Mann v. Astrue , 314 F. App'x 141 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                       FILED
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    February 24, 2009
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    Elisabeth A. Shumaker
    Clerk of Court
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    RICKY J. MANN,
    Plaintiff-Appellant,                    No. 08-1084
    (D.C. No. 1:06-CV-02015-MSK)
    v.                                                   (D. Colo.)
    MICHAEL J. ASTRUE,
    Commissioner of Social Security,
    Defendant-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before O’BRIEN, McCONNELL, and TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges.
    As of January 26, 2001, Ricky J. Mann was adjudicated disabled and
    awarded benefits. This case involves an earlier application for Social Security
    disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits for a closed period
    of disability from July 17, 1999, through January 25, 2001. Mann appeals from
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
    ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
    precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and
    collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent
    with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
    the district court’s oral ruling affirming the Commissioner’s denial of benefits
    only for that temporally finite period.
    In December 1996, Mann suffered an on-the-job injury. He applied for
    benefits in the fall of 1999, alleging an inability to work since July 17, 1999, due
    to back, neck, and shoulder pain; headaches; numbness and tingling in both arms;
    pain radiating into both arms from his neck; pain radiating into both legs; and
    constant pain and stiffness. The agency denied his applications initially and on
    reconsideration, and on January 25, 2001, the ALJ issued a decision denying
    benefits. Mann submitted additional evidence, and on September 28, 2001, the
    ALJ issued an amended decision denying benefits. The Appeals Council
    considered both decisions and denied Mann’s request for review. He then sought
    judicial review, and the district court remanded the case for further administrative
    proceedings. After the remand, the ALJ held a hearing and, on April 13, 2006,
    denied benefits at step four of the applicable five-step sequential evaluation
    process. See Williams v. Bowen, 
    844 F.2d 748
    , 750-52 & 751 n.2 (10th Cir. 1988)
    (describing five-step process and explaining that at steps one through four the
    claimant bears the burden of establishing a prima facie case of disability). The
    ALJ concluded Mann suffered from severe impairments (degenerative disc disease
    of the cervical and thoracic spine, hypertension, and Hepatitis C), but that his
    residual functional capacity during the relevant time period “did not prevent him
    from performing his past relevant work.” Aplt. App., Vol. II at 398. The ALJ
    -2-
    also found Mann “not entirely credible.” Id. at 392. The Appeals Council denied
    Mann’s request for review. This appeal followed the district court’s oral ruling
    affirming the agency decision. 1
    Mann raises the same issues here as raised in the district court, viz.: (1) the
    ALJ did not apply the correct legal standards in evaluating the opinion of treating
    physician Jennifer Pentecost; (2) substantial evidence does not support the ALJ’s
    determination that Mann’s subjective complaints were not entirely credible; and
    (3) the ALJ did not apply the correct legal standards in concluding that Mann
    could perform his past relevant work.
    We review the Commissioner’s decision to determine whether
    the factual findings are supported by substantial evidence in the
    record and whether the correct legal standards were applied.
    Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind
    might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. It requires more
    than a scintilla, but less than a preponderance. We consider whether
    the ALJ followed the specific rules of law that must be followed in
    weighing particular types of evidence in disability cases, but we will
    not reweigh the evidence or substitute our judgment for the
    Commissioner’s.
    Lax v. Astrue, 
    489 F.3d 1080
    , 1084 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations and quotations
    omitted).
    Mann’s arguments fail. In an remarkably well-reasoned oral ruling, the
    district judge thoroughly analyzed and rejected each of Mann’s challenges to the
    ALJ’s decision using the same standard that governs our review. We cannot
    1
    Our jurisdiction arises under 
    42 U.S.C. § 405
    (g) and 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    .
    -3-
    improve upon her excellent summary and analysis and, therefore, adopt it. The
    Commissioner’s conclusion that Mann was not disabled between July 17, 1999,
    and January 25, 2001, was the product of a correct application of the law and
    supported by substantial record evidence.
    We AFFIRM the judgment of the district court for substantially the same
    reasons as stated in its January 29, 2008, oral ruling.
    Entered for the Court
    Terrence L. O’Brien
    Circuit Judge
    -4-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 19-6131

Citation Numbers: 314 F. App'x 141

Judges: O'Brien, McConnell, Tymkovich

Filed Date: 2/24/2009

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/19/2024