United States v. Sandersfield ( 1996 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
JUN 18 1997
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 95-6444
(D. Ct. No. CR-95-80-M)
JAMES EDWARD SANDERSFIELD, (W. D. Okla.)
a/k/a James Eddie Sandersfield, a/k/a
Eddie Sandersfield,
Defendant - Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before TACHA, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge panel
has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1.9. The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of
law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court generally disfavors the
citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
Defendant James Edward Sandersfield appeals his conviction in district
court for aiding and abetting in the possession of stolen government property in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 2, and receiving stolen mail matter in violation
of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1708 and 2. Sandersfield argues that the district court erred in:
(1) refusing to grant a continuance to obtain new counsel and to admit substitute
counsel in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and (2) restricting
Sandersfield’s cross-examination of a key government witness in violation of his
Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. We exercise jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1291 and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Early Monday morning on May 29, 1996, postal workers discovered that the
Southeast Station of the Oklahoma City Post Office had been burglarized. Among
the items taken were three “bait” money orders, a large mail hamper, some
stamps, and a specialized computer. After one of the money orders was
negotiated, postal inspectors traced the money order to Joan Ellen Jenkin, who
resided next door to Sandersfield. As the inspectors approached Jenkin’s home,
they noticed several muddy footprints in the walkway. Finding no one home, the
inspectors left for the day.
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Early the next morning, one of the inspectors observed Sandersfield and
Jenkin exit her home. The inspector noticed that Sandersfield locked the front
door as he left. The inspector watched as Sandersfield entered his home next
door and as Jenkin climbed into a van parked nearby. The inspector approached
Jenkin and obtained her permission to search the house. Meanwhile another
inspector arrested Sandersfield, noticing that his shoes appeared to match
footprints left at the post office and the muddy footprints outside Jenkin’s house.
The inspectors proceeded to search Jenkin’s house by opening the
combination lock on Jenkin’s front door using Sandersfield’s date of birth. In the
house, the inspectors found the items taken from the post office. They also found
Sandersfield’s wallet located in a bedroom.
A grand jury indicted Sandersfield and Ms. Jenkin on two counts of aiding
and abetting each other in the possession of stolen government property in
violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 641 and 2 (Counts One and Three), and aiding and
abetting each other in the receipt of stolen mail matter in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1708 and 2 (Count 4). The grand jury also indicted Ms. Jenkin with one count
of falsely making and forging a material endorsement on a money order in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 500 (Count 2).
On the morning of the first day of trial, Sandersfield requested a
continuance to retain different counsel. The court denied defendant’s request,
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finding that the attempt to substitute counsel was untimely and would cause undue
cost and delay. The court also noted that Sandersfield had not yet retained new
counsel, that Sandersfield’s current counsel was prepared to go to trial, and that
Sandersfield would not be prejudiced by the denial of a continuance. After the
trial began, Sandersfield’s attorney, at his client’s request, filed a motion to admit
new counsel. Again, the court denied the request.
At trial, the prosecution’s key witness against Sandersfield was Ernest
Draper. Draper was a cellmate of Sandersfield at the Oklahoma County Jail.
Draper testified that Sandersfield told him that he and two others burglarized the
post office and stole money orders, computers, and other items. The court refused
to permit the defense to question Draper about the nature of the state charges
pending against him. Instead, the court allowed questions regarding whether
Draper had been promised leniency in exchange for his testimony. Draper
testified that he had not received anything other than being transferred to a
different cell.
The jury acquitted Sandersfield on Count One but convicted him on Counts
Three and Four. This appeal followed.
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DISCUSSION
I. R IGHT TO C OUNSEL
Sandersfield contends that the district court erred in denying his motions
for a continuance to obtain substitute counsel and to admit new counsel after the
trial began. We review a district court’s refusal to substitute counsel for an abuse
of discretion. United States v. Johnson, 961 F.2d 1488, 1490 (10th Cir. 1992).
“While we recognize the right to choose and be represented by one’s preferred
attorney is encompassed by the Sixth Amendment, the Supreme Court reminds us
that the ‘essential aim of the Amendment is to guarantee an effective advocate for
each criminal defendant rather than to ensure that a defendant will inexorably be
represented by the lawyer whom he prefers.’” United States v. Mendoza-Salgado,
964 F.2d 993, 1015 (10th Cir. 1992) (quoting Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S.
153, 159 (1988)). When a defendant seeks a continuance to retain substitute
counsel, courts must “balance a defendant’s constitutional right to retain counsel
of his choice against the need to maintain the highest standards of professional
responsibility, the public’s confidence in the integrity of the judicial process and
the orderly administration of justice.” United States v. Collins, 920 F.2d 619, 626
(10th Cir. 1990).
