McDonald v. Colorado's 5th Judicial District ( 2016 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT May 16, 2016
_________________________________
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
R. KIRK MCDONALD,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v. No. 15-1478
(D.C. No. 1:15-CV-02310-LTB)
COLORADO’S 5TH JUDICIAL (D. Colo.)
DISTRICT; THE HONORABLE
FREDERICK WALKER GANNETT,
District Court Judge, 5th Judicial District,
Colorado; COLORADO’S 18TH
JUDICIAL DISTRICT;THE
HONORABLE MARK HANNEN, District
Court Judge 18th Judicial District,
Colorado; COLORADO ATTORNEY
GENERAL CYNTHIA COFFMAN;
ARAPAHOE COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEY,
Defendants - Appellees.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before BRISCOE, BACHARACH, and McHUGH, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
R. Kirk McDonald filed a pro se complaint in the district court, claiming his
constitutional and civil rights were violated by adverse rulings entered in certain
Colorado state-court proceedings.1 Although it was unclear whether the state-court
proceedings had concluded, the district court determined that dismissal was required
under either the Rooker-Feldman doctrine2 if they had or the Younger abstention
doctrine3 if they had not. The court therefore dismissed the case, and Mr. McDonald
moved to alter or amend the judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). After the court
denied his motion, Mr. McDonald appealed. We now affirm for substantially the
same reasons stated by the district court.
I
According to the complaint, Mr. McDonald has been engaged in two Colorado
state-court actions involving real property. The first suit he apparently initiated as
the “victim of a mortgage fraud scheme” perpetrated by two national banks. R. at 4.
In connection with that case, he claimed a state court judge from Colorado’s 5th
judicial district “refused to provide [an] order granting [him] pro se status and[,] in
an interlocutory order under color of law[,] breached Colorado common and statutory
laws by granting partial judgment to [the] lender . . . .” Id. at 11. In connection with
the second suit, which involved a homeowners association (HOA), Mr. McDonald
1
We liberally construe Mr. McDonald’s pro se materials but do not act on his
behalf. See United States v. Pinson, 584 F.3d 972, 975 (10th Cir. 2009).
2
See Rooker v. Fid. Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923); D.C. Ct. App. v. Feldman,
460 U.S. 462 (1983).
3
See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
2
claimed the same state court judge “ruled in favor of [the HOA]” and “refused to
provide final judgment to [him] as had been done in the national bank fraud case
above, violating [his] civil rights, equal protection rights[,] and due process rights
. . . .” Id. at 19. Because the judge ruled against him a second time, Mr. McDonald
sought to have the judge criminally prosecuted. But state and county prosecutors
declined to file charges, and a different judge from Colorado’s 18th judicial district
refused to hold hearings on the matter or provide Mr. McDonald a transcript. Thus,
Mr. McDonald claimed the judge from the 18th judicial district violated his “due
process rights, civil rights, and equal protections under Colorado and United States
Constitutions.” Id. at 26.
The district court dismissed the suit under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
which bars federal appellate review of state-court judgments, and the Younger
abstention doctrine, which prevents federal courts from interfering in ongoing state-
court proceedings. The court noted that although it was unclear whether the state
proceedings were ongoing, Mr. McDonald alleged his cases had not “concluded
because the state court ha[d] intentionally refused to obey appellate court orders,
craft and serve final judgments to parties.” Id. at 24. Given these allegations, the
court ruled that if the state proceedings were final, Rooker-Feldman applied; if the
state proceedings were ongoing, Younger applied. The court subsequently denied
Mr. McDonald’s Rule 59(e) motion, and this appeal followed.
3
II
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under both the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and the Younger abstention doctrine. Campbell v. City of Spencer,
682 F.3d 1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012) (Rooker-Feldman); Taylor v. Jaquez, 126 F.3d
1294, 1296 (10th Cir. 1997) (Younger). As the district court correctly observed, the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars “cases brought by state-court losers complaining of
injuries caused by state-court judgments rendered before the district court
proceedings commenced and inviting district court review and rejection of those
judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284
(2005). The doctrine is rooted in 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), which states that “[f]inal
judgments or decrees rendered by the highest court of a State in which a decision
could be had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court . . . .” By vesting “the
Supreme Court with appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments, [Congress]
implied that the lower federal courts lacked authority to review state-court judicial
proceedings.” Campbell, 682 F.3d at 1281. Accordingly, as the district court
explained, the proper course for review of state-court judgments is to the state’s
highest court and then to the Supreme Court under 28 U.S.C. § 1257. See R. at 222
(citing Facio v. Jones, 929 F.2d 541, 543 (10th Cir. 1991)).
