United States v. Medina-Corrales , 299 F. App'x 831 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
November 13, 2008
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 08-3241
(D.C. No. 6:08-CR-10063-MLB)
JUAN CARLOS (D. Kan.)
MEDINA-CORRALES,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before KELLY, HARTZ and HOLMES, Circuit Judges.
Defendant Juan Carlos Medina-Corrales entered a guilty plea to one count
of possession with the intent to distribute more than five grams of
methamphetamine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and 18 U.S.C. § 2. His
plea agreement states that he “knowingly and voluntarily waives any right to
appeal or collaterally attack any matter in connection with [his] prosecution,
*
This panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not
materially assist the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2);
10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral
argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and
10th Cir. R. 32.1.
conviction and sentence.” Mot. to Enforce, Attach. A at 5 ¶9. The agreement
further states that “[b]y entering into this agreement, the defendant knowingly
waives any right to appeal a sentence imposed which is within the guideline range
determined appropriate by the court.” Id. The district court determined that the
advisory guideline range was 108 to 135 months and imposed a sentence of 108
months, at the low end of the range.
Defendant has filed an appeal from his sentence in which he seeks to
challenge the district court’s calculation of his sentence, specifically the court’s
conversion of $14,000 into a drug quantity, and the court’s refusal to give him a
sentence reduction for being a minor participant. The government has moved to
enforce defendant’s appeal waiver under United States v. Hahn, 359 F.3d 1315
(10th Cir. 2004) (en banc) (per curiam). We grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
Under Hahn, we consider “(1) whether the disputed appeal falls within the
scope of the waiver of appellate rights; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and
voluntarily waived his appellate rights; and (3) whether enforcing the waiver
would result in a miscarriage of justice.” Id. at 1325. Defendant concedes that
his appeal falls within the scope of his appeal waiver and he does not assert that
enforcing the appeal waiver would result in a miscarriage of justice. He argues
instead that he did not knowingly and voluntarily waive his appeal rights.
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“When determining whether a waiver of appellate rights is knowing and
voluntary, we especially look to two factors. First, we examine whether the
language of the plea agreement states that the defendant entered the agreement
knowingly and voluntarily. Second, we look for an adequate Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 colloquy.” Hahn, 359 F.3d at 1325 (quotation and citation
omitted). Defendant does not raise any challenge with respect to language of the
plea agreement. See Resp. to Mot. to Enforce at 3 (admitting that “[c]ertainly
there is language that indicates that the appeal waiver is knowingly and
voluntarily made” and “the appeal waiver is clearly defined in the plea
agreement.”). He argues, however, “that the plea colloquy was insufficient on the
issue of [] giving up his right to appeal, in that it did not address the effect of
relevant conduct on [his] sentence, and it did not address that the Court would be
the final arbiter on issues relating to the appropriate guideline sentence.” Id. at
3-4. He explains further that it was not made clear during the colloquy (1) what
the appropriate guideline range would be; (2) who determines the guideline range;
and (3) that he was “waiving the right to appeal even if the Court errs in its
application of the sentencing guidelines.” Id. at 4.
Essentially defendant is arguing that his appeal waiver cannot be
considered knowing and voluntary because he did not know how the district court
was going to calculate his sentence and what errors might occur in that process.
We rejected a similar argument in Hahn. See 359 F.3d at 1326 (rejecting the
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argument that “a defendant can never knowingly and voluntarily waive his
appellate rights because he cannot possibly know in advance what errors a district
court might make in the process of arriving at an appropriate sentence.”). And in
United States v. Montano, 472 F.3d 1202, 1205 (10th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 128
S. Ct. 224 (2007), we expressly declined to adopt a rule that an appeal waiver is
unenforceable when a defendant did not know what the sentencing range would be
at the time she entered into the plea agreement.
As we explained in Hahn, a defendant need not “know with specificity the
result he forfeits before his waiver is valid.” 359 F.3d at 1327. “The law
ordinarily considers a waiver knowing, intelligent, and sufficiently aware if the
defendant fully understands the nature of the right and how it would likely apply
in general in the circumstances-even though the defendant may not know the
specific detailed consequences of invoking it.” Id. (brackets and quotation
omitted). Defendant, therefore, did not need to know exactly how his sentence
would be calculated in order to waive his right to appeal any aspect of his
sentence. Moreover, it is clear from the plea agreement and the plea colloquy that
the defendant was on notice that his sentence had not yet been calculated, that the
district court would make the final decision about his sentence calculation, and
that once it was calculated, defendant would not be able to challenge any aspect
of that sentence (except in the limited circumstance of an upward departure from
the applicable guideline range, which is not relevant here).
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The plea agreement states that the parties’ request that the United States
Sentencing Guidelines be applied by the district court, it acknowledges that
uncharged related criminal activity as well as conduct charged in any dismissed
counts may be considered as relevant conduct in calculating the sentence under
the guidelines; and it acknowledges that the sentence to be imposed will be
determined solely by the district court. At the plea colloquy, the district court
asked defendant if he understood his plea agreement and he said he did. The
court asked defendant if he had any questions about the plea agreement and he
said no.
During the plea colloquy, the court informed defendant that it did not know
what sentence it would impose and that it could not know what sentence it would
impose until it saw the presentence report. The court told defendant that if it
believed that a sentence within the advisory guideline range was appropriate,
defendant would not be able to withdraw his plea. After this statement, the court
asked defendant if he understood and he said yes. The district court went over
paragraph nine of the plea agreement, explaining that in that paragraph defendant
was agreeing not to appeal his sentence as long as it is within the advisory
guidelines. And the court further clarified, “you will not come back at a later
date and ask me to reopen your case for some reason. The bottom line of
Paragraph 9 is that you are agreeing that you will never ask any court anywhere at
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any time for any reason to review your case.” Mot. to Enforce, Attach. B at 9-10.
The court asked if the defendant understood and he replied that he did. At the
conclusion of the plea colloquy, the following exchange took place:
THE COURT: . . . And finally, for all practical purposes, you have no
right to appeal. Do you understand the rights you’re giving up?
DEFENDANT MR. MEDINA-CORRALES: Yes.
THE COURT: Do you have any questions at this point?
DEFENDANT MR. MEDINA-CORRALES: No.
THE COURT: How do you plead to Count 1, guilty or not guilty?
INTERPRETER MS. PAUBEL: Guilty.
Id. at 13.
The plea colloquy and the plea agreement demonstrate that defendant
waived his appellate rights knowingly and voluntarily. Accordingly, because
defendant has failed to carry his burden to show that the appeal waiver was not
entered knowingly and voluntarily, see United States v. Edgar, 348 F.3d 867,
872-73 (10th Cir.2003), we GRANT the government’s motion to enforce the
appeal waiver and DISMISS the appeal.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
PER CURIAM
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