United States v. Mendoza-Alarcon ( 2020 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT December 3, 2020
_________________________________
Christopher M. Wolpert
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
No. 20-2069
v. (D.C. Nos. 1:19-CV-00613-JCH-SMV &
1:14-CR-03758-JCH-SMV-1)
LUIS MENDOZA-ALARCON, (D. New Mexico)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER DENYING CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY*
_________________________________
Before PHILLIPS, MURPHY, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
A federal jury convicted Luis Mendoza-Alarcon of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute five kilograms or more of cocaine. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon filed a
motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance
by (1) failing to request further legal instruction in response to a jury question, and
(2) failing to argue in closing that the government had not proven intent to distribute. The
district court denied the motion without the evidentiary hearing requested by
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and without accepting a proffered affidavit from his trial counsel.
It also denied Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon a certificate of appealability (“COA”).
*
This order is not binding precedent except under the doctrines of law of the case,
res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value
consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon now asks this court to hear his appeal from that order and reverse
the district court’s decision. For the reasons stated below, we deny his request for a COA
and dismiss this matter.1
I. BACKGROUND2
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Giovanni Montijo-Dominguez were convicted after a
joint jury trial of, as relevant to this appeal, conspiracy to possess cocaine with intent to
distribute. At trial, they did not dispute that Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon had attempted to
purchase a large quantity of cocaine. Their defenses were that Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon
acted under duress due to a threat to his daughter and that Mr. Montijo-Dominguez was
unaware he was participating in a drug deal, instead believing he was helping
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon pay a cartel not to harm Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s daughter.
Accordingly, Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez argued there was no
1
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon asks to supplement the record with the majority of
exhibits entered at trial. He informs us the government takes no position on his request.
We grant his request with regard to the electronically filed exhibits and deny it with
regard to his request to conventionally file DVDs. Having considered the electronically
filed exhibits, which include transcripts of the video and audio files Mr. Mendoza-
Alarcon seeks to file conventionally, we determine the conventionally filed recordings
would not alter our conclusions. And our review of the electronically filed exhibits
indicates we need not discuss them in detail as they do not bear upon our conclusions that
the jury necessarily determined Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez
conspired with one another, and that the jury followed the jury instructions.
2
Some volumes of the Record on Appeal have transcripts which appear to have
been stamped with numbers in the prior appeal but now no longer reflect the page
number in those volumes because other transcripts have been placed before them. We cite
to the page of the PDF in the current Record on Appeal.
2
conspiracy with regard to the drugs and that Mr. Montijo-Dominguez, like Mr. Mendoza-
Alarcon, was acting under duress.
A. Factual History
According to Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon, he participated in several telephone
conversations between May and September of 2016 with Lazaro Mendoza-Dominguez3
regarding Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s purchase of a house. During these conversations,
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon revealed he had $150,000 in cash available to put toward the
purchase.
On September 29, Lazaro called to confirm Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon still had the
money. When Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon indicated that he did, Lazaro told Mr. Mendoza-
Alarcon he would be contacted by a Mexican drug cartel to purchase drugs. Lazaro
instructed Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon to complete the purchase and to bring the drugs to
Lazaro. Otherwise, Lazaro threatened, the cartel would kidnap and torture Mr. Mendoza-
Alarcon’s adult daughter, who lived in Mexico. And, Lazaro warned, the cartel would do
the same if Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon involved the police or mentioned Lazaro. Lazaro told
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon the cartel contact would identify as “Sergio” and use certain code
words to refer to drugs and money. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon testified he took this threat
seriously, and his daughter testified that he instructed her to go live with her
grandparents.
3
We refer to Lazaro Mendoza-Dominguez by his first name to avoid confusion
with the defendants.
3
Homeland Security Investigations (“HSI”), part of the Department of Homeland
Security, provided additional evidence. HSI learned that a person called “Leche was
interested in . . . purchasing 6 kilograms of cocaine.” ROA, Vol. V at 802. HSI also
discovered that Leche was Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon. Acting on this information, an
undercover HSI agent posing as a cartel member called Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon to set up
the transaction, purportedly on behalf of “Sergio.” Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon contacted his
friend, Mr. Montijo-Dominguez, who agreed to accompany Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon to
Albuquerque. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon maintains he told Mr. Montijo-Dominguez only that
they needed to deliver money to prevent the kidnapping of Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s
daughter. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon testified he told Mr. Montijo-Dominguez nothing about
the drug transaction. The two men drove to Albuquerque, where HSI agents posing as
cartel members gave Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon packages that he believed contained cocaine.
