Zarska v. Higgins ( 2006 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
March 20, 2006
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
ERIC ALLEN ZARSKA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
No. 05-3204
v. (D.C. No. 04-CV-3319-CM)
(D. Kan.)
DONALD R. HIGGINS, COII/SST, in
his official and private capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before HENRY, McKAY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Plaintiff-Appellant Eric Allen Zarska, an inmate at the El Dorado
Correctional Facility (EDCF) in Kansas, appeals the dismissal of his pro se
42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights complaint. Mr. Zarska alleged that Defendant-
Appellee Donald R. Higgins, a sergeant at EDCF, violated his First Amendment
right to freedom of speech by filing a disciplinary charge in retaliation for an
affidavit Mr. Zarska gave supporting another prisoner’s grievance.
The district court dismissed Mr. Zarska’s complaint for failure to exhaust
his administrative remedies in accordance with 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a) of the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). In a footnote, the court stated that it “likely
would have dismissed plaintiff’s claims on the merits had it further considered the
matter.” R., Doc. 37 at 4 n.1.
In a motion for reconsideration, Mr. Zarska argued that the exhibits
attached to his complaint demonstrated that he had exhausted his administrative
remedies. The district court denied the motion, stating that it “remain[ed]
unconvinced [Mr. Zarska] in fact exhausted his administrative remedies,” id.,
Doc. 46 at 2, and expounding upon its alternate determination that dismissal was
also proper on the merits. Mr. Zarska appeals the court’s orders dismissing his
complaint and denying his motion for reconsideration. Exercising our jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse.
Background
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Mr. Zarska’s factual allegations are straightforward; for purposes of our
legal analysis we accept them as true and construe them in the light most
favorable to him. Yousef v. Reno, 254 F.3d 1214, 1219 (10th Cir. 2001). While
on his way to the prison library, Mr. Zarska witnessed Sergeant Higgins
threatening and intimidating another inmate and he later provided an affidavit
regarding the incident to that inmate. Shortly after Sergeant Higgins received a
copy of Mr. Zarska’s affidavit, he filed a disciplinary report charging Mr. Zarska
with “unauthorized presence” for having “no authorization to be out of his cell
house at the time [Mr. Zarska] witnessed [Sergeant Higgins] threatening and
intimidating [the] inmate.” R., Doc. 1 at 3. Mr. Zarska’s cell was searched in
connection with the disciplinary report despite the fact that it had been previously
searched that same morning. According to Mr. Zarska, the officers conducting
the search “ransack[ed] [his] living quarters.” Id. at 5.
The day after the disciplinary report was filed, Mr. Zarska asked Sergeant
Higgins to withdraw the charge because he had permission to be out of his cell
house at the time in question. Sergeant Higgins refused, stating: “he now
realized that [Mr. Zarska] had a pass to be out of his cell house, but that
[Mr. Zarska] should not have been looking at what [Sergeant Higgins] was
doing.” Id. at 4.
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The day after speaking to Sergeant Higgins, Mr. Zarska filed a grievance
alleging that the disciplinary report was filed in retaliation for his affidavit. The
response he received at all levels was that the grievance procedure could not be
used as a substitute for disciplinary proceedings. A disciplinary hearing was held
and the charge against Mr. Zarska was dismissed.
Exhaustion Of Administrative Remedies
Section 1997e(a) provides that “[n]o action shall be brought with respect to
prison conditions under section 1983 of this title, or any other Federal law, by a
prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such
administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” “[Section] 1997e(a)
imposes a pleading requirement on the prisoner” that may not be waived and “a
complaint that fails to allege the requisite exhaustion of remedies is tantamount to
one that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.” Steele v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 355 F.3d 1204, 1209-10 (10th Cir. 2003) (quotation omitted).
“We review de novo the district court’s finding of failure to exhaust
administrative remedies.” Jernigan v. Stuchell, 304 F.3d 1030, 1032 (10th Cir.
2002).
