United States v. Haggerty , 731 F.3d 1094 ( 2013 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
September 24, 2013
PUBLISH Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v. No. 13-1093
TYRE S. HAGGERTY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:12-CR-00284-RBJ-1)
Submitted on the briefs:
John F. Walsh, United States Attorney, and J. Bishop Grewell, Assistant United
States Attorney, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Robert G. Levitt, Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant.
Before PORFILIO, ANDERSON, and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
BRORBY, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Tyre S. Haggerty pled guilty to one count of possession with
intent to distribute a controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1)
and (b)(1)(B)(viii), and one count of possession of a firearm by a previously
convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). He now appeals his
seventy-two-month sentence, claiming it is procedurally unreasonable because the
district court failed to consider the criteria in United States Sentencing Guidelines
(“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”) § 3E1.1(b) for a one-level reduction for acceptance
of responsibility. The government supports the appeal on similar grounds. Both
parties seek reversal and remand of the judgment, with directions for the district
court to grant or deny the § 3E1.1(b) reduction based on its consideration of
§ 3E1.1(b) and its commentary. We exercise jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse and remand to the district court for
resentencing. 1
I. Factual and Procedural Background
Mr. Haggerty’s tumultuous criminal history as a teenager culminated in a
felony drug conviction at the age of nineteen and a felony conviction for being a
felon in possession of a firearm at the age of twenty-one, for which he spent most
of 2003 to 2008 incarcerated.
On May 16, 2012, a fight erupted outside Mr. Haggerty’s home, in which
eight individuals got out of their vehicles and started an altercation with his
1
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has
determined unanimously to honor the parties’ request for a decision on the briefs
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(f); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case
is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument.
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relatives, including a young female and her newborn baby. In response to her
screams, Mr. Haggerty ran to his car, grabbed a pistol, and waved it around. As
the instigators drove away, Mr. Haggerty gave chase. After law enforcement
arrived on the scene and contacted Mr. Haggerty, they searched his vehicle,
finding 15.3 grams of methamphetamine he admitted to possessing but which he
claimed he picked up off the ground after one of the individuals he chased
dropped it and that he took it for his own personal use, believing it was cocaine.
Later, Mr. Haggerty again admitted to authorities he possessed the
methamphetamine and that the amount he possessed constituted a distribution
amount. He also admitted to purchasing and possessing the pistol involved in the
incident.
On July 9, 2012, a two-count indictment issued, charging Mr. Haggerty
with possession with intent to distribute a controlled substance and possession of
a firearm by a previously convicted felon. On November 27, 2012, pursuant to a
plea agreement, Mr. Haggerty pled guilty to both counts and admitted possessing
the methamphetamine with the intent to distribute it. In exchange for his guilty
plea, the government agreed to move for a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1(b) in calculating his sentence.
Following Mr. Haggerty’s guilty plea, a probation officer prepared a
presentence report using the 2012 Guidelines. In calculating his sentence, the
probation officer noted the government’s stipulation that it would move for a one-
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level reduction under § 3E1.1(b) and, accordingly, applied the two-level and one-
level offense reductions under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a) and (b) for his acceptance of
responsibility, which resulted in a total offense level of 24. Mr. Haggerty’s total
offense level of 24, together with his criminal history category of III, resulted in a
Guidelines range of sixty-three to seventy-eight months imprisonment. As
promised in the plea agreement, the government filed a motion for a one-level
decrease in the offense level under § 3E1.1(b) on grounds Mr. Haggerty’s timely
notice and agreement to plead guilty allowed it to avoid preparing for trial and
permitted both it and the court to allocate resources more efficiently.
At the sentencing hearing, the district court informed the parties it would
apply a two-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) but
denied the motion for a one-level reduction under U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b). As
grounds for denying the reduction, it explained:
I believe that what the Sentencing Commission had in mind for
acceptance of responsibility was a true and sincere acceptance of
responsibility, not simply the fact that a defendant is willing to plead
guilty.
... [T]he motion to grant the additional one-level decrease is
based entirely on the fact that the defendant agreed to plead guilty,
permitting the Government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting
[it] and the court to allocate resources more efficiently.
I will never agree that avoidance of trial is a more efficient or
appropriate allocation of resources. On the contrary, I think trials are
the way that our system wants us to resolve these cases and that they
are a good thing, not a bad thing. I do not think that saving the
Government the task of preparing for trial is a benefit that’s entitled
to any weight, nor do I think that saving the Court the trouble of
presiding over a trial is a positive that is entitled to any credit at all.
