Ciempa v. Dinwiddie , 340 F. App'x 516 ( 2009 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
August 12, 2009
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
DAVID CIEMPA,
Petitioner-Appellant, No. 09-5068
v. (N.D. of Okla.)
WALTER DINWIDDIE, Warden, (D.C. No. 4:08-CV-00119-CVE-FHM)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, TYMKOVICH, and GORSUCH, Circuit Judges. **
David Ciempa, a state prisoner appearing pro se, 1 seeks a certificate of
appealability (COA) to appeal from the district court’s dismissal of his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241 habeas petition for failure to exhaust administrative and state court
remedies. Because we agree with the district court’s determination that Ciempa
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
1
We construe Ciempa’s pro se filings liberally. See Van Deelen v.
Johnson, 497 F.3d 1151, 1153 n.1 (10th Cir. 2007).
has failed to exhaust his available state remedies, we DENY Ciempa’s request for
a COA and DISMISS this appeal.
I. Background
This appeal has a lengthy procedural background. Ciempa is an Oklahoma
state prisoner serving time for a variety of crimes, including attempted armed
robbery. In mid-2006, Ciempa allegedly sent a threatening letter to a state prison
employee. Prison authorities filed an offense report—which Ciempa signed and
acknowledged—and conducted an investigation. Thereafter, a disciplinary
hearing was scheduled and Ciempa was offered an opportunity to present
witnesses and evidence on his behalf.
At this disciplinary hearing, which Ciempa apparently refused to attend,
Ciempa was adjudged guilty of menacing. As punishment, the Oklahoma
Department of Corrections (DOC) revoked 365 days of Ciempa’s good time
credits. Ciempa concedes that he did not appeal this finding to the DOC director
as provided by the disciplinary procedures.
Ciempa instead filed a grievance, challenging the DOC investigation of his
alleged misconduct. The DOC apparently did not respond to this grievance.
Ciempa subsequently filed an application for judicial review in state district
court. The state court determined the DOC had provided Ciempa with all his
statutory due process rights. Additionally, the court determined that because
DOC remedies were still available, Ciempa had failed to exhaust his
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administrative remedies prior to filing the court action. As a result, on April 18,
2007, the state court dismissed Ceimpa’s application under Okla. Stat. tit. 57,
§ 566(A)(1). Ciempa did not directly appeal this finding.
On September 13, 2007, Ciempa filed a belated motion for a new trial in
state district court, raising the same claims as before. The court summarily
denied this motion. Ciempa then appealed to the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals (OCCA).
The OCCA dismissed the appeal as untimely, finding Ciempa had failed to
file the appeal within 30 days of the state district court’s final order. The court
also determined that Ciempa’s belated motion for a new trial, filed almost five
months after the state district court’s dismissal, did not excuse Ciempa from his
duty to file a timely appeal. Ciempa did not seek an appeal out of time as
provided by OCCA rules.
On March 3, 2008, Ciempa filed this 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition in federal
district court, alleging violation of his due process rights and seeking the
restoration of his lost good time credits. In his habeas petition, Ciempa raised
nine claims of due process violations by the Oklahoma state courts and the DOC.
He alleged that: (1) he did not receive the state district court’s April 18, 2007
order until late August; (2) the state courts (both the OCCA and the district court)
refused to take judicial notice of his alleged failure to receive the state district
court’s April 18th order; (3) the OCCA unfairly applied its rules governing the
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timing of appeals; (4) he failed to receive any notice regarding his improperly
submitted grievance until late February 2007, allegedly causing a loss of appellate
rights; (5) the state courts refused to take judicial notice regarding his failure to
receive a response to his improperly filed grievance; (6) the DOC and other
reviewing authorities repeatedly denied his requests for an investigation of the
offense report and the alleged menacing incident; (7) the state courts failed to
direct the DOC to explain these denials; (8) the offense report inaccurately noted
that he had voluntarily waived his opportunity to attend the disciplinary hearing;
and (9) the state district court erred in determining he had waived his right to
present evidence at the disciplinary hearing.
In addressing Ciempa’s habeas claims, the federal district court divided
them into two groups: claims 1, 2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 alleged errors by the Oklahoma
state courts while claims 4, 6, and 8 implicated administrative rulings. As to
Ciempa’s claims alleging due process violations by the state courts, the district
court held Ciempa had failed to exhaust his state court remedies. Specifically, the
court noted:
[Ciempa’s] due process and access to courts claims arise from his
allegation that he was denied an appeal through no fault of his own
because he failed to receive the state district court’s order denying his
application for judicial review until it was too late to file a timely
appeal. [Ciempa] has not presented those claims to the state courts and
he has an available remedy: to seek an appeal out of time in the state
district court.
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R., Doc. 11 at 5. Consequently, the court dismissed without prejudice claims 1,
2, 3, 5, 7, and 9 for failure to exhaust.
Addressing Ciempa’s allegations of administrative due process violations,
the court similarly concluded Ciempa still had unexhausted state administrative
remedies available. The district court summarized Ciempa’s posture:
Ciempa cannot, however, assert that administrative remedies became
unavailable because he waived an appeal when he refused to attend the
hearing and at the same time assert that he did not refuse to attend the
hearing. Stated another way, [Ciempa] wants to challenge DOC’s
assertion that he refused to attend the disciplinary hearing yet use the
refusal to avoid compliance with DOC’s administrative procedures.
