Alford v. Commissioner, SSA ( 2019 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT April 5, 2019
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
JAMES BEDFORD ALFORD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 18-2075
(D.C. No. 1:16-CV-00800-KBM)
COMMISSIONER, SSA, (D. N.M.)
Defendant - Appellee.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, BACHARACH, and PHILLIPS, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
James Bedford Alford, appearing pro se, sued the Commissioner for negligence
and other alleged misconduct in denying his applications in 2012 for disability insurance
benefits (DIB) and supplemental security income (SSI) and awarding him benefits based
on his 2015 applications. The district court dismissed his claims on various grounds,
including lack of jurisdiction, and Alford appealed. Exercising jurisdiction under
42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
BACKGROUND
Alford first applied for DIB and SSI on August 3, 2012, alleging he became
disabled on April 15, 2009. The Commissioner denied his applications at the initial level
in January 2013. Alford did not administratively appeal this decision.
Alford returned to work for several years following the denial of his
2012 applications, but stopped working in 2015 because of his physical impairments. In
September 2015, he applied again for DIB and SSI, alleging disability beginning on
June 1, 2015. In September 2015, the Commissioner approved Alford’s SSI application
at the initial level, but denied his DIB application on the ground that he became disabled
after the last date he was insured.
Alford administratively appealed the denial of his DIB application, and the
Appeals Council reversed this decision in April 2017, concluding updated information
showed his date last insured was after his claimed disability onset date. As a result, the
Appeals Council concluded Alford was entitled to DIB benefits beginning on June 1,
2015, the date of disability onset he claimed in his application.
In July 2016, while his administrative appeal of the DIB denial was pending,
Alford filed this pro se action against the Social Security Administration (SSA) and, later,
one of its employees. In his initial and amended complaints, he sought monetary relief
for the SSA’s and the employee’s alleged negligence, operation under false pretenses,
deceptive practices, breach of contract, and breach of trust in connection with his
2012 and 2015 applications. In later filings, he also challenged the SSA’s favorable
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decision on his 2015 DIB application, alleging he was entitled to additional benefits
based on a disability onset date of May 18, 2012 or earlier.1
In October 2016, the district court dismissed Alford’s amended complaint without
prejudice, holding Alford had not met his burden of alleging facts establishing the court’s
jurisdiction to decide his claims. Specifically, the court held it was not apparent from
Alford’s allegations that he had exhausted administrative remedies with respect to his tort
claims, as required by the Federal Tort Claims Act, and, to the extent he asserted a claim
for denial of benefits, that he had received a final decision as required for judicial review
under the Social Security Act. The district court granted Alford’s motion for
reconsideration and reopened the case in July 2017 after learning the Appeals Council
had issued its April 2017 final decision on Alford’s administrative appeal.
Alford filed a series of motions following the case’s reopening in which he sought,
among other things, amendment of the disability onset date in the Commissioner’s DIB
decision and a favorable ruling on his damages claims against the agency.2 The district
1
Alford at times asserted a disability onset date in May of 2010 in the district
court. In his reply brief in this appeal, Alford asserted, apparently for the first time,
that his disability onset date should be reset to April 15, 2009, the onset date he
alleged in his 2012 applications.
2
Alford also requested that the district court issue a waiver that would allow
him to receive social security retirement benefits early as a result of his disability.
Alford has not challenged the district court’s denial of this motion on appeal and so
we do not address this issue. See Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir.
2007) (“[T]he omission of an issue in an opening brief generally forfeits appellate
consideration of that issue.”).
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court denied Alford’s motions and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.3 This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction de
novo. Niemi v. Lasshofer, 770 F.3d 1331, 1344 (10th Cir. 2014). Because Alford is
acting pro se, we construe his filings liberally, but do not act as his advocate. Garrett
v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).
B. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction; they must have a statutory basis
for their jurisdiction.” Dutcher v. Matheson, 733 F.3d 980, 984 (10th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “[W]e presume no jurisdiction exists absent an adequate
showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction.” Id. at 985 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
1. Challenge to the 2015 benefits decision
Alford’s challenge to the disability onset date and DIB benefits awarded in the
Commissioner’s 2015 decision is subject to section 405(g) of the Social Security Act.
It provides that an individual may obtain judicial review of “any final decision of the
Commissioner of Social Security made after a hearing to which he was a party.”
3
The district court also denied Alford’s challenge to the disability onset date in
the 2015 decision on the merits, but we need not reach this alternative ground to decide
this appeal.
4
42 U.S.C. § 405(g). But as the district court held, this provision does not allow
judicial review of agency decisions that are favorable to the claimant. See Jones v.
Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 18 (2d Cir. 1978) (“Section 405(g) assumes as a condition for
judicial review that the determination by the Secretary after a § 405(b) hearing will be
adverse to the claimant of benefits. It makes no provision for judicial review of a
determination favorable to the complainant.”); 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (stating the hearing
that is a prerequisite to judicial review is only available with respect to decisions that are
“in whole or in part unfavorable”).4 Alford received a fully favorable decision on his
2015 application for DIB benefits because the Commissioner awarded him benefits,
and did so based on the June 1, 2015 disability onset date he asserted in his
application. He therefore lacked standing under section 405(g) to challenge this
decision, and the district court correctly held it lacked jurisdiction over this claim.5
4
Further evidence of the limited scope of section 405(g)’s judicial review
provision is found in Senate and House reports that the provision was added to provide a
remedy “in the event [an individual’s] claim for benefits is denied by the Board.” Social
Security Act Amendments of 1939, S. Rep. No. 76-734, at 52 (1939) (emphasis added);
Social Security Act Amendments of 1939, H.R. Rep. No. 76-728, at 43 (1939) (emphasis
added) (both available at https://www.ssa.gov/history/pdf/Downey%20PDFs/
Social%20Security%20Amendments%20of%201939.pdf).
5
In addition, “[a]s a matter of practice and prudence,” the Supreme Court and
other federal courts “have generally declined to consider cases at the request of a
prevailing party, even when the Constitution allowed [them] to do so.” Camreta v.
Greene, 563 U.S. 692, 703-04 (2011); see id. at 702-704 (discussing this judicial policy).
This is because “[a] party who receives all that he has sought generally is not aggrieved
by the judgment affording the relief” and therefore should not be allowed to appeal from
it. Deposit Guar. Nat. Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1980); see Camreta,
563 U.S. at 703-04. Thus, prudential standing provides an additional basis for finding
Alford lacked standing to appeal his favorable benefits determination.
5
On appeal, Alford does not dispute that judicial review of favorable decisions
is not allowed under section 405(g). Instead, he suggests he did not in fact receive a
favorable decision on his 2015 application. But he contends the decision was not
favorable only because it adopted the June 1, 2015 disability onset date he asserted in
his applications instead of the 2012 (or earlier) date he now seeks to impose through
this action. A favorable decision on an application for disability insurance benefits
does not become unfavorable merely because a claimant wishes to improve on it.
2. Challenge to 2012 benefits decision
To the extent Alford seeks to challenge the Commissioner’s denial of his
applications for DIB and SSI in 2012, he also lacks statutory standing to pursue this
claim. Under section 405(g), a claimant may only seek review of a final decision of
the Commissioner made after a hearing. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). To obtain a final
decision, a claimant must exhaust administrative remedies as provided in the SSA’s
regulations. See, e.g., Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07 (2000); see also
20 C.F.R. § 404.900(a) (setting out four-step administrative review process required
to obtain a final decision for purposes of judicial review); Weinberger v. Salfi,
422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975) (holding existence of a final decision made after a
hearing is central to the grant of subject matter jurisdiction under § 405(g)). Here, it
is undisputed Alford did not seek reconsideration or request a hearing before an
administrative law judge as required to exhaust his administrative remedies after the
Commissioner denied his 2012 applications. He also does not argue that any
exception to the exhaustion requirement applies here. See Heckler v. Ringer,
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466 U.S. 602, 617-619 (1984) (discussing exceptions to exhaustion doctrine).
Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear a claim challenging these
decisions.
Alford apparently contends his failure to exhaust administrative remedies
regarding his 2012 claim should be excused because the SSA never told him it had
denied the claim. But Alford’s argument is inadequate because it is conclusory and
unsupported by evidence or legal authority. See, e.g., Nixon v. City & Cty. of Denver,
784 F.3d 1364, 1369-70 (10th Cir. 2015) (“A brief must contain an argument consisting
of more than a generalized assertion of error, with citations to supporting authority”
(internal quotation marks omitted)); Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841 (holding issues are
inadequately briefed if they are supported by “conclusory allegations with no
citations to the record or any legal authority”). “[W]e routinely have declined to
consider arguments that are not raised, or are inadequately presented, in an appellant’s
opening brief.” Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099, 1104 (10th Cir. 2007). As a result,
we do not consider this contention.
3. Negligence and other claims
The district court dismissed Alford’s tort claims for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction, because Alford’s complaint did not allege that he had timely presented his
tort claims to the SSA as required by the Federal Torts Claim Act, and dismissed his
claims for breaches of contract, duty and trust on the ground that they are not cognizable
under the Social Security Act. Alford reiterates these claims in his briefs in conclusory
fashion, but does not address the district court’s holding that it lacked jurisdiction to
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consider them. As a result, Alford failed “to explain to us why the district court’s
decision was wrong,” which is “[t]he first task of an appellant.” Nixon, 784 F.3d at 1366.
An appellant who fails in this task waives any argument for reversing the district court’s
decision. See, e.g., id. at 1368 (arguments “not adequately developed in a party’s brief”
are waived); Garrett, 425 F.3d at 841 (same). Accordingly, we conclude Alford has
waived any challenge to the district court’s dismissal of his tort and related claims for
lack of jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, we affirm the district court’s order dismissing this
matter for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. We deny Alford’s “Motion to Compel” as
moot.
Entered for the Court
Gregory A. Phillips
Circuit Judge
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