Maureen Bigpond v. Michael Astrue , 280 F. App'x 716 ( 2008 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                  May 30, 2008
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT                     Clerk of Court
    MAUREEN BIGPOND,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 07-6275
    (D.C. No. 5:06-CV-01140-D)
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE, Commissioner                     (W.D. Okla.)
    of the Social Security Administration,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before KELLY, McKAY, and BRISCOE, Circuit Judges.
    Maureen Bigpond appeals from a district court order affirming the
    Commissioner’s denial of her application for Social Security disability benefits.
    Exercising jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
     and 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g), we
    affirm.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    Ms. Bigpond alleged disability beginning on June 1, 1997. Her last insured
    date was on June 30, 1997. Thus, the critical issue is whether she was disabled
    during the one-month period prior to her last insured date. An administrative law
    judge (ALJ) found that she had severe impairments of diabetes mellitus with
    sequelae, arthritis, and hypertension, but concluded that she had a residual
    functional capacity for a wide range of light work during the relevant period.
    Addressing the medical evidence, the ALJ found that
    [i]n essence, she appears to have been in the beginning stages of
    disease processes which would later dramatically worsen as of 2004,
    when she was found disabled. 1 However, as of and prior to the date
    last insured . . . of June 30, 1997, there is no reason the claimant
    would have been unable to perform a wide range of light exertional
    tasks.
    Aplt. App., Vol. II at 26. The ALJ held that, as of June 30, 1997, Ms. Bigpond
    could perform her past relevant work, as well as a significant number of other
    jobs, and was therefore not entitled to disability benefits. The district court
    affirmed the ALJ’s determination.
    “We review the district court’s decision de novo and independently
    determine whether the ALJ’s decision is free from legal error and supported by
    substantial evidence.” Fischer-Ross v. Barnhart, 
    431 F.3d 729
    , 731 (10th Cir.
    1
    Ms. Bigpond also applied for and was granted Supplemental Security
    Income benefits. The ALJ’s reference here to 2004 appears to be a typographic
    error because, as the ALJ acknowledged elsewhere in the decision, Ms. Bigpond
    was found to be disabled under Title XVI as of April 1, 2003.
    -2-
    2005). On appeal, Ms. Bigpond raises two claims of legal error, both of which
    relate to her cardiac condition. She asserts that the ALJ erred by (1) failing to
    discuss her cardiac problems in the decision and (2) failing to consult with a
    medical advisor regarding the onset date of her cardiac disability.
    The Commissioner does not dispute that Ms. Bigpond ultimately became
    disabled in 2003, but contends that substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s
    determination that she was not disabled six years earlier, when she last met the
    insured status requirements. It is clear, despite the Commissioner’s assertion to
    the contrary, that the ALJ did not discuss Ms. Bigpond’s cardiac condition, either
    as it existed during the relevant period in June 1997, or thereafter. In fact, there
    is no mention of any evidence related to her cardiac problems in the ALJ’s
    decision. But the question is whether that omission resulted in legal error.
    We turn first to Ms. Bigpond’s contention that the ALJ was required to
    consult with a medical advisor regarding the onset date of her cardiac disability.
    For this proposition she relies on Social Security Ruling 83-20 and our decision in
    Blea v. Barnhart, 
    466 F.3d 903
     (10th Cir. 2006). SSR 83-20 provides that an ALJ
    should consult a medical advisor at the hearing when the onset date of a disability
    must be inferred. See 
    1983 WL 31249
    , at *3. In Blea we held, with respect to the
    onset date of a disability, that an ALJ “may not make negative inferences from an
    ambiguous record; rather, it must call a medical advisor pursuant to SSR 83-20.”
    466 F.3d at 913. “[T]he issue of whether the ALJ erred by failing to call a
    -3-
    medical advisor turns on whether the evidence concerning the onset of [the
    claimant’s] disabilities was ambiguous, or alternatively, whether the medical
    evidence clearly documented the progression of his conditions.” Id. at 912.
    Blea is factually distinguishable from this case. The claimant in Blea
    sought no medical treatment during an eighteen-month period that included his
    last insured date. Id. at 912-13. Therefore, there were no contemporaneous
    medical records for the ALJ to consider. We held under those circumstances that
    the ALJ could not reasonably draw negative inferences from the lack of medical
    records. Id. at 912. In contrast, Ms. Bigpond has medical records both before
    and after June 1997. Indeed, she points to some of these records in support of her
    contention that the medical evidence is ambiguous regarding the onset date of her
    cardiac disability. Thus, in contrast to Blea, this is not a case where the medical
    evidence is ambiguous because adequate medical records are not available.
    Ms. Bigpond nonetheless argues that the evidence regarding the onset date