In reviewing the district court’s discretionary decision to deny a
continuance to obtain substitute counsel, we look to a number of factors,
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including: (1) whether the request was timely; (2) whether the continuance would
have inconvenienced the witnesses, the court, counsel, or the parties; (3) whether
other continuances had been granted; (4) whether legitimate reasons existed for
the delay; (5) whether defendant contributed to the circumstances giving rise to
the request; (6) whether defendant had other competent counsel prepared to try
the case; (7) whether rejecting defendant’s request caused identifiable prejudice
to his case, constituting material or substantial harm; and (8) whether the
complexity of the action or other relevant factors necessitated the delay. See
Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1015; Johnson, 961 F.2d at 1490. “Because the
factors influencing a particular case often vary, the district court enjoys broad
discretion on matters of continuance, even when the parties implicate Sixth
Amendment issues.” Mendoza-Salgado, 964 F.2d at 1015.
Applying these factors, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in denying defendant’s motion for a continuance to obtain substitute
counsel. The record shows that Sandersfield’s attorney requested a continuance
on the morning the trial was to begin. Because Sandersfield had known about the
trial date for nearly two months, the request was untimely and would have
inconvenienced the other participants in the trial. Sandersfield could give no
reason for his last minute request other than that his family wanted to hire a
different attorney and had not yet done so. Sandersfield’s attorney made
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numerous attempts before trial to obtain the names of other attorneys
Sandersfield’s family might retain, but as of the morning of trial, no other
attorney had been hired. Finally, the court determined that Sandersfield’s
attorney was prepared to try the case, and Sandersfield has failed to identify any
prejudice to his case as a result of the representation. Although Sandersfield
contends that his attorney was not prepared to try the case because of a “complete
breakdown in his communication with Mr. Sandersfield and his family,” App’t.
Br. at 14, the record does not support his contention. Accordingly, we hold that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Sandersfield’s motion for
a continuance in order to obtain substitute counsel.
Similarly, we conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in
refusing to admit new counsel after the trial began. “Absent a showing the
district court unreasonably or arbitrarily interfered with defendant’s right to
counsel of choice, we believe reversal is appropriate only when defendant
identifies specific prejudice resulting from denial of preferred counsel, and when
such prejudice renders the trial fundamentally unfair.” Mendoza-Salgado, 964
F.2d at 1016 (citing United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 n. 31 (1984)). In
this case, the defendant has identified no specific prejudice resulting from the
denial of new counsel. On the contrary, the district court stated that he was
concerned that admission of new counsel after the start of the trial might cause
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prejudice to both Sandersfield and Jenkin. Further, in denying defendant’s
motion, the district court relied on the potential for delay and “the interest of an
efficient administration of justice.” Because the district court’s refusal to admit
new counsel was not arbitrary or unreasonable and because defendant has not
identified prejudice resulting from the denial, we conclude that the district court
did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit new counsel once the trial began.
II. R IGHT TO C ONFRONT WITNESSES
Mr. Sandersfield next argues that the district court violated his right to
confrontation by restricting his cross-examination of Earnest Draper concerning
the nature of a pending state felony indictment against him. We review an alleged
violation of the Sixth Amendment right to confrontation de novo. Hatch v.
Oklahoma, 58 F.3d 1447, 1467 (10th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1881(1996).
“[A] criminal defendant states a violation of the Confrontation Clause by
showing that he was prohibited from engaging in otherwise appropriate
cross-examination designed to show a prototypical form of bias on the part of the
witness.” Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 680 (1986). However, “trial
judges retain wide latitude insofar as the Confrontation Clause is concerned to
impose reasonable limits on such cross-examination based on concerns about . . .
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harassment, prejudice, confusion of the issues, the witness’[s] safety, or
interrogation that is repetitive or only marginally relevant.” Id. at 679.
In this case, the defense sought to cross-examine Draper about the nature of
his pending state indictment, arguing that the seriousness of the state charges
created a “prototypical form of bias” favoring the prosecution. Sandersfield
contends that Draper had an obvious incentive to help the federal prosecution
because if convicted on the state charges, he faced life imprisonment.
We addressed a similar argument in United States v. Ellzey, 936 F.2d 492(10th Cir. 1991). In that case, we held that the district court did not abuse its
discretion in restricting the defendant’s cross-examination of a government
witness concerning a pending state indictment. Id. at 496. We noted that the
defendant failed to offer any evidence of an actual agreement with the prosecution
or that the witness had a subjective hope or belief that he would benefit from
testifying. Id. We emphasized that the defendant had “shown only the existence
of an indictment in another jurisdiction being prosecuted under separate
prosecuting authority.” Id. Thus, we held that the state indictment did “not
establish the direct link between the witness’s testimony and potential reward or
retribution by the charging prosecution.” Id. at 497.
As in Ellzey, the federal prosecutors in this case had no direct authority or
influence over the state charges pending against Draper. The defense also failed
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in its repeated attempts to elicit testimony from Draper that he was testifying
against Sandersfield in the hope of receiving favorable treatment. On the
contrary, Draper testified that he had not been promised anything for his
testimony, that he had not asked for leniency from the prosecution, and that he
was unaware of any deals with any law enforcement agency that would result in
favorable treatment. R. Vol. IV, at 509-511, 524. Because Sandersfield has not
satisfied his burden of showing evidence from which an appropriate inference of a
“prototypical form of bias” could be drawn, the district court did not abuse its
discretion in restricting Sandersfield’s cross-examination.
AFFIRMED.
ENTERED FOR THE COURT,
Deanell Reece Tacha
Circuit Judge
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