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It also stated its belief Mr. Haggerty did not take responsibility because he told
the officers he picked up the methamphetamine off the ground, thereby pointing
the finger of blame at others. Mr. Haggerty’s counsel made a contemporaneous
objection which the district court denied. After the district court granted a one-
level reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1, it calculated the Guidelines range at
sixty-three to seventy-eight months and sentenced Mr. Haggerty to seventy-two
months imprisonment.
II. Discussion
Mr. Haggerty now appeals his sentence, claiming it is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court failed to consider the criteria under
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) for a one-level reduction in the calculation of his total
offense level. In making this argument, he contends the district court gave
reasons for the denial which are factually incorrect and legally inconsistent with
Guidelines § 3E1.1(b) and its commentary, including its determination Mr.
Haggerty’s plea lacked sufficient contrition and its own personal belief that guilty
pleas should not result in lesser sentences. He points out a one-level reduction
would result in a total offense level of 23 and a Guidelines range of fifty-seven to
seventy-one months incarceration, which is below the seventy-two-month
sentence he received. He also submits his sentence is substantively unreasonable
due to this procedural error.
The government supports the defendant’s appeal on similar grounds,
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agreeing the district court relied on impermissible reasons to deny the one-level
reduction. Both parties seek reversal and remand of the judgment, with directions
for the district court to grant or deny the § 3E1.1(b) reduction based on a
determination as to whether Mr. Haggerty’s plea was sufficiently timely to save
the court and the government resources. In asking for reversal and remand, the
government acknowledges a split exists in circuit courts over whether a district
court must grant a one-level reduction if certain conditions in Guidelines
§ 3E1.1(b) are met. However, it points out that even in circuits which have held
the decision is discretionary, the district court’s discretion is limited to deciding
if the timeliness of the plea allows the court and government to save resources.
We review a sentence for reasonableness, giving deference to the district
court under an abuse of discretion standard. See United States v. Smart, 518 F.3d
800, 802-03, 805 (10th Cir. 2008). “Our appellate review for reasonableness
includes both a procedural component ... as well as a substantive component,
which relates to the length of the resulting sentence.” Id. at 803. “Procedural
reasonableness addresses whether the district court incorrectly calculated ... the
Guidelines sentence, treated the Guidelines as mandatory, failed to consider the
§ 3553(a) factors, relied on clearly erroneous facts, or failed to adequately explain
the sentence.” United States v. Huckins, 529 F.3d 1312, 1317 (10th Cir. 2008).
The issue in this appeal is whether denial of the one-level reduction under
§ 3E1.1(b), which affected calculation of the Guidelines range, resulted in a
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procedurally unreasonable sentence. Subsection 3E1.1(a) allows a two-level
decrease if “the defendant clearly demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for
his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). In turn, § 3E1.1(b), on which both parties
rely, states:
If the defendant qualifies for a decrease under subsection (a), the
offense level determined prior to the operation of subsection (a) is
level 16 or greater, and upon motion of the government stating that
the defendant has assisted authorities in the investigation or
prosecution of his own misconduct by timely notifying authorities of
his intention to enter a plea of guilty, thereby permitting the
government to avoid preparing for trial and permitting the
government and the court to allocate their resources efficiently,
decrease the offense level by 1 additional level.
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(b) (emphasis added). As the government points out, this
subsection outlines three conditions for granting a one-level reduction, which it
claims Mr. Haggerty met, including: (1) he qualified for acceptance of
responsibility under § 3E1.1(a) as determined by the district court; (2) he had an
offense level, before the acceptance of responsibility reduction, of 16 or higher;
and (3) the government filed a motion certifying he assisted authorities by timely
notifying it of his intention to plead guilty. With respect to the issue of the
timeliness of his plea, Application Note 6 to § 3E1.1 states:
The timeliness of the defendant’s acceptance of responsibility is a
consideration under both subsections, and is context specific. In
general, the conduct qualifying for a decrease in offense level under
subsection (b) will occur particularly early in the case. For example,
to qualify under subsection (b), the defendant must have notified
authorities of his intention to enter a plea of guilty at a sufficiently
early point in the process so that the government may avoid
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preparing for trial and the court may schedule its calendar
efficiently.
