Smith v. Klinger ( 1998 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
OCT 9 1998
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
THEODORE SMITH,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v. No. 98-6012
(D.C. No. CIV-97-583-A)
KEN KLINGER, (W.D. Okla.)
Respondent-Appellee.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before ANDERSON , BARRETT , and TACHA , Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
This is an appeal from the district court’s order denying petitioner-
appellant Theodore Smith’s petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 2254. This matter is before us on Mr. Smith’s motion for a
certificate of appealability (COA). In order to receive a COA, Mr. Smith must
make a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2253(c)(2). A habeas petitioner meets this standard if he shows that his issues
“are debatable among jurists, or that a court could resolve the issues differently,
or that the questions deserve further proceedings.” United States v. Sistrunk,
111 F.3d 91, 91 (10th Cir. 1997).
Mr. Smith was convicted in Oklahoma state court of several counts
involving the passing of bad checks. After exhausting his state remedies, he
pursued this habeas action in federal district court. The magistrate judge
assigned to the case recommended that his petition be denied. After considering
Mr. Smith’s objections, the district court adopted the magistrate judge’s
recommendations, made additional findings, and denied Mr. Smith’s petition.
Mr. Smith first argues that he was arrested illegally, without probable
cause, in violation of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. He asserts that the
state court improperly failed to suppress the evidence resulting from his illegal
arrest. Where a state has provided opportunity for full and fair litigation of
Fourth Amendment claims, a state prisoner may not be granted habeas corpus
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relief on the grounds that evidence obtained through illegal search and seizure
was introduced at his trial. See Stone v. Powell , 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
The district court found that Mr. Smith had a full and fair opportunity to
litigate his Fourth Amendment claim in state court. Mr. Smith argues that he was
denied such an opportunity because his attorney failed to appear at a suppression
hearing. That claim is properly viewed as an assertion of ineffective assistance of
counsel with respect to Mr. Smith’s Fourth Amendment issue. Such claims are
cognizable in federal habeas proceedings, notwithstanding the rule in Stone .
See Kimmelman v. Morrison , 477 U.S. 365, 382-83 (1986).
Mr. Smith bears a demanding burden in asserting his ineffectiveness claim,
however. He must show not only that his underlying Fourth Amendment claim
was meritorious, but also that his attorney’s ineffectiveness deprived him of a fair
trial. See id. at 382. Mr. Smith does not describe what evidence was seized as
the result of his allegedly illegal arrest, or how the introduction of this evidence
prejudiced him. See United States v. Owens , 882 F.2d 1493, 1501 (10th Cir.
1989) (petitioner asserting ineffective assistance with regard to Fourth
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Amendment claim must make affirmative showing of prejudice). 1
He is not
therefore entitled to a COA on this issue.
Mr. Smith further asserts that his attorney was ineffective (1) in failing to
conduct an investigation; (2) in failing to object to a witness’s statement at trial
on hearsay grounds; (3) in failing to call a handwriting expert; (4) in failing to
prepare an alibi defense; (5) in failing to call the arresting officers as witnesses to
his illegal arrest, and concerning the search of a motor vehicle; and (6) in failing
to appear at a hearing where he could have argued against use of prior bad acts
and other improper evidence against Mr. Smith. We have reviewed the record and
the district court’s analysis of these issues, and we agree with the district court
that Mr. Smith has failed to demonstrate that his counsel was constitutionally
ineffective.
In his next issue, Mr. Smith argues that the state court erroneously failed
to submit an alibi instruction to the jury. He argues that he could not have
committed two of the crimes charged, because he was in police custody when they
occurred. Mr. Smith carries the heavy burden on this issue of showing that the
1
Mr. Smith further argues that he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing with
respect to this claim. His failure to make more than conclusory allegations of
prejudice also means that he fails to show that the facts underlying his claim
“would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that but for
constitutional error, no reasonable fact-finder would have found [him] guilty of
the underlying offense.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2)(B). He is therefore not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing.
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omission of an alibi instruction resulted in a trial which was fundamentally unfair
in a constitutional sense. See Lujan v. Tansy , 2 F.3d 1031, 1035 (10th Cir. 1993).
Testimony at trial showed that police took Mr. Smith into custody prior to
7:45 p.m. on November 13, 1993. Count Two charged him with attempting to
cash a bad check at Homeland Grocery in Duncan, Oklahoma on that date.
Mr. Jackson, Homeland’s assistant manager, testified that he “believed”
Mr. Smith and Mr. Bivens were in his store at “around” 8:00 p.m. State R. Vol.
