United States v. Cruz-Mendez ( 1999 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 9 1999
TENTH CIRCUIT PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
No. 98-4048
v.
(D.C. No. 97-CR-402-001)
(Utah)
MANUEL DE JESUS CRUZ-
MENDEZ,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before SEYMOUR, Chief Judge, BALDOCK and HENRY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The cause is
therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel. The court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
The Defendant Manuel Cruz-Mendez pled guilty to re-entering the United
States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326, and was sentenced on March 6, 1998.
Unhappy with the length of the sentence he received, he filed a notice of appeal
on March 20, four days beyond the ten day filing period. This court then ordered
the case partially remanded to the district court to determine whether Mr. Cruz-
Mendez’s failure to comply with the filing deadline was the result of excusable
neglect. In February 1999, the district court issued an order finding the neglect
inexcusable. Mr. Cruz-Mendez then filed a “Supplementation to Jurisdictional
Memorandum” in this court, requesting that we either remand for re-sentencing,
reverse the district court’s refusal to find excusable neglect, or defer the
jurisdictional issue to the merits panel.
As a preliminary matter, in order for us to exercise jurisdiction over the
court’s finding of no excusable neglect, we must have received a timely notice of
appeal from the February 1999 order. “A timely notice of appeal is both
mandatory and jurisdictional.” United States v. Langham, 77 F.3d 1280, 1280
(10th Cir. 1996). The “Supplementation to Jurisdictional Memorandum” filed by
Mr. Cruz-Mendez was not labeled as such, but we choose to treat it as the
functional equivalent of a notice of appeal. See Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co.,
487 U.S. 312, 316-17 (1988) (“[I]f a litigant files papers in a fashion that is
technically at variance with the letter of a procedural rule, a court may
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nonetheless find that the litigant has complied with the rule if the litigant’s action
is the functional equivalent of what the rule requires.”); United States v. Smith,
182 F.3d 733, 735 (10th Cir. 1999). We therefore have jurisdiction over Mr.
Cruz-Mendez’s appeal from the district court’s refusal to find excusable neglect.
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b)(1) requires that a defendant file a
notice of appeal in the district court within ten days after the entry of judgement.
Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). Upon a finding of “excusable neglect or good
cause,” however, the district court may extend the time to file a notice of appeal
for up to 30 days from the expiration of the original deadline. See Fed. R. App.
P. 4(b)(4).
We review the district court’s determination of the presence or absence of
excusable neglect for an abuse of discretion. See City of Chanute v. Williams
Natural Gas Co., 31 F.3d 1041, 1045 (10th Cir. 1994). “The real question here is
not whether we would have found . . . excusable neglect but rather whether we
should second-guess the trial judge’s decision . . . .” Varhol v. National R.R.
Passenger Corp., 909 F.2d 1557, 1564 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc; per curiam).
The Federal Rules do not define “excusable neglect,” but the Supreme
Court has directed that in determining what constitutes excusable neglect the
court must “tak[e] account of all relevant circumstances surrounding the party’s
omission.” Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v. Brunswick Assocs., L. P., 507 U.S. 380, 395
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(1993). 1 The Court specifically pointed to four factors relevant to the calculation:
the danger of prejudice to the nonmoving party, the length of the delay and its
potential impact on judicial proceedings, the reason for the delay, and whether the
movant acted in good faith. See id.
The Supreme Court stated in Pioneer that Congress allows the courts,
where appropriate, to “accept late filings caused by inadvertence, mistake, or
carelessness.” Id. at 388. The defendant has the burden of establishing a
sufficient reason for his failure to comply with the filing requirements. See
United States v. Lucas, 597 F.2d 243, 245 (10th Cir. 1979). In this case, Mr.
Cruz-Mendez failed to do so.
On the record before us, we can find little explanation for the late filing
beyond a statement signed by Mr. Cruz-Mendez’s attorney, in which he declares
that he “believe[d]” after the sentencing hearing that “the defendant was
dissatisfied with the length of the sentence he received.” Rec., Supp. vol. I, doc.
34. The attorney then states that he received a phone call at some point, from
some family member of the defendant’s, requesting that he file an appeal, and that
he believes “an appeal would only have been filed on the defendant’s behalf after
1
The Pioneer Court was discussing “excusable neglect” as it appears in the
bankruptcy statute, but the analysis extends to the use of the term in many places
within the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Appellate
Procedure. This court has previously applied Pioneer’s analysis to Fed. R. App.
P. 4(a). See Chanute, 31 F.3d at 1046.
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such a phone call.” Id. The attorney offers no explanation, much less an excuse,
for not filing a notice of appeal immediately after learning of defendant’s
dissatisfaction with the court’s ruling. The district court therefore did not abuse
its discretion in refusing to find excusable neglect.
Because the district court was acting within its discretion when it found no
excusable neglect, the time for filing a notice of appeal was not extended and we
are without jurisdiction to consider the merits of Mr. Cruz-Mendez’s appeal of his
sentence.
For the foregoing reasons, the defendant’s appeal is DISMISSED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT
Stephanie K. Seymour
Chief Judge
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