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon instructed Mr. Montijo-Dominguez to turn over the $150,000 in
exchange. HSI then arrested both men.
B. Procedural History
The government charged Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez with
conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute five kilograms or more of a mixture and
substance containing cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(A), in
addition to other charges not relevant here. The matter proceeded to a joint jury trial.
In closing, the government argued Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon had entered into an
agreement with Lazaro and brought Mr. Montijo-Dominguez into that agreement. The
government did not explicitly discuss the intent to distribute element, but rather focused
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on the duress defense and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez’s knowledge that he was participating
in a drug deal. But it also implied the money Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon brought to the drug
deal was ill-gotten, possibly from drug trafficking beyond the charged conduct.
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s trial counsel used closing argument to argue duress and did not
directly address intent to distribute.
The district court instructed the jury:
A conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons to
accomplish an unlawful purpose. It is a kind of “partnership in criminal
purposes” in which each member becomes the agent or partner of every
other member. The evidence may show that some of the persons involved
in the alleged conspiracy are not on trial. This does not matter. There is no
requirement that all members of a conspiracy be charged or tried together in
one proceeding.
The evidence need not show that the members entered into an
express or formal agreement. Nor does the law require proof that the
members agreed on all the details. But the evidence must show that the
members of the alleged conspiracy came to a mutual understanding to try to
accomplish a common and unlawful plan.
ROA, Vol. III at 523. This instruction appeared on page 6 of the jury instructions.
During deliberations, the jury sent a note to the judge: “pg 6 of instructions—2 or
more persons agreed to possess . . . . . Who can be the 2 people—agents, defendants,
etc.?” Id. at 542. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s trial counsel took the position that “the
instruction stands on its own. There’s no reason to supplement it with an additional
answer.” ROA, Vol. V at 2054. The government argued—incorrectly—that under
“federal law . . . it can be anyone” and the district court should so inform the jury. Id. at
2055; contra United States v. Barboa, 777 F.2d 1420, 1422 (10th Cir. 1985) (holding
“that there can be no indictable conspiracy involving only the defendant and government
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agents or informers”). Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s trial counsel asked the district court to tell
the jury, “You must rely on the instruction as given.” Id. at 2056. The district court
agreed with Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s trial counsel, noting the instruction was “a Tenth
Circuit pattern instruction. So, [it was] inclined, then, to just stick with the circuit’s
instruction.” Id. at 2058. The district court accordingly sent a note to the jury reading,
“You must rely on the Court’s instructions as written.” Id.
The jury found Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez guilty on the
conspiracy count. The district court sentenced Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon to 144 months’
imprisonment.
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez both appealed, arguing the
district court erred in denying their motions for judgment of acquittal and refusing to
clarify the conspiracy instruction in response to the jury’s question. United States v.
Montijo-Dominguez, 771 F. App’x 870, 871 (10th Cir. 2019) (unpublished). Mr. Montijo-
Dominguez also challenged his sentence. Id. We consolidated their appeals under Federal
Rule of Appellate Procedure 3(b)(2). Id. Concluding that both defendants had invited
error, we held they were precluded from contesting the trial court’s response to the jury’s
question. Id. at 874. Next, we rejected the defendants’ claims that no evidence showed
they conspired to distribute cocaine and that, because Mr. Montijo-Dominguez did not
know about the cocaine, the government had presented insufficient evidence to prove
conspiracy. Id. at 874–75. We explained that the intention “to transfer possession of the
cocaine to Lazaro” was intent to distribute. Id. at 875. And we held there was sufficient
evidence to support such an intention, including the amount of the narcotics (although
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that would not be sufficient alone), “testimony that Mr. Mendoza[-Alarcon] spoke to the
agents about a ‘next time,’” and testimony that the federal agents “believed [Mr. Montijo-
Dominguez] to be an experienced drug trafficker” based on their conversation with him.