III at 417. Count Three charged Mr. Smith with cashing a bad check at Super H
in Duncan, also on November 13, 1993. Margie Stallons, an office clerk at Super
H, testified that Mr. Smith and Mr. Bivens were “probably” in the store around
8:30. Id. at 446. She based this estimate on the store’s closing time of 9:00,
reasoning that the defendants were there “around closing time probably.” Id.
Mr. Smith rests his alibi theory on the discrepancy between the time of
his arrest and the time the witnesses estimated that the crimes occurred. The
witnesses merely gave estimates of the time of the crimes, however, making it
entirely possible for Mr. Smith to have participated in the commission of the
crimes. In light of the other evidence tying Mr. Smith to the crimes charged in
Counts Two and Three, he fails to show that failure to give an alibi instruction
resulted in a fundamentally unfair trial.
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Mr. Smith also recasts this issue on appeal as a challenge to the sufficiency
of the evidence to convict him on Counts Two and Three. He did not present this
sufficiency of evidence issue to the state courts; however, we may still reach and
deny it on the merits. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(2). 2
A sufficiency of the evidence
claim presents a mixed question of law and fact which we review de novo on
federal habeas review. See Maes v. Thomas , 46 F.3d 979, 988 (10th Cir. 1995).
“[T]he relevant question is whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia ,
443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); accord Scrivner v. Tansy , 68 F.3d 1234, 1239
(10th Cir. 1995). 3
For the same reasons discussed above in the context of his jury
instruction challenge, we determine that Mr. Smith fails to show that a rational
trier of fact could not have found him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of Counts
Two and Three.
2
Strictly speaking, this issue is also barred because Mr. Smith has raised it
for the first time on appeal. See Oyler v. Allenbrand , 23 F.3d 292, 300 n.8 (10th
Cir. 1994). We do consider it, however, because it fails for much the same reason
as Mr. Smith’s jury instruction challenge.
3
Normally, in a post-AEDPA case like this one, the state court’s application
of the Jackson standard would circumscribe the scope of our review. See 28
U.S.C. § 2254(d). Since Mr. Smith did not present this claim to the state court,
however, our review is not measured by the state court finding.
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Mr. Smith next claims that the state withheld exculpatory information from
the defense in violation of Brady v. Maryland , 373 U.S. 83 (1963). In order to
establish a Brady violation, the defendant must show that the prosecution
suppressed evidence; that the evidence was favorable to the defendant; and that
the evidence was material. See United States v. Woodlee , 136 F.3d 1399, 1411
(10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed (U.S. May 22, 1998) (No. 97-9239). Mr. Smith
argues that the prosecution improperly suppressed evidence of the results of a
handwriting analysis conducted by the state’s expert. He argues that this analysis
excluded him as the endorser of the bad checks.
The record does not support this claim. The state’s attorney informed
the district court at trial that the handwriting analysis had been inconclusive.
He therefore declined to call the handwriting expert as a state’s witness. The
state’s attorney also noted that he had provided this information to Mr. Smith’s
counsel. Mr. Smith’s counsel did not challenge these statements by the state’s
attorney. Thus, Mr. Smith fails to show that the state suppressed evidence
favorable to him. 4
4
Mr. Smith now insists that the test was not inconclusive, that it excluded
him as the endorser of the bad checks. He presents no evidence to support this
claim, however, other than an affidavit which he signed and presented for the first
time with his objections to the magistrate judge’s recommendations. Mr. Smith
contends in his affidavit that a previous counsel who represented him prior to trial
told him that he had seen the results of the handwriting analysis and that Mr.
(continued...)
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Finally, Mr. Smith argues that his appellate counsel was ineffective in
failing to raise the following issues: (1) ineffective assistance of trial counsel;
(2) suppression of exculpatory evidence; and (3) use of false evidence or
testimony at his trial. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that
Mr. Smith had failed to show that his appellate counsel was constitutionally
ineffective. Mr. Smith fails to show that this determination either is contrary to
established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or is
based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence
presented in state court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
Mr. Smith’s motion for a COA is DENIED, and his appeal is DISMISSED.
Entered for the Court
Stephen H. Anderson
Circuit Judge
4
(...continued)
Smith had passed the test. In state court, however, Mr. Smith specifically argued
that the test was inconclusive, not that it excluded him. His belated, self-serving
affidavit is not sufficient to win him an evidentiary hearing. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(e)(2).
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