Armendariz v. City/County Denver ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 24 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
BEATRICE A. ARMENDARIZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY AND COUNTY OF DENVER, a
municipal corporation; THE OFFICE OF
EMPLOYEE ASSISTANCE, a
Department of the Executive Branch of
No. 99-1006
the government of the City and County of
(D.C. No. 97-WY-2657-CB)
Denver; ANDREW WALLACH,
(District of Wyoming)
individually and in his official capacity as
the Assistant to the Mayor of the City and
County of Denver; CHRISTOPHER
WEIMER, individually and in his capacity
as the Director of the Office of Employee
Assistance,
Defendants-Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
Before MURPHY, Circuit Judge, McWILLIAMS, Senior Circuit Judge, and ROGERS,
Senior District Judge**.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
Honorable Richard D. Rogers, Senior District Judge, United States District Court
for the District of Kansas, sitting by designation.
Beatrice A. Armendariz (“Ms. Armendariz”) brought suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado against her erstwhile employer, the City and
County of Denver, Andrew Wallach, assistant to the Mayor of Denver, and Christopher
Weimer, director of the Office of Employee Assistance for Denver, alleging numerous
violations of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. §1981; the Civil Rights Act of
1871, 42 U.S.C. §1983; Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §2000e et.
seq. as amended by the Civil Rights Act of 1991; the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29 U.S.C. §
206(d); the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. §621 et. seq.; and the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §12101 et .seq.
In her complaint, Ms. Armendariz described herself as a “forty-six year old female
citizen of the United States of Mexican-American and Native American descent who,
during the times relevant to this complaint, suffered from the mental maladies of
depression and situational anxiety disorder.” The defendants in due time filed an answer
and an amended answer to the complaint. Discovery ensued. Thereafter the defendants
filed a motion for summary judgment alleging, inter alia, that there was no genuine issue
of material fact. In support thereof, defendants filed a 255 page memorandum brief
which included extended excerpts from depositional testimony and numerous affidavits.
Ms. Armendariz filed a 105 page brief in opposition to the motion for summary
judgment, with numerous attachments, to which the defendants filed a 31 page reply
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brief. After oral argument, the district court in a 28 page order granted defendants’
motion for summary judgment and dismissed all claims with prejudice. In so doing, the
district court carefully analyzed the evidentiary matter before it, concluding that as to
certain claims there was no adverse employment action and holding that, as to other
claims, even assuming that Ms. Armendariz had made a prima facie showing, the
defendants had articulated legitimate non-discriminatory reasons for their adverse
employment actions and that Ms. Armendariz had failed to show pretext. Ms.
Armendariz, incidentally, was eventually terminated.
The facts of the case are fully set forth in the district court’s unpublished order
and need not be set forth here, since the facts are not really in dispute. In his brief,
counsel for Ms. Armendariz describes the “Issues Presented for Review” on appeal as
follows:
The issues presented for review by this Court are: (1)
whether the plaintiff-appellant presented sufficient evidence
of pretext to create genuine issues of material fact regarding
the defendant-appellee’s proffered explanations for the
adverse employment actions taken against the plaintiff-
appellant and (2) whether the district court erred in granting
the defendant-appellee’s motion for summary judgment.
Since these two issue are inextricably interwoven, the
plaintiff-appellant will make one argument which is
applicable to both.
Also in his brief for Ms. Armendariz, counsel’s “Summary of the
Argument”, in its entirety, reads as follows:
The plaintiff submits that she presented sufficient
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evidence of pretext to the court below to overcome the
defendants’ articulated reasons regarding the adverse
employment actions of which she complained thus creating
genuine issues for determination by a jury.
From the foregoing we conclude that the only issue in this appeal is whether in
granting summary judgment for the defendants the district court erred in holding that Ms.
Armendariz failed to make a sufficient showing that the defendants’ articulated non-
discriminatory reasons for their adverse employment actions were, in fact, not their true
reasons and were, indeed, pretextual.1 In this regard, in Cone v. Longmont United
Hospital Ass’n, 14 F.3d 526, 529 (10th Cir. 1994), we spoke as follows:
If the plaintiff satisfies the prima facie requirements under
the ADEA, then the case enters the next stage. In this second
stage, the burden of production moves to the defendant. The
defendant has to present a legitimate nondiscriminatory
reason for its action. If the defendant articulates a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action, then the burden of
persuasion moves back to the plaintiff. In this third stage of
the discrimination analysis, the plaintiff must show that age
was a determinative factor in the defendant’s employment
decision, or show that the defendant’s explanation for its
action was merely pretext. Failure to come forward with
evidence of pretext will entitle the defendant to judgment
(citations omitted).
1
At oral argument, counsel raised certain matter that was not raised in Ms.
Armendariz’ brief. We generally do not consider issues raised for the first time in oral
argument and which were not raised in the briefs. Thomas v. Denny’s, Inc., 111 F.3d
1506, 1510 n.5 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1028 (1997), citing Durham v. Xerox
Corp., 18 F.3d 836, 841 n.4 (10th Cir.) cert. denied, 513 U.S. 819 (1994). Other matter,
though casually mentioned in Ms. Armendariz’ brief, was not “adequately briefed,” and is
therefore deemed waived. Gross v. Burggraf Const. Co., 53 F.3d 1531, 1547 (10th Cir.
1995).
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And in the very recent case of Perry v. Woodward, 199 F.3d 1126, 1135 (10th
Cir.
1999), we stated:
A plaintiff relying on McDonnell Douglas bears the initial
burden of establishing a prima facie case by a preponderance
of the evidence. One way a plaintiff may establish a prima
facie case of wrongful termination is by showing that: (1) she
belongs to a protected class; (2) she was qualified for her job;
(3) despite her qualifications, she was discharged; and (4) the
job was not eliminated after her discharge. If the plaintiff
establishes her prima facie case, a rebuttable presumption
arises that the defendant unlawfully discriminated against her.
The defendant must then articulate a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse employment action
suffered by the plaintiff. If the defendant is able to articulate
a valid reason, the plaintiff can avoid summary judgment only
if she is able to show that a genuine dispute of material fact
exists as to whether the defendant’s articulated reason was
pretextual (citations omitted).
Our study of the present record leads us to conclude that the district court did not
err in holding that Ms. Armendariz failed to show that the defendants proffered reasons
for their adverse employment actions, which reasons Ms. Armendariz apparently
concedes were facially legitimate non-discriminatory reasons, were “pretextual”. On this
basis, we affirm.
Judgment affirmed.
Entered for the Court
Robert H. McWilliams
Senior Circuit Judge
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