Because the Government is in the best position to determine
whether the defendant has assisted authorities in a manner that
avoids preparing for trial, an adjustment under subsection (b) may
only be granted upon a formal motion by the Government at the time
of sentencing. 2
U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.6 (emphasis added). While this application note places
the onus on the government to determine whether a defendant meets the relevant
criteria, another application note to § 3E1.1 states that “[t]he sentencing judge is
in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of responsibility. For
this reason, the determination of the sentencing judge is entitled to great
deference on review.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1 cmt. n.5. As the government points out,
the United States Sentencing Commission, in an effort to clarify how the
government’s § 3E1.1(b) motion and the district court’s discretion should
interplay in application of the reduction, has proposed to Congress an amendment
to such commentary, effective November 1, 2013, which expressly provides
2
Prior to 2003, the decision whether to grant a one-level reduction was
vested in the judiciary under the first two criteria; however, passage of the
PROTECT Act in 2003 amended the Guidelines, adding the third criterion, which
makes the application of the reduction dependent on the government filing a
motion. See United States v. Reeves, 586 F.3d 20, 25-26 (D.C. Cir. 2009). Prior
to the Act’s passage and issuance of Booker, which explains the Guidelines are
merely advisory, many circuits held that the language in § 3E1.1(b) was
mandatory, so that if the sentencing court found the two-fold criteria were met,
the one-level reduction must be given. See United States v. Robertson, 260 F.3d
500, 507 (6th Cir. 2001); United States v. Townsend, 73 F.3d 747, 755 (7th Cir.
1996); United States v. Eyler, 67 F.3d 1386, 1390 (9th Cir. 1995); United States
v. Talladino, 38 F.3d 1255, 1264 (1st Cir. 1994).
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sentencing courts discretion in applying a one-level reduction, stating:
If the government file[s] such a motion, and the court in deciding
whether to grant the motion also determines that the defendant has
assisted authorities in the investigation or prosecution of his own
misconduct by timely notifying authorities of his intention to enter a
plea of guilty, thereby permitting the government to avoid preparing
for trial and permitting the government and the court to allocate their
resources efficiently, the court should grant the motion.
78 Fed. Reg. 26425, 26431-32 (May 6, 2013) (emphasis added). See also 78 Fed.
Reg. 51821-01 (Aug. 21, 2013) (providing technical changes to the proposed
amendments and stating they will be effective November 1, 2013, “unless
Congress acts to the contrary”).
However, because this amendment has not yet become effective, we turn
for instruction to case law treatment of the existing commentary. The Seventh
Circuit has held subsection (b) confers an entitlement on the government and that
“if it wants to give the defendant additional credit for acceptance of
responsibility, perhaps to induce additional cooperation, and can satisfy the
criteria in the subsection, it can file a motion and the defendant will get the
additional one-level reduction in his offense level ....” United States v. Deberry,
576 F.3d 708, 710 (7th Cir. 2009). See also United States v. Mount, 675 F.3d
1052, 1057 (7th Cir. 2012) (holding one-level reduction is mandatory when three
criteria in § 3E1.1(b) are met); United States v. Divens, 650 F.3d 343, 346 (4th
Cir. 2011) (holding once government determines defendant has taken the steps
specified in subsection (b), he is entitled to the one-level reduction).
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In turn, as the government contends, other circuits have held the district
court has discretion in determining if the reduction is warranted by considering
whether the § 3E1.1(b) criteria are met, including the timeliness of the
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility and whether the government has been
able to avoid preparing for trial and the court has been able to schedule its
calendar efficiently. See United States v. Williamson, 598 F.3d 227, 230 (5th Cir.
2010) (holding both the government and the sentencing court must be satisfied the
requisite criteria are met); United States v. Stacey, 531 F.3d 565, 567 (8th Cir.
2008) (ruling that once government motion is made, court’s inquiry must be
“context specific” as noted in the commentary to § 3E1.1(b)); United States v.
Sloley, 464 F.3d 355, 359 (2d Cir. 2006) (explaining § 3E1.1(b) “is crafted and
structured in a manner that divides the power to reduce a defendant's offense level
for acceptance of responsibility between the sentencing court and the
prosecutor”).
As the government points out, these cases seemingly limit the district
court’s discretion to a determination of whether the § 3E1.1(b) criteria and its
commentary requirements are met. See Williamson, 598 F.3d at 230; Stacey, 531
F.3d at 568. 3 This includes reversing and remanding for a determination on the
3
Even the Seventh Circuit, which takes the position the government’s
motion mandates a reduction, allows the district court discretion to consider the
other § 3E1.1(b) criteria when the government fails to file a motion. See
Deberry, 576 F.3d at 711 (holding if government motion is not filed but other
§ 3E1.1(b) criteria are met the district court has broad discretion to ignore the
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timeliness of the defendant’s plea and/or cooperation. See Stacey, 531 F.3d at
568. While we have not discussed in detail the interplay between a government’s
motion and the sentencing court’s discretion in applying § 3E1.1(b), we have
remanded the issue of a § 3E1.1(b) reduction based on the district court’s failure
to consider whether the defendant acted in a timely manner, see United States v.