Id. In response to Mr. Montijo-Dominguez’s sentencing challenge, we expressly
concluded that “the jury necessarily must have found that Mr. Montijo[-Dominguez]
knowingly participated in a conspiracy with Mr. Mendoza[-Alarcon].” Id. at 876.
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon timely filed a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255,
alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court referred the motion to a
magistrate judge, who recommended it be denied without an evidentiary hearing. The
magistrate judge proposed holding that Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s trial counsel had not
fallen below an objective standard of reasonableness regarding the jury question, and that
neither the failure to request a supplemental jury instruction in response to the jury
question nor the failure to argue the government had not proved intent to distribute was
prejudicial. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon objected. The district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s proposed findings and recommended disposition, entered judgment, and denied a
COA. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon then filed a notice of appeal and asked this court to grant a
COA.
II. DISCUSSION
Under 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1)(B), appeal from a final order on a motion under 28
U.S.C. § 2255 is allowed only upon issuance of a COA. To obtain a COA, Mr. Mendoza-
Alarcon must demonstrate “that jurists of reason could disagree with the district court’s
resolution of his constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues presented
7
are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” United States v. Silva, 430
F.3d 1096, 1100 (10th Cir. 2005) (quoting Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327
(2003)). “This threshold inquiry does not require full consideration of the factual or legal
bases adduced in support of the claims.” Miller-El, 537 U.S. at 336. A “claim can be
debatable [for COA purposes] even though every jurist of reason might agree, after the
COA has been granted and the case has received full consideration, that petitioner will
not prevail.” Buck v. Davis, 137 S. Ct. 759, 774 (2017) (quoting Miller-El, 537 U.S. at
338).
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon raised two claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, one
claim relating to his trial counsel’s failure to request a specific response to the jury’s
question and one claim relating to his trial counsel’s failure to argue in closing that the
government had not proven intent to distribute. He asks us to issue a COA on both
claims. “To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, a movant must show (1) that
counsel’s representation was deficient because it ‘fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness’ and (2) that counsel’s ‘deficient performance prejudiced the defense.’”
United States v. Herring, 935 F.3d 1102, 1107 (10th Cir. 2019) (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984)).
The prejudice prong of the Strickland test is dispositive of both claims. “The
standard measure of prejudice in the context of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim
is the effect an attorney’s deficient performance had on the result or outcome.” United
States v. Rushin, 642 F.3d 1299, 1309 (10th Cir. 2011). Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon must show
“there is a reasonable probability that, absent the errors, the factfinder would have had a
8
reasonable doubt respecting guilt.” Hanson v. Sherrod, 797 F.3d 810, 826 (10th Cir.
2015) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 695). “A reasonable probability is a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” Ryder ex rel. Ryder v. Warrior, 810
F.3d 724, 741 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694).
A. The Jury Question
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon argues his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to ask the
district court to inform the jury that he could not be convicted of conspiracy “based on
agreement with a government agent or cooperator,” and that the district court erred in
rejecting this ineffective assistance argument. Appellant Br. at 37. The district court held
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon did not establish prejudice from the failure to request such a
response, because the evidence did not support that Lazaro was a government agent and
the jury necessarily found Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon conspired with Mr. Montijo-
Dominguez, who was not a government agent. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon argues the district
court “overlooked . . . facts suggesting Lazaro was cooperating with the government.” Id.
at 42. Additionally, he argues the evidence demonstrated no conspiracy with
Mr. Montijo-Dominguez. Because no reasonable jurist could disagree with the district
court’s conclusion that the jury necessarily determined Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon conspired
with Mr. Montijo-Dominguez, we deny a COA on this issue.
“In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate
judge’s report are deemed waived.” United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031
(10th Cir. 2001). Before the magistrate judge, Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon “made only one
argument regarding” the theory that he had conspired with Mr. Montijo-Dominguez: that
9
the jury’s note would be unnecessary if the jury had made such a finding. ROA, Vol. I at
2302. He makes this argument on appeal as well. But Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon added an
argument in his objections to the magistrate judge’s report and recommendation: that the
jury could have concluded Mr. Montijo-Dominguez conspired with the government
agents. He raises this argument again on appeal. We agree with the district court that this
argument was waived by Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s failure to raise it before the magistrate
judge.
