United States v. Saavedra-Villasenor ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES CO URT O F APPEALS
September 23, 2008
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
U N ITED STA TES O F A M ER ICA ,
Plaintiff -A ppellee, No. 08-2038
v. District of New M exico
M A RTIN SA A V ED RA - (D.C. Nos. 2:06-CR-00615-W J-1 &
VILLASENOR , 1:07-CV -00946-W J-RLP)
Defendant-Appellant.
OR DER DENY ING CERTIFICATE O F APPEALABILITY *
Before T AC HA , KE LL Y and M cCO NNELL , Circuit Judges.
M artin Saavedra-Villasenor , a federal prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks a
certificate of appealability (COA) that would allow him to appeal from the district
court’s order denying his habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B). Because we conclude that M r. Saavedra-Villasenor has
failed to make “a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” w e
deny his request for a COA and dismiss the appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).
*
This order is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of
the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel.
Background
On August 18, 2006, M r. Saavedra-Villasenor, an alien, pled guilty to re-
entering the United States illegally after being deported, in violation of 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1326(a)(1) and (a)(2). The indictment alleged that he had a prior aggravated
felony conviction for “Domestic Battery, Second Offense.” The presentence
report recommended a sixteen level enhancement on account of M r. Saavedra-
Villasenor’s prior felony domestic battery conviction. M r. Saavedra-Villasenor
made no objection to the recommended enhancement. At the plea hearing, after
the prosecutor said that M r. Saavedra-Villasenor “had been convicted of
aggravated felony, that being domestic battery, second offense,” the defendant
confirmed that this statement was correct. The district court then sentenced M r.
Saavedra-Villasenor to a term of 77 months in prison followed by three years of
supervised release.
After sentencing, M r. Saavedra-Villasenor filed a motion to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2255. He argued that his counsel
was ineffective because he failed to investigate the underlying felony of domestic
violence, which Petitioner claimed was primarily for verbal abuse. The
magistrate judge filed a report recommending dismissal of the petition. The
report concluded that M r. Saavedra-Villasenor had two prior convictions for
domestic battery amounting to an aggravated felony under federal law, and that
M r. Saavedra-Villasenor read the plea agreement, reviewed it with his attorney,
-2-
and voluntarily signed it. M r. Saavedra-Villasenor failed to file any written
objections to the magistrate judge’s report or recommendations within the
requisite ten-day period. The D istrict Court accepted the magistrate judge’s
recommendations, issuing an order denying Petitioner habeas relief.
Discussion
1. Certificate of Appealability
The denial of a motion for relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 may be appealed
only if the district court or this Court first issues a COA. 28 U.S.C. §
2253(c)(1)(B). A COA will issue “only if the applicant has made a substantial
showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). To
make such a showing, a petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists could
debate whether . . . the petition should have been resolved in a different manner
or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further.” Slack v. M cDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 483-84 (2000) (internal quotation
marks omitted). W here, as here, the district court denies habeas relief on
procedural grounds, the petitioner must demonstrate that “jurists of reason would
find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.”
Id. at 478.
-3-
By failing to file objections to the magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation, 1 the petitioner has waived the right to appellate review on the
merits of the district court’s order. See M orales-Fernandez v. INS, 418 F.3d
1116, 1119 (10th Cir. 2005); see also Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 147-48
(1985). There are two exceptions to the waiver rule: (1) where a pro se litigant
was not informed of the time period for objecting and the consequences of failing
to do so, or (2) w here the “interests of justice” require review. See M orales-
Fernandez, 418 F.3d at 1119; see also M oore v. United States, 950 F.2d 656, 659
(10th Cir. 1991).
Neither exception applies. The magistrate judge’s report and
recommendation explicitly stated in its first footnote that a party must file
objections within ten days of service if appellate review is desired. The relevant
paragraph ends by stating, “If no objections are filed, no appellate review will be
allowed.” The first exception therefore does not apply.