In dismissing the complaint on exhaustion grounds, the district court found
that “it is clear from plaintiff’s complaint and the Martinez report that plaintiff
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never filed a grievance complaining of the alleged retaliation.” 1 R., Doc. 37 at 4.
On the contrary, Mr. Zarska alleged exhaustion in his complaint and attached as
exhibits copies of grievances and appeals alleging retaliation. In its denial of
Mr. Zarska’s motion for reconsideration, the court acknowledged that he had, in
fact, filed a grievance alleging retaliation, but did not expound upon its
exhaustion ruling, stating only: “[t]he court remains unconvinced that plaintiff in
fact exhausted his administrative remedies with respect to the claims alleged in
his Complaint.” Id., Doc. 46 at 2.
Here, the prison relied on Kansas Administrative Regulations § 44-15-
101a(d)(2) in refusing to address Mr. Zarska’s grievances. Both the initial
administrative response and the second-level response from the warden referenced
this regulation, which reads in part: “The grievance procedure shall not be used
in any way as a substitute for, or as a part of, the inmate disciplinary procedure
. . . .” Kan. Admin. Regs. § 44-15-101a(d)(2). The third-level response from the
designee of the Secretary of Corrections simply incorporated the previous
responses. Regulation 44-15-101a(d)(2) further states that if the grievance
process “was conducted improperly, the grievance may challenge the manner in
1
“A Martinez report is a judicially authorized investigative report prepared
by prison officials to help the court determine if a pro se prisoner’s allegations
have any factual or legal basis.” Simkins v. Bruce, 406 F.3d 1239, 1240 n.2 (10th
Cir. 2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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which the decision was made;” however, “[g]rievances of this type shall be made
only after the decision process is completed unless the inmate would incur
irreparable harm if delayed until the end of the process.” Id.We have held “that the PLRA . . . contains a procedural default concept
within its exhaustion requirement.” Ross v. County of Bernalillo, 365 F.3d 1181,
1186 (10th Cir. 2004). Consequently, Mr. Zarska’s grievances would be
insufficient to exhaust his administrative remedies if they were properly denied
for failure to follow the above grievance procedures. See Jernigan, 304 F.3d at
1032-33 (holding that inmate that the doctrine of substantial compliance does not
apply and the inmate must cure procedural deficiencies). Because of the brevity
of the responses to Mr. Zarska’s grievance and appeals, however, it is unclear
whether the correction officials interpreted the grievance as a premature attack on
the grievance procedure, or if they considered the issue to be not grievable.
Either way, the district court erred in finding that Mr. Zarska failed to
exhaust his administrative remedies. Mr. Zarska’s grievance expressly alleged
retaliation and did not challenge the disciplinary procedure or the manner in
which the disciplinary decision was made. 2 Consequently, Mr. Zarska exhausted
2
An allegation of retaliation by the filing of a disciplinary charge does not
necessarily require an attack on the disciplinary charge itself. See Peterson v.
Shanks, 149 F.3d 1140, 1144 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding retaliation is improper
“even where the action taken in retaliation would be otherwise permissible”).
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his administrative remedies and the district court erred in dismissing his
complaint on exhaustion grounds.
Failure To State A Claim Upon Which Relief May Be Granted
We next examine whether Mr. Zarska’s complaint failed to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted.
A complaint should not be dismissed [for failure to state a claim
upon which relief may be granted] under Rule 12(b)(6) unless it
appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in
support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.
Yousef, 254 F.3d at 1219 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Mr. Zarska alleged that his First Amendment right to freedom of speech
was violated when Sergeant Higgins filed his disciplinary report and failed to
withdraw it once he knew the true facts. “We have held that prison officials may
not retaliate against or harass an inmate because of the inmate’s exercise of his
constitutional rights.” Peterson, 149 F.3d at 1144 (internal quotation marks and
alteration omitted). “Retaliation, though it is not expressly referred to in the
Constitution, is nonetheless actionable because retaliatory actions may tend to
chill individuals’ exercise of constitutional rights.” Poole v. County of Otero,
271 F.3d 955, 960 (10th Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). But “[a]n
inmate claiming retaliation must allege specific facts showing retaliation because
of the exercise of the prisoner’s constitutional rights.” Peterson, 149 F.3d at
1144 (internal quotation marks omitted) (emphasis in original).