Marquez, 337 F.3d 1203, 1211 (10th Cir. 2003), or its reliance on impermissible
grounds on which to base a denial, see United States v. Ortiz, 63 F.3d 952, 955-56
(10th Cir. 1995). 4
In this case, even if the one-level reduction is within the sentencing court’s
discretion, rather than mandatory on the government’s motion, it is clear the
district court did not base its denial of the government’s motion on consideration
of the specific criteria outlined in § 3E1.1(b) and its commentary, including the
timeliness of Mr. Haggerty’s guilty plea “so that the government may avoid
preparing for trial and the court may schedule its calendar efficiently.” U.S.S.G.
§ 3E1.1 cmt. n.6. Instead, it merely articulated its own personal belief a
defendant should not be rewarded under § 3E1.1(b) for avoiding trial by pleading
guilty and that trials are the better or intended way to resolve cases in our judicial
absence of the motion and use “the [other] criteria in subsection (b) ... to lower
the defendant’s sentence”).
4
We find these cases instructive even though both were decided prior to
Booker and the PROTECT Act, which added the third criterion requiring a motion
by the government in order to obtain a one-level reduction.
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system. 5
While the right to trial is a fundamental part of our judicial system, no trial
was required in this situation because Mr. Haggerty elected, as is his prerogative,
to plead guilty. The Supreme Court has held that “there is no per se rule against
encouraging guilty pleas” and the government “may encourage a guilty plea by
offering substantial benefits in return for the plea.” Corbitt v. New Jersey, 439
U.S. 212, 218-19 (1978). It also recognizes a guilty plea may result in “the
possibility or certainty ... of a lesser penalty than the sentence that could be
imposed after a trial and a verdict of guilty.” Id. at 219 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “While confronting a defendant with the risk of more severe
punishment clearly may have a discouraging effect on [his] assertion of his trial
rights, the imposition of these difficult choices is an inevitable–and permissible–
attribute of any legitimate system which tolerates and encourages the negotiation
of pleas.” Id. at 220-21 (internal quotation marks omitted). As a result, the
Supreme Court recognizes the government’s “legitimate interest in encouraging
the entry of guilty pleas and in facilitating plea bargaining,” which is “a process
mutually beneficial to both the defendant and the [Government].” Id. at 222. It
5
The parties also point out the district court’s other reason for denying the
reduction, which it based on its belief Mr. Haggerty did not accept responsibility
for his conduct, is also not a criterion listed under § 3E1.1(b). See Eyler, 67 F.3d
at 1390 (holding that although § 3E1.1(b) is part of the acceptance of
responsibility guideline, “the measure of a defendant’s contrition is generally
irrelevant to the § 3E1.1(b) inquiry”). We similarly leave this issue for
consideration by the district court on remand.
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further recognizes the courts’ interest in saving scarce judicial resources. See
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 752 (1970).
Clearly, an intent to file a § 3E1.1(b) motion for a one-level reduction in
sentencing is an incentive the government may offer a defendant who timely
notifies it of his intention to enter a plea of guilty and from which the government
benefits by not having to prepare for trial. Accordingly, we agree with the parties
on appeal that a sentencing judge’s personal view that one should not be rewarded
with a lesser sentence for pleading guilty is an impermissible reason for denying a
§ 3E1.1(b) reduction and constitutes an abuse of discretion resulting in a
procedurally unreasonable sentence.
Because the district court did not consider the § 3E1.1(b) criteria or its
commentary, we reverse and remand the issue of the § 3E1.1(b) reduction to the
district court for its consideration. 6 See Ortiz, 63 F.3d at 955-56. While the
Guidelines are deemed advisory with their application generally left to the court’s
discretion, the Supreme Court has also held that “district courts, while not bound
to apply the Guidelines, must ... take them into account when sentencing.” United
States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 264 (2005). It has also held that “[a]s a matter of
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the
starting point and the initial benchmark” in sentencing. Gall v. United States, 552
6
Given our remand, we need not consider the substantive reasonableness
of Mr. Haggerty’s sentence.
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U.S. 38, 49 (2007).
III. Conclusion
Accordingly, we REVERSE and REMAND to the district court for
resentencing consistent with this decision and our discussion herein.
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