As to the “interests of justice” exception, we have held that this is similar
to reviewing for plain error under Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b). M orales-Fernandez,
418 F.3d at 1120; see United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)
(describing plain error review). To satisfy this standard, a petitioner must show
that the district court committed error that is plain, affects substantial rights, and
1
The petitioner’s “traverse motion”does not qualify as a written objection to
the report and recommendation, as it was filed before the magistrate judge issued
his report and recommendation.
-4-
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.” See United States v. Haney, 318 F.3d 1161, 1166-67 (10th Cir.
2003)(en banc)(quoting United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. at 732). Only if the
district court committed plain error with respect to the characterization of
petitioner’s prior conviction or with respect to his claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel may we exercise our discretion and reach the merits of his claim.
2. Aggravated Felony
M r. Saavedra-Villasenor argues that his prior conviction was only a
misdemeanor and not an aggravated felony. However, the record before the
district court showed (1) that he pleaded guilty to an indictment that listed his
previous offense as an aggravated felony conviction for “Domestic Battery,
Second Offense”; (2) that he filed no objection to the presentence report’s
recommendation of a sixteen level enhancement on account of his prior felony
domestic battery conviction, see Fed. R. Crim. P. 32(i)(3)(A) (the court “may
accept any undisputed portion of the presentence report as a finding of fact”); and
(3) that he explicitly admitted at the plea hearing that he “had been convicted of
aggravated felony, that being domestic battery, second offense.” M r. Saavedra-
Villasenor failed to present any evidence that his past conviction was not an
aggravated felony. Based on this record, the district court did not com mit error,
let alone plain error, in finding that the enhancement applied.
-5-
3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
M r. Saavedra-Villasenor also argues that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance by not investigating the nature of his convictions or objecting to their
classification. To succeed on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must show that his counsel’s representation fell below an objective
standard of reasonableness and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). As both the magistrate
judge and district court concluded, M r. Saavedra-Villasenor could show neither of
the Strickland requirements. Counsel’s failure to further investigate his client’s
past convictions was not objectively unreasonable under these circumstances.
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43), an aggravated felony includes, inter alia, a
state or federal “crime of violence for which the term of imprisonment [is] at least
one year.” The Petitioner incurred his prior conviction in Illinois. Under Illinois
law, domestic battery is a Class A M isdemeanor, but is considered a Class 4
Felony if it is a second-time offense. 720 I LL . C OMP . S TAT . A NN . 5/12-3.2(b)
(LexisNexis 2008). 2 A Class 4 Felony is punishable by no less than one year and
no more than three years. 730 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/5-8-1(a)(7) (LexisNexis
2008). Because domestic battery is a violent crime, and a second domestic
2
Neither party has expressly stated when Petitioner was convicted of
domestic battery. However, this particular provision of Illinois law has been in
effect since July 1, 1994.
-6-
battery offense is punishable in Illinois by no less than one year in prison, it is an
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43).
No reason existed for Petitioner’s counsel to contest the classification of
the prior conviction, especially considering M r. Saavedra-Villasenor’s repeated
affirmations of it. Although he now asserts in his brief before this court that he
was sentenced only to seven months’ probation, there is no evidence in the record
that he received a sentence less than the minimum the statute specifies. To show
ineffective assistance of counsel, the burden is on the petitioner to present
evidence and to prove the facts underlying his claim. United States v. Cronic,
466 U.S. 648, 658 (1984). Petitioner failed to present any evidence to the district
court that tended to prove his prior sentence was for less than one year or the
prior conviction was not an aggravated felony. The district court did not commit
the equivalent of plain error w hen it rejected a claim based on no evidence.
Conclusion
Accordingly, we D EN Y M r. Saavedra-Villasenor’s request for a COA and
DISM ISS this appeal.
Petitioner’s motion to proceed in form a pauperis is GRANTED.
Entered for the Court,
M ichael W . M cConnell
Circuit Judge
-7-