In contrast with Rooker-Feldman, the Younger abstention doctrine applies
when state proceedings have not concluded; it “dictates that federal courts not
interfere with state court proceedings by granting equitable relief—such as
injunctions of important state proceedings or declaratory judgments regarding
4
constitutional issues in those proceedings—when such relief could adequately be
sought before the state court,” Amanatullah v. Colo. Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 187 F.3d
1160, 1163 (10th Cir. 1999) (internal quotation marks omitted). Younger abstention,
the district court recognized, is non-discretionary and must be applied when three
conditions exist:
(1) there is an ongoing state criminal, civil, or administrative
proceeding, (2) the state court provides an adequate forum to hear the
claims raised in the federal complaint, and (3) the state proceedings
involve important state interests, matters which traditionally look to
state law for their resolution or implicate separately articulated state
policies.
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, the district court recognized that the only question is whether the cause
should have been dismissed under Rooker-Feldman or Younger. If the state
proceedings have concluded, then dismissal was proper under Rooker-Feldman
because Mr. McDonald unquestionably seeks review and rejection of the adverse
rulings entered in those proceedings. To the extent Mr. McDonald attempted to
pursue disciplinary and criminal proceedings against the judge from the 5th judicial
district, his claim for declaratory relief against the judge from the 18th judicial
district for refusing to entertain those proceedings or provide a transcript still seeks
review and rejection of those decisions.4 Thus, if the state proceedings have
4
It is unclear whether the attempted disciplinary/criminal proceedings were
separate from the second real estate action or part of it. It is patently clear, however,
that Mr. McDonald seeks to have the district court review and reject the 18th judicial
district judge’s decisions in that matter. This is precisely the type of federal court
review of state-court decisions that Rooker-Feldman prohibits.
5
concluded, the district court correctly ruled that dismissal was required under
Rooker-Feldman.
If, however, the state proceedings have not concluded, then dismissal was
proper under Younger because as the district court indicated, the three requisite
conditions for Younger abstention are all satisfied. Indeed, the first condition—an
ongoing state proceeding—is satisfied because Mr. McDonald alleged (and presently
maintains) that no final judgment has entered in his state cases. See R. at 24 (“The
two above cases have not concluded because the state court has intentionally refused
to obey appellate court orders, craft and serve final judgments . . . .”); Aplt. Br. at 39
(“There are no judgments in the above cases because the state court has refused to
craft and serve either party or specifically Mr. McDonald a final judgment and its
interlocutory orders.”). The second condition—an adequate state forum—is also
satisfied because Mr. McDonald could pursue his constitutional claims in state court.
And last, the third condition—a state case involving important state interests—is
satisfied because the state proceedings involve real property located within Colorado
and Mr. McDonald’s efforts to have a state judge criminally prosecuted. Under these
circumstances, and accepting Mr. McDonald’s allegation that the state proceedings
are ongoing, the district court correctly abstained under Younger.5
5
Although Mr. McDonald insists Rooker-Feldman is inapplicable because the
state proceedings are ongoing, he curiously does not challenge or even mention
Younger abstention anywhere in his appellate brief. His failure to dispute this
alternative basis for dismissal necessarily forecloses any prospect of success on
appeal. See Murrell v. Shalala, 43 F.3d 1388, 1389-90 (10th Cir. 1994).
6
As for the denial of Mr. McDonald’s Rule 59(e) motion, we perceive no abuse
of discretion. See Loughridge v. Chiles Power Supply Co., 431 F.3d 1268, 1275
(10th Cir. 2005) (reviewing for abuse of discretion). The district court correctly
explained that a Rule 59(e) motion “should be granted only to correct manifest errors
of law or to present newly discovered evidence.” Phelps v. Hamilton, 122 F.3d 1309,
1324 (10th Cir. 1997) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court also observed
that relief may be appropriate when “the court has misapprehended the facts, a
party’s position, or the controlling law.” Servants of the Paraclete v. Does, 204 F.3d
1005, 1012 (10th Cir. 2000). Mr. McDonald’s Rule 59(e) motion merely disputed the
court’s application of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which was not a
misapprehension of the controlling law. The district court acted within its discretion
in denying the Rule 59(e) motion.
III
The judgment of the district court is affirmed for substantially the same
reasons stated in the district court’s order of dismissal, dated October 23, 2015, and
its order denying Mr. McDonald’s Rule 59(e) motion, dated November 16, 2015.
Mr. McDonald’s motion to proceed on appeal without prepayment of costs or fees is
granted, but only prepayment of fees is waived, not the fees themselves. See
28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(1). Payment shall be made to the Clerk of the District Court.
Entered for the Court
Mary Beck Briscoe
Circuit Judge
7