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Sergeant Higgins argued that the complaint should be dismissed for failure
to state a claim because “even were it true that [he] acted in retaliation, the prison
system corrected the problem by dismissing the disciplinary report.” R., Doc. 20
at 3. The district court agreed, citing Love v. Scrivner, 2004 WL 2029328 (D.
Kan. Sept. 3, 2004) (unpublished). In Love, a prison librarian threatened to fire
prisoners working in the library if they continued to complain about library
procedures. When one of the prisoners filed a grievance alleging retaliation and
violation of his right to free speech, the librarian was informed that her actions
were inappropriate and she apologized to the inmate for making the threatening
statements. The inmate was unsatisfied and filed a lawsuit for damages. The
district court dismissed the complaint finding that the grievance system had
remedied the alleged violation and that a person of ordinary firmness would not
have been chilled by the comment which had been promptly withdrawn and
apologized for.
Relying on Love, the district court held that Mr. Zarska’s First Amendment
rights were neither subjectively nor objectively chilled because (1) he filed a
grievance against Sergeant Higgins, and (2) a person of ordinary firmness would
not have been chilled by Sergeant Higgins’ actions. The court also found that,
like the inmate in Love, Mr. Zarska “was given immediate relief once his
complaint was heard through the proper procedural channels.” R., Doc. 46 at 4.
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The court “note[d] that, had the disciplinary hearing perpetuated the error and
punished [Mr. Zarska] for being where he was authorized to be, a different result
might be justified. But the purpose of the disciplinary proceeding is to correct
such potential errors.” Id.We disagree that Mr. Zarska obtained relief through the disciplinary
proceedings. Mr. Zarska alleged that Sergeant Higgins filed his disciplinary
complaint in retaliation for the affidavit and refused to withdraw the complaint
even though he knew it was baseless. The prison refused to act on Mr. Zarska’s
grievance and the disciplinary hearing did not address Mr. Zarska’s retaliation
claim. The dismissal did not remedy Sergeant Higgins’ actions–it simply
prevented the harm to Mr. Zarska caused by those actions from being greater than
it already was.
Further, we hold that Sergeant Higgins’ alleged filing of disciplinary
proceedings to retaliate for a report of misconduct “would chill a person of
ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that activity.” 3 Poole, 271 F.3d at
960 (internal quotation marks omitted). Considering the level of control that
3
It is irrelevant that Mr. Zarska subsequently filed his grievance against
Sergeant Higgins. As noted above, the proper inquiry is whether Sergeant
Higgins’ actions would “chill a person of ordinary firmness from continuing to
engage in that activity,” Poole, 271 F.3d at 960, not whether Mr. Zarska
specifically was prevented from filing any further affidavits or grievances. Cf id.(holding that reckless driving charges lodged against a motorcyclist need not have
actually deterred the motorcyclist from suing the arresting officers).
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prison officials have over inmates’ lives, retaliation is not to be taken lightly.
Sergeant Higgins’ alleged pursuit of a baseless disciplinary charge should not be
ignored simply because the charge was later dismissed at the disciplinary hearing.
There is, after all, no guarantee that a baseless charge will always be dismissed.
But even if the disciplinary charge had not been baseless, there is an implicit
threat in the filing of a valid charge for retaliatory reasons that would chill further
action. Pursuing disciplinary proceedings against a prisoner as punishment for a
prisoner’s exercise of his or her constitutionally protected rights, is not allowed.
Conclusion
Therefore, we conclude that the district court erred in dismissing
Mr. Zarska’s complaint for failure to exhaust his administrative remedies and for
failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. We therefore
REVERSE the court’s orders dismissing Mr. Zarska’s complaint and denying his
motion for reconsideration and REMAND the case to the district court for further
proceedings consistent with this Order and Judgment.
Entered for the Court
Monroe G. McKay
Circuit Judge
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