    of her cardiac disability is ambiguous. We note that the ambiguity must relate to
    the relevant time period. We consider “whether the evidence is ambiguous
    regarding the possibility that the onset of her disability occurred before the
    expiration of her insured status.” Id. at 911 (quotation omitted). “Disability” is
    defined as the “inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of
    any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected
    to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
    -4-
    period of not less than 12 months.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 423
    (d)(1)(A). Here the question
    is whether the evidence shows any possibility that Ms. Bigpond’s cardiac
    problems were disabling as of June 30, 1997. The Commissioner argues that the
    evidence clearly documents the progression of her cardiac problems, showing that
    they did not become disabling until long after her last insured date.
    Ms. Bigpond contends that medical records from 1997 indicate ambiguity
    regarding whether her cardiac problems were disabling at that time. Although she
    recites what these records say, she does not explain how they show that her
    cardiac problems made her unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity in
    June 1997. She emphasizes several ECG reports with notations that an
    abnormality found “may be [a] normal variant.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 187, 599,
    619 (all caps omitted). One of those ECG reports also indicated, “Inferior
    myocardial infarction . . . probably old,” with a warning that “[d]ata quality may
    affect interpretation.” 
    Id. at 187
     (all caps omitted). In October 1997,
    Ms. Bigpond sought treatment for light-headedness and left-arm pain. The
    examination showed a regular heart rate and rhythm. The record states “angina”
    as one of the purposes of her visit. 
    Id. at 601
    . She was given a prescription for
    nitroglycerin and referred for a cardiology examination. The notes from the
    cardiology consultation indicate that she had “multiple complaints” and that her
    diabetes and hypertension were “poorly controlled.” 
    Id. at 289
    . The cardiologist
    acknowledged her reports of fatigue and dizziness, but stated, “In listening to her
    -5-
    complaints of chest pain there [were] several varieties and I did not think there
    was a strong history of angina pectoris.” 
    Id.
     He scheduled Ms. Bigpond for an
    exercise tolerance test once her diabetes and hypertension were better controlled.
    There is no indication in the record that Ms. Bigpond followed up with an
    exercise tolerance test. But, as the Commissioner points out, her extensive
    medical records over the next several years show no cardiovascular complaints, as
    well as normal heart examinations with the exception of some further abnormal
    ECG reports. In July 2003 she reported a “history of exertional chest discomfort
    recently occurring.” 
    Id. at 266
     (emphasis added). At that time she was referred
    for a cardiac catheterization and she ultimately underwent bypass surgery in
    May 2004. We agree with the Commissioner that the evidence is not ambiguous.
    It fails to show a possibility that Ms. Bigpond’s cardiac problems were disabling
    as of June 30, 1997. Therefore, the ALJ did not err in failing to consult with a
    medical advisor regarding the onset date of her cardiac disability.
    We conclude as well that the ALJ did not err in failing to discuss
    Ms. Bigpond’s cardiac problems in the decision. “[A]n ALJ is not required to
    discuss every piece of evidence.” Clifton v. Chater, 
    79 F.3d 1007
    , 1009-10
    (10th Cir. 1996). But Ms. Bigpond argues that an ALJ “must discuss the
    uncontroverted evidence he chooses not to rely upon, as well as significantly
    probative evidence he rejects.” 
    Id. at 1010
    . As our above discussion illustrates,
    however, the evidence of her cardiac problems was not significantly probative of
    -6-
    whether she was disabled as of June 30, 1997. Nor did the ALJ ignore
    uncontroverted evidence of a cardiac disability during the relevant time period.
    See Howard v. Barnhart, 
    379 F.3d 945
    , 947 (10th Cir. 2004) (rejecting claim that
    ALJ was required to discuss all the evidence where none of the medical evidence
    conflicted with ALJ’s conclusion claimant could perform light work). Therefore,
    we hold that the ALJ did not commit legal error in failing to discuss
    Ms. Bigpond’s cardiac problems. 2
    The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
    Entered for the Court
    Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
    Circuit Judge
    2
    We also reject Ms. Bigpond’s assertion that, in responding to her claims of
    error, the Commissioner engaged in post hoc justification of the ALJ’s decision.
    She raised issues regarding what the ALJ failed to do. We have simply reviewed
    the record in order to determine whether, and then to illustrate why, the ALJ’s
    omissions were not legal error. The ALJ was not required to provide grounds in
    the decision for failing to do what was not required. Thus, neither we nor the
    Commissioner have relied on a substitute rationale for upholding the ALJ’s
    decision.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-6275

Citation Numbers: 280 F. App'x 716

Judges: Kelly, McKay, Briscoe

Filed Date: 5/30/2008

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 11/5/2024