Ciempa cannot have it both ways.
Id. at 6. The court did observe, however, that Ciempa still had an available
administrative remedy—i.e., requesting an out of time administrative appeal with
the DOC director. It therefore concluded Ciempa had failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies and dismissed claims 4, 6, and 8 without prejudice.
On March 30, 2009, two months after the district court dismissed his
habeas petition, Ciempa filed several motions with the district court seeking to
have the court reopen its judgment as to claims 4, 6, and 8. In particular, Ciempa
provided documents indicating that he had sought an out of time appeal with the
DOC director, and that this appeal had apparently gone unanswered. The district
court, construing Ciempa’s request as a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)
motion, denied relief, concluding the “fact that [Ciempa’s] request for an
administrative appeal out of time was returned unanswered does not . . . entitle
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[him] to relief from the Judgment entered in this action on January 12, 2009.
[Ciempa] had not exhausted administrative remedies when he commenced this
action.” R., Doc. 16 at 4.
Ciempa now appeals, raising the same claims as he did below.
II. Analysis
A state prisoner may appeal from the denial of federal habeas relief under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 only if the district court or this court first issues a COA. 28
U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(A); see Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 867 (10th Cir.
2000) (holding that state prisoners must obtain a COA to appeal denials of 28
U.S.C. § 2241 petitions). Before granting a COA, we must conclude that Ciempa
“has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.”
§ 2253(c)(2). Ciempa bears the burden to demonstrate “that reasonable jurists
could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have
been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to
deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473,
484 (2000) (internal quotation marks omitted).
Furthermore, where, as here, the district court denied the “habeas petition
on procedural grounds without reaching the prisoner’s underlying constitutional
claim,” the prisoner must also, in order to obtain a COA, demonstrate “that jurists
of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the
denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable
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whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id. Ciempa fails
to make such a showing.
For substantially the same reasons set forth by the district court dismissal
order and its denial of Ciempa’s motions to reopen, we conclude that Ciempa has
failed to exhaust his state judicial and administrative remedies.
The district court properly found that Ciempa had failed to exhaust his state
court remedies. Rather than determining that Ciempa’s failure to timely appeal
the state court denial operated as a procedural bar, the district court permitted
Ciempa an opportunity to seek one apparently remaining avenue of state judicial
relief: an out of time appeal with the OCCA. See Magar v. Parker, 490 F.3d 816,
819 (10th Cir. 2007) (“The Supreme Court has explained that if state court
remedies are no longer available because the prisoner failed to comply with the
deadline for seeking review, the prisoner’s procedural default functions as a bar
to federal habeas review.”) (citing Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92–93 (2006)).
Nothing in the record or Ciempa’s arguments persuades us that the district court’s
dismissal without prejudice was in error. Ciempa can still file the identical
§ 2241 challenges to the DOC’s revocation of his good time credits in federal
district court once he has exhausted all potential avenues of appeal with the
OCCA.
Ciempa also claims the district court erred in refusing to reconsider its
dismissal of his petition as to his claims of administrative error. He contends he
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has filed an out of time appeal with the DOC director, which has apparently gone
unanswered. He argues the district court improperly refused to consider his post-
dismissal proffer of evidence showing he has now exhausted his administrative
remedies.
We review a district court’s denial of a Rule 60(b) motion for an abuse of
discretion. Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1097 n.8 (10th Cir. 2009). We
only reverse a district court’s Rule 60(b) determination “if we find a complete
absence of a reasonable basis and are certain that the district court’s decision is
wrong.” Utah ex rel. Div. of Forestry, Fire & State Lands v. United States, 528
F.3d 712, 723 (10th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). We find no such abuse of
discretion here.
The district court concluded that Ciempa’s post-dismissal filings fell short
of demonstrating that he had actually exhausted his administrative appeal with the
DOC director. Rather, the district court properly noted Ciempa’s evidence only
demonstrated he had submitted an out of time administrative appeal. The district
court refused to equate Ciempa’s contention his request had gone unanswered
with a denial of relief. We are not convinced this conclusion is wrong and
without a reasonable basis. Moreover, as noted above, because the district court
dismissed Ciempa’s habeas petition without prejudice, Ciempa can simply refile
his § 2241 petition once he has adequate evidence that he has actually exhausted
his administrative remedies.
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In his Rule 60(b) motion, Ciempa also alleged his failure to exhaust state
remedies should be ignored because all state remedies were inadequate or futile.
Ciempa’s motion falls far short of his “burden of showing that he has exhausted
available state remedies,” or of “affirmatively show[ing] that resort to them
would be useless.” Miranda v. Cooper, 967 F.2d 392, 398 (10th Cir. 1992). The
district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion in denying Ciempa’s Rule
60(b) motion.
In sum, reasonable jurists would not debate the correctness of the district
court’s determination that Ciempa has failed to exhaust his state judicial and
administrative remedies.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Ciempa’s request for a COA and
DISMISS this appeal.
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
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