous conditions in the construction
zone following completion of the project.
All three defendants filed motions for summary judgment. After hearing
oral argument, the district court granted these motions and dismissed the case in
its entirety. On appeal, Mr. Christensen contends the United States failed to
exercise reasonable care to discover the exposed wire, it had constructive notice
that the wire had become unearthed, and circumstantial evidence exists that the
construction of the water pipeline exposed the wire. He argues there are triable
issues of material fact with respect to his claims against all three defendants, thus
precluding summary judgment.
II
The district court’s conclusions were four-fold. First, in granting the
United States’ motion for summary judgment, the court held that, regardless of
whether he was an invitee or licensee on the land, Mr. Christensen had “not
shown a breach of the duty owed to him.” Christensen v. United States, No.
2:05CV55DAK, 2007 WL 1467347, at *6 (D. Utah May 18, 2007) (hereinafter D.
Ct. Op.). Under Utah law, if the alleged negligence arises out of “unsafe
conditions of a temporary nature,” a plaintiff must show the defendant had actual
or constructive knowledge that the unsafe condition existed, and sufficient time
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after such knowledge to remedy the condition. Schnuphase v. Storehouse Market,
918 P.2d 476, 478 (Utah 1996). The district court pointed out that even Mr.
Christensen’s “expert would not fault the United States for relying” on the project
engineer and the excavating crew to monitor the job site and report any problems.
D. Ct. Op. at *4. The court observed there was “no evidence that the United
States had actual or constructive knowledge of an exposed grounding wire with
time to remedy the condition before Christensen’s accident,” concluding that “[a]
private person would not be liable on these facts under Utah law.” Id. at *5. See
Goebel v. Salt Lake City Southern R.R. Co., 104 P.3d 1185, 1193-94 (Utah 2004).
Second, the court declined to hold that the United States had a heightened
duty of care. The court explained that because the wire Mr. Christensen’s horse
tripped over was not “live,” “[t] he circumstances of this case do not involve a
degree of danger that would justify a heightened standard of care.” D. Ct. Op. at
*6. The court noted that other courts have “declined to hold electrical utilities to
a heightened duty of care where the danger does not involve live wires,” and that
“conventional negligence concepts” have been applied when the danger from such
wires is minimal. Id. (citing McFarland v. Entergy Mississippi, 919 So.2d 894,
899 (Miss. 2005); Keegan v. Grant County Pub. Util. Dist., 661 P.2d 146, 149
(Wash. Ct. App. 1983)).
Third, in granting Jay Digs Inc.’s motion for summary judgment, the
district court held that absent temporal proximity, Mr Christensen had “no
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evidence that the water pipe installation disturbed the grounding wire or rod.” D.
Ct. Op. at *7. 1 Indeed, the court determined that Mr. Christensen could not prove
the two main theories of his case against Jay Digs which were:
(1) the grounding rod was located within the area where the trench
for the water line was to be dug and so was moved by Jay Digs; and
(2) that during installation of the water pipe, a track on the heavy
equipment reached down and snagged the wire and pulled it and the
rod to the surface.
Id. at *7. The court noted there was “no evidence that the grounding rod and wire
were ever within the easement where Jay Digs was working,” and that Mr.
Christensen’s “own expert witnesses . . . have been unable to reach a conclusion
supported by actual evidence of how the grounding rod could have been disturbed
during the excavation.” Id. Further, the court observed:
Perhaps the most telling fact is that after Christensen fell, no one
could find any evidence that the area around the pole had been
disturbed during construction. No tire or crawler tracts [sic] were
located. No soil appeared to have been recently dug up. And, there
was no evidence that the rod or wire had been recently disturbed or
re-buried. There is no evidence from any source that the wire was
tangled, dented, bent, or otherwise deformed so as to suggest that it
had been torn from the ground in a construction accident.
Id. at *8 (emphasis added). The court concluded Jay Digs was entitled to
summary judgment because of the lack of evidence regarding causation.
Fourth, in granting Forsgren’s motion for summary judgment, the court
1
The court noted that temporal proximity does not provide proof of
causation, citing Sunward Corp. v. Dun & Bradstreet, 811 F.2d 511, 521 (10th
Cir. 1987).
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concluded there were “no documents, photographs, or other types of evidence
offered to establish that Forsgren caused Christensen’s injuries.” Id. at *9.
Significantly, it emphasized that “[m]any people have had access to the land since
the power poles were installed and there is no evidence to narrow down the
potential cause of the exposed grounding wire.” Id. Finally, the court observed
that “[w]hile it is generally true that a jury is allowed to infer causation and
negligence from the underlying operative facts, a jury is not allowed to infer the
underlying operative facts.” Id.
III
Having read the record, the parties’ briefs, and the relevant case law, we
cannot fault the district court’s analysis. With no evidence as to when the loop of
wire was exposed, there is no supportable inference that any of the defendants
was responsible. We affirm substantially for the reasons given by the district
court in its well stated opinion.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Circuit Judge
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