Moreover, we are not persuaded by Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s properly preserved
argument that the jury question would have been unnecessary “[i]f the jury had
concluded that [the] defendants conspired with each other.” Appellant Br. at 46. The note
asked, in full, “pg 6 of instructions—2 or more persons agreed to possess . . . . . Who can
be the 2 people—agents, defendants, etc.?” ROA, Vol. III at 542. So, the jury evinced the
same level of uncertainty about whether the two defendants could conspire as whether a
defendant could conspire with a government agent. It went on to convict both
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon and Mr. Montijo-Dominguez of conspiracy to possess the cocaine
with intent to distribute. The government’s theory presented to the jury was that
Mr. “Mendoza-Alarcon entered into this agreement with Lazaro” and then “brought
[Mr.] Montijo-Dominguez into the agreement.” ROA, Vol. V at 1963.
On direct appeal, we held the “evidence was sufficient to support a finding that
Mr. Mendoza[-Alarcon] and Mr. Montijo[-Dominguez] conspired to possess with an
intent to distribute large quantities of cocaine.” Montijo-Dominguez, 771 F. App’x at 876.
That holding was based upon the theory that they conspired with one another. Id. at 875–
10
76. And in rejecting an argument from Mr. Montijo-Dominguez that the jury might have
credited his testimony to the contrary, we held “the jury necessarily must have found that
Mr. Montijo[-Dominguez] knowingly participated in a conspiracy with Mr. Mendoza[-
Alarcon].” Id. at 876.
Under these circumstances, Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon is not entitled to a COA to
challenge the district court’s conclusion that trial counsel’s failure to ask the district court
to instruct the jury that a conspiracy may not be with a government agent, whether
deficient or not, did not prejudice Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon.
B. Intent to Distribute
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon argues the district court also erred in rejecting the argument
that his counsel was ineffective for failing to argue the intent to distribute element in
closing. Assuming without deciding that Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s trial counsel was
deficient in failing to argue the government had not proven intent to distribute, no
reasonable jurist would disagree with the district court’s conclusion that this assumed
error did not result in prejudice. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon provides only three sentences of
argument on this point: the first is conclusory, the second notes only that the district court
“surmised that the jury may have believed [Mr.] Mendoza-Alarcon’s testimony, but
concluded that [the] defendants technically did not meet the stringent requirements of the
duress defense,” and the third speculates, “it is reasonably probable that the jury would
have weighed . . . in conjunction with the lack of evidence of drug trafficking or drug
history on Mendoza-Alarcon’s part and arrived at a different verdict.” Appellant Br. at
51–52.
11
This argument relies on the assumption that the jury was not “made aware that the
government was required to prove a shared intent to distribute.” Id. at 52. But the jury
was instructed it needed to find beyond a reasonable doubt that “two or more persons
agreed to possess a controlled substance for distribution.” ROA, Vol. III at 523. “[A] jury
is presumed to follow the trial court’s instructions.” Grant v. Royal, 886 F.3d 874, 940
(10th Cir. 2018). Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s argument that, despite this instruction, “the
jury could easily have failed to realize that it was required to specifically find that two or
more persons shared the intent to distribute” flies in the face of this presumption.
Appellant Br. at 49. Furthermore, it is unsupported by any argument that might rebut
such presumption. Accordingly, Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon has not met his burden of
demonstrating a COA is warranted on the ground that his trial counsel was ineffective in
failing to argue in closing that the government had failed to prove intent to distribute.
C. Decision Not to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing
Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon also asks for a COA on the question of whether the district
court erred in denying his request for an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon
argues he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing because the record does not conclusively
show he is entitled to no relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b). Because we hold no reasonable
jurist could disagree with the district court’s conclusion that the record definitively shows
no prejudice arose from trial counsel’s alleged failures, no COA is warranted on this
ground.
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III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we DENY Mr. Mendoza-Alarcon’s request for a
certificate of appealability and DISMISS this matter.
Entered for the Court
Carolyn B. McHugh
Circuit Judge
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