United States v. Mansker ( 1997 )


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  •                                                                                 F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    DEC 4 1997
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
    Plaintiff-Appellee,
    No. 97-5106
    v.                                                     (D.C. No. 97-CV-42-B)
    (N.D. Okla.)
    ALVIN MANSKER,
    Defendant-Appellant.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
    Before BRORBY, EBEL, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.
    Petitioner Alvin Mansker requests a certificate of appealability in order to
    appeal the district court's dismissal of his motion to vacate, set aside, or correct
    an illegal sentence pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255. We deny the certificate and
    dismiss the appeal.
    *
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously to grant the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs without oral
    argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines
    of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the
    citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under
    the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    In 1992 Mr. Mansker pleaded guilty to a charge of conspiracy to distribute
    50 grams or more of crack cocaine pursuant to a plea agreement. In return for Mr.
    Mansker’s guilty plea as well as his cooperation and truthful testimony, the
    Government promised not to charge him for other acts connected to the
    conspiracy, and to grant him immunity for the use and disclosures of his
    testimony. In that agreement the Government also promised that if Mr. Mansker
    made a good-faith effort to provide the Government with “substantial assistance”
    the Government would file a motion with the court, either before or after
    sentencing, for the purpose of allowing the court to depart downward from the
    mandatory minimum of ten years imprisonment prescribed in the Sentencing
    Guidelines.
    Mr. Mansker cooperated with the Government at first, until he learned that
    a co-defendant who had cooperated with the Government had been murdered
    shortly after sentencing. From that point on, Mr. Mansker refused to cooperate as
    per the plea agreement. As a result, the Government refused to file the
    “substantial assistance” motion with the court. Mr. Mansker requested that the
    district court allow him to withdraw his guilty plea. The district court refused.
    The court sentenced him to the mandatory minimum sentence of ten years
    imprisonment.
    -2-
    On direct appeal before this court Mr. Mansker claimed (1) that the district
    court abused its discretion by refusing to allow him to withdraw his guilty plea,
    and (2) that the government breached the plea agreement by refusing to file a
    motion recommending a downward departure in his sentence for substantial
    assistance. We denied both of Mr. Mansker’s claims. See United States v.
    Mansker, No. 93-5022 (10th Cir. Aug. 16, 1993) (unpublished).
    On January 15, 1997, Mr. Mansker filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 attack on his
    sentence. In that motion, Mansker (1) again claimed that the Government
    breached the plea agreement; (2) raised for the first time the claim that his
    sentence was a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) in that it created unwarranted
    sentence disparities among defendants with similar records found guilty of similar
    conduct; and (3) raised for the first time a claim that his sentence should be
    reduced under the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f). The district
    court denied Mr. Mansker’s motion on the grounds that (1) the plea agreement
    issue was addressed by this court’s decision in Mr. Mansker’s direct appeal, thus
    barring relief via collateral attack; (2) Mr. Mansker’s 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6)
    disparate sentence claim failed on the merits; and (3) Mr. Mansker’s 18 U.S.C. §
    3553(f) safety valve claim failed as he was sentenced before passage of this
    provision.
    -3-
    Because Mr. Mansker’s § 2255 motion was filed with the district court after
    enactment of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
    (AEDPA), the provisions of that act requiring § 2255 appellants to obtain a
    certificate of appealability apply in this case. See United States v. Kunzman, 
    125 F.3d 1363
    , 1365 n.2 (10th Cir. 1997). The certificate of appealability may only
    be granted upon substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. See
    28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2) (West Supp. 1997). We have held that the standard for
    granting a certificate of appealability under the AEDPA is the same as the
    standard set out by the Supreme Court in Barefoot v. Estelle, 
    463 U.S. 880
    (1983). See Lennox v. Evans, 
    87 F.3d 431
    , 434 (10th Cir. 1996), cert. denied
    
    117 S. Ct. 746
    (1997) and overruled on other grounds by 
    Kunzman, 125 F.3d at 1365
    n.2. Under the Barefoot standard, a certificate will issue only where the
    petitioner has demonstrated the issues raised are debatable among jurists of
    reason, a court could resolve the issues differently, or the questions presented are
    deserving of further proceedings. See 
    Barefoot, 463 U.S. at 893
    n.4.
    Mr. Mansker has failed to make such a showing. Accordingly, the
    certificate of appealability is DENIED and the appeal is DISMISSED.
    -4-
    The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    David M. Ebel
    Circuit Judge
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 97-5106

Filed Date: 12/4/1997

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/18/2021