Bruns v. Commissioner , 98 F. App'x 811 ( 2004 )


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  •                                                                           F I L E D
    United States Court of Appeals
    Tenth Circuit
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    MAY 26 2004
    FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
    PATRICK FISHER
    Clerk
    RONALD C. BRUNS,
    Petitioner-Appellant,
    v.                                                   No. 03-9002
    (T.C. No. 11356-01)
    COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL
    REVENUE,
    Respondent-Appellee.
    ORDER AND JUDGMENT            *
    Before KELLY , Circuit Judge, BRORBY , Senior Circuit Judge, and        BRISCOE ,
    Circuit Judge.
    After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
    unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist the determination of
    this appeal.   See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is
    therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
    *
    This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the
    doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. The court
    generally disfavors the citation of orders and judgments; nevertheless, an order
    and judgment may be cited under the terms and conditions of 10th Cir. R. 36.3.
    Ronald C. Bruns, proceeding pro se, appeals the decision of the Tax Court
    upholding deficiencies and additions to tax for 1997 as determined by the Internal
    Revenue Service (IRS). We exercise jurisdiction under 
    26 U.S.C. § 7482
    (a)(1),
    and affirm.
    Mr. Bruns filed the underlying action in the Tax Court challenging the
    amount of income imputed to him and asserting that he was entitled to personal
    deductions before calculating the tax. R. Vol. I, doc. 1, at 2. The government
    then sent interrogatories and a request for production of documents to Mr. Bruns
    seeking information about his 1997 income and expenses, but he declined to
    answer, invoking his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. He
    claimed that the information sought pertaining to income and possession of
    documents could support a criminal prosecution against him for tax evasion.
    Therefore, according to Mr. Bruns, he could not be compelled to produce the
    information or documents requested.
    The Tax Court eventually entered an order to compel discovery, but
    Mr. Bruns continued to refuse to comply. As a sanction, the Tax Court ruled that
    the matters covered by the discovery requests would be deemed admitted at trial.
    At trial, Mr. Bruns repeated his arguments that he could not be compelled to
    produce any evidence of his income for 1997. The Tax Court entered a judgment
    against Mr. Bruns for $8,404.00 in income tax, plus additions to the tax.
    -2-
    On appeal, Mr. Bruns renews his argument made to the Tax Court that he
    was entitled to invoke a blanket Fifth Amendment privilege against producing any
    information relevant to his income for 1997 because his answers and documents
    could support a criminal conviction or furnish a link in the chain of evidence
    needed to prosecute him for a federal crime. He also maintains that the Tax Court
    erred in imposing on him the initial burden of proving that the government’s
    assessment was incorrect.    1
    We review the Tax Court’s decisions “in the same manner and to the same
    extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a jury.”
    § 7482(a)(1). Legal questions are subject to a de novo review, while issues of
    fact are reviewed for clear error.   IHC Health Plans, Inc. v. Commissioner    , 
    325 F.3d 1188
    , 1193 (10th Cir. 2003).     Because plaintiff is representing himself on
    appeal, his pleadings will be liberally construed. See Haines v. Kerner, 
    404 U.S. 519
    , 520-21 (1972).
    The Fifth Amendment privilege extends both to answers that would support
    a criminal prosecution and to those that “would furnish a link in a chain of
    evidence needed to prosecute the claimant for a federal crime.”     Hoffman v.
    United States , 
    341 U.S. 479
    , 486 (1951). The privilege applies, however, only
    1
    Mr. Bruns does not challenge on appeal the additions to tax so we do not
    address them. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon   , 
    31 F.3d 979
    , 984 n.7
    (10th Cir. 1994).
    -3-
    where the petitioner “has reasonable cause to apprehend danger from a direct
    answer. The witness is not exonerated from answering merely because he
    declares that in so doing he would incriminate himself–his say-so does not of
    itself establish the hazard of incrimination.”      
    Id.
     (citation omitted). Rather, “[t]he
    trial court is to evaluate the incriminatory potential of questions asked.”         United
    States v. Jones , 
    703 F.2d 473
    , 476 (10th Cir. 1983). The Fifth Amendment
    privilege “may not be itself used as a method of evading payment of lawful
    taxes.” United States v. Schmidt , 
    816 F.2d 1477
    , 1482 (10th Cir. 1987) (quotation
    omitted).
    Mr. Bruns maintains that answering the government’s interrogatories and
    request for documents “could result in [his] admitting one or more elements” of
    income tax evasion or other crimes. Aplt. Br. at 8-9. As the Tax Court twice
    explained, Mr. Bruns has not shown that he faces a real hazard of criminal
    liability, so his mere assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege is not a valid
    exercise of the privilege. R. Vol. II, doc. 34, at 9;       
    id.
     , doc. 20, at 1. Mr. Bruns
    relies heavily on case law from other circuits, but “we are controlled by the law of
    this circuit,” United States v. Rodriguez-Mejia         , 
    20 F.3d 1090
    , 1092 n.2 (10th Cir.
    1994), and are not bound by the decisions of other circuits,         Garcia ex rel. Garcia
    v. Miera , 
    817 F.2d 650
    , 658 (10th Cir. 1987). Because Mr. Bruns has not made
    the showing required in this circuit, we conclude that the Tax Court properly
    -4-
    rejected his assertion of a “general and blanket privilege.”    United States v. Clark ,
    
    847 F.2d 1467
    , 1474 (10th Cir. 1988).
    Mr. Bruns also claims that the Tax Court committed reversible error by
    placing the burden on him to prove that the IRS’s determination of the taxes was
    not correct. On the contrary, “[t]he taxpayer carries the burden of proving the
    Commissioner’s assessment is incorrect.”        Anaya v. Commissioner , 
    983 F.2d 186
    ,
    188 (10th Cir. 1993). Moreover, Mr. Bruns’ income was established by the Tax
    Court’s sanction that deemed admitted the matters covered by the discovery
    requests.   2
    Furthermore, the government showed the income it imputed to
    Mr. Bruns by producing authenticated documents from two entities who paid
    funds to him in 1997. Accordingly, we affirm the assessment.
    The judgment of the Tax Court is AFFIRMED. The mandate shall issue
    forthwith.
    Entered for the Court
    Wade Brorby
    Senior Circuit Judge
    2
    Mr. Bruns does not challenge the Tax Court’s sanction except to say that
    his Fifth Amendment privilege should have precluded it.
    -5-