Stephens v. Atherton ( 2000 )

F I L E D
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
MAR 21 2000
TENTH CIRCUIT
PATRICK FISHER
Clerk
WAYNE STEPHENS,
Petitioner - Appellant,
vs. No. 99-1529
(D.C. No. 99-Z-805)
E. E. ATHERTON; ATTORNEY (D. Colo.)
GENERAL FOR THE STATE OF
COLORADO,
Respondents - Appellees.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
Before BRORBY, KELLY, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges. **
Mr. Stephens, an inmate appearing pro se, seeks to appeal from the denial
of his habeas application, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He was convicted in Colorado state
court of first degree aggravated motor vehicle theft, Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-409,
and two counts of being a habitual criminal. He was sentenced to twenty-five
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. This court
generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
**
After examining the briefs and the appellate record, this three-judge
panel has determined unanimously that oral argument would not be of material
assistance in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 10th
Cir. R. 34.1 (G). The cause is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
years imprisonment. His sentence was affirmed on direct appeal. See People v.
Stephens, 837 P.2d 231 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied as improvidently
granted, 854 P.2d 231 (Colo. 1993). Mr. Stephens contends that he exhausted the
claims he brings now in state post-conviction proceedings. His federal
application for habeas relief was denied by the district court on the merits. The
district court also denied a motion to reconsider, and denied a certificate of
appealability. We deny a certificate of appealability and dismiss the appeal.
The facts are not in dispute. On September 15, 1989, Mr. Stephens
borrowed his employer’s car. The employer gave permission for Mr. Stephens to
use the car until the morning of September 16, 1989. Mr. Stephens never returned
the car, and “was arrested one month later with the vehicle still in his
possession.” Stephens, 837 P.2d at 233.
Mr. Stephens claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to
raise a claim of fatal variance between the allegations in the indictment and the
crime of which he was convicted. He argues that the indictment was
constructively amended to require proof of specific intent because, under his
interpretation of the statute, the government would have to show that he never had
permission to possess the car. Mr. Stephens relies exclusively upon People v.
Andrews, 632 P.2d 1012 (Colo. 1981), in which the Colorado Supreme Court
upheld a § 18-4-409 conviction and noted that the defendant “neither sought nor
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obtained permission from [his employer] to use the vehicle.” Id. at 1017.
“‘An indictment is constructively amended if the evidence presented at
trial, together with the jury instructions, raises the possibility that the defendant
was convicted of an offense other than that charged in the indictment.’” Hunter
v. New Mexico, 916 F.2d 595, 599 (10th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). According
to Mr. Stephens, the indictment stated:
On or about September 16, 1989, Wayne Stephens did
unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly obtain and
exercise control over the motor vehicle of Howard Smith
without authorization and by threat and deception and
did retain possession and control over the motor vehicle
for more than twenty-four hours, wherein the value of
said motor vehicle being less than ten thousand dollars.
Aplt. Br. at 16a. This indictment tracks the language of Colo. Rev. Stat. § 18-4-
409(2), which states: “A person commits aggravated motor vehicle theft in the
first degree if he knowingly obtains or exercises control over the motor vehicle of
another without authorization or by threat or deception and: (a) Retains
possession or control of the motor vehicle for more than twenty-four hours . . . .”
Mr. Stephens contends that because he had received permission from Mr.
Smith to use the vehicle for some time, he could not thereafter be convicted under
§ 18-4-409. His reliance upon Andrews for this argument is patently mistaken.
In Andrews, the defendant worked as a salesman for a car dealership which
provided “demonstrator vehicles” for use by its employees in connection with
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their sales duties. 632 P.2d at 1014. So long as they were employed by the
dealership, the salesmen were allowed to use the demonstrator vehicles for their
private use. See id. The defendant took the car home with him one day and never
returned with it. In upholding his conviction under § 18-4-409, the Colorado
Supreme Court noted that defendant left work and “thereafter he neither sought
nor obtained permission from [his employer] to use the vehicle.” Id. at 1017
(emphasis added).
Andrews is on all fours with the present case. In both instances, the
defendant had permission from his employer to use the vehicle. It was only after
this permission ended that the crime began. Mr. Stephens’ argument that a
constructive variance existed between the indictment and the crime for which he
was convicted is meritless. Therefore, his attorney was not ineffective in failing
to raise this claim.
We DENY a certificate of appealability as Mr. Stephens has not “made a
substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right,” 28 U.S.C. § 2253,
DENY the motion to proceed in forma pauperis, and DISMISS the appeal.
Entered for the Court
Paul J. Kelly, Jr.
Circuit Judge
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