Morrison v. Pugh ( 1998 )


Menu:
  •                                                                          F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    OCT 2 1998
    TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    ARTHUR MORRISON,
    Petitioner - Appellant,
    No. 98-1278
    v.
    (D.C. No. 98-D-1358)
    (District of Colorado)
    MICHAEL PUGH,
    Respondent - Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT         *
    Before ANDERSON , McKAY and LUCERO , Circuit Judges.
    Pro se petitioner Arthur Morrison appeals the district court’s dismissal of
    his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
    . We affirm.
    Morrison brought this action, which challenges his confinement in the
    Federal Correctional Institution at Florence, Colorado, in the United States
    District Court for the District of Colorado. The district court issued Morrison an
    order to show cause why his application should not be denied because he has an
    *
    The case is unanimously ordered submitted without oral argument
    pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 34(a) and 10th Cir. R. 34.1.9. This order and
    judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case,
    res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court generally disfavors the citation of
    orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order and judgment may be cited under the
    terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    adequate and effective remedy under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . Following Morrison’s
    response, the district court dismissed the application without prejudice, finding
    that Morrison had not shown the § 2255 remedy to be “inadequate or ineffective.”
    Morrison, while temporarily incarcerated in the Federal Transfer Center at
    Oklahoma City, filed a prior habeas petition in the Western District of Oklahoma.
    The district court dismissed his petition on the ground that, even if § 2241 was a
    proper basis for his claim, the court lacked jurisdiction because Morrison was, by
    that time, no longer in custody in Oklahoma; we affirmed.     See Morrison v.
    Guzik , Nos. 97-6351, 97-6416, 
    1998 WL 380539
     (10th Cir. June 30, 1998). We
    noted that Morrison’s claims in that petition attacking the validity of his sentence
    were “properly within the province of a § 2255 petition.”    Id. at *2.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     provides that a prisoner in federal custody may attack the
    validity or duration of his or her sentence through a motion to the court that
    imposed the sentence. It additionally provides that
    An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner
    who is authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to this
    section, shall not be entertained if it appears that the applicant has
    failed to apply for relief, by motion, to the court which sentenced
    him, or that such court has denied him relief, unless it also appears
    that the remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the
    legality of his detention.
    
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    . In contrast, “[a] petition under 
    28 U.S.C. § 2241
     attacks the
    execution of a sentence rather than its validity and must be filed in the district
    -2-
    where the prisoner is confined.”     Bradshaw v. Story , 
    86 F.3d 164
    , 166 (10th Cir.
    1996). Morrison attacks the jurisdiction of the United States District Court for
    the Southern District of New York. This is clearly an attack on the validity of his
    sentence, and thus cannot be brought under § 2241. “The exclusive remedy for
    testing the validity of a judgment and sentence, unless it is inadequate or
    ineffective, is that provided for in 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
    .”     Bradshaw , 
    86 F.3d at 166
    (quoting Johnson v. Taylor , 
    347 F.2d 365
    , 366 (10th Cir. 1965);     cf. McIntosh v.
    United States Parole Comm’n , 
    115 F.3d 809
    , 812 (10th Cir. 1997) (listing matters
    that constitute attacks on the execution of a sentence). Morrison has offered no
    arguments on appeal as to why 
    28 U.S.C. § 2255
     is “inadequate or ineffective” in
    his case. The district court properly found that his arguments below, including
    allegations of bias and inability to raise a § 2255 motion while his direct appeal
    was still pending, failed to indicate the level of inadequacy necessary to obviate
    recourse to that remedy.    See Bradshaw , 
    86 F.3d at 167
    . Accordingly, we
    conclude that the district court did not err in denying Morrison’s § 2241 petition
    and dismissing his action without prejudice.
    On appeal, Morrison renews his motion to proceed in forma pauperis. To
    succeed on this motion, “an appellant must show a financial inability to pay the
    required filing fees and the existence of a reasoned, nonfrivolous argument on the
    law and facts in support of the issues raised on appeal.”     DeBardeleben v.
    -3-
    Quinlan , 
    937 F.2d 502
    , 505 (10th Cir. 1991). We previously rejected Morrison’s
    contention that his attacks on his conviction and sentence should be brought in the
    form of a § 2241 petition, see   Morrison , 
    1998 WL 380539
     at *2, and Morrison
    offers no nonfrivolous arguments to distinguish his claims in this appeal.
    Therefore, we deny the motion to proceed in forma pauperis. Appellant’s motions
    to supplement his brief are denied.
    AFFIRMED.       The mandate shall issue forthwith.
    ENTERED FOR THE COURT
    Carlos F. Lucero
    Circuit Judge
    -4-