Fidelity National Title v. Pitkin County Title ( 2019 )

FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
_________________________________ January 23, 2019
Elisabeth A. Shumaker
FIDELITY NATIONAL TITLE Clerk of Court
INSURANCE COMPANY, a California
corporation,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 18-1128
(D.C. No. 1:12-CV-03077-RM-KLM)
PITKIN COUNTY TITLE, INC., (D. Colo.)
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
ORDER AND JUDGMENT*
_________________________________
Before HOLMES, O’BRIEN, and CARSON, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
Pitkin County Title, Inc. (Pitkin) appeals from a summary judgment entered in
favor of Fidelity National Title Insurance Co. (Fidelity) on Fidelity’s breach of contract
claim. It also appeals from the denial of its motion to alter or amend the judgment under
Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). We affirm.1
*
After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined
unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of
this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore
ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding
precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral
estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with
Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.
1
Our jurisdiction derives from 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
I
This case presents a title insurance dispute involving real property located in
Aspen, Colorado. The property was purchased by Preston and Betty Henn; title was
insured by a policy issued by Pitkin and underwritten by Fidelity. An agency agreement
authorized Pitkin to sell and issue Fidelity’s title insurance policies consistent with its
terms. Fidelity’s policies ordinarily excluded coverage for easements or claims of
easements, but the policy issued by Pitkin to the Henns deleted that and other exceptions.
Consequently, the Henns’ policy committed Fidelity to extended coverage for unrecorded
easements on the property.
As it happens, the Henns became embroiled in a dispute over a neighbor’s use of a
footpath across their insured property. The neighbor brought a quiet title action against
the Henns in state court, resulting in a prescriptive easement on the property. Although
the Henns sought defense and indemnification from Fidelity, Fidelity denied coverage. It
later acknowledged that some of the neighbor’s claims were covered, but the Henns
rejected Fidelity’s partial coverage offer and commenced this suit in federal court,
asserting claims for breach of contract and bad faith failure to defend.
Several months later, Fidelity filed a third-party complaint against Pitkin. Count
one claimed Pitkin was negligent in issuing the policy to the Henns with four exceptions
deleted, in particular the exception for unrecorded easements. Count two claimed Pitkin
breached its agency agreement with Fidelity by deleting the four exceptions from the
Henns’ policy without first obtaining written authorization from Fidelity, as required by
the agency agreement. The district court consolidated the cases, and the Henns
2
eventually settled with Fidelity, leaving Fidelity’s two claims against Pitkin. Fidelity
later stipulated to the dismissal of its negligence claim, leaving only its breach of contract
claim against Pitkin.
On cross motions for summary judgment, the district judge decided Pitkin
breached the agency agreement and, moreover, it was liable to Fidelity for the full
amount of the loss because “Pitkin was negligent in its breach of the Agreement,” Aplt.
App., Vol. VI at 74. In allocating the full loss to Pitkin, the district court applied the
relevant provisions of the agency agreement, which required Pitkin to reimburse Fidelity
for the entire amount of a loss arising from Pitkin’s “negligent, willful or reckless
conduct.” Id., Vol. III at 90.
In response, Pitkin moved to alter or amend its judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P.
59(e). Without disputing its breach of the agency agreement, it claimed the entire loss
ought not have been assigned to it because 1) Fidelity had already stipulated to the
dismissal of its negligence claim, 2) Fidelity neither pleaded nor established the elements
of negligence, and 3) the issue of negligence was barred by Colorado’s economic loss
rule, which generally bars tort claims for economic losses arising from contractual duties
absent an independent duty of care, see Town of Alma v. AZCO Constr., Inc., 10 P.3d
1256, 1264 (Colo. 2000) (en banc). The district judge rejected the arguments because
negligence remained an issue within the context of Fidelity’s breach of contract claim,
the dismissal of Fidelity’s negligence claim notwithstanding. Moreover, Pitkin failed to
preserve its economic loss theory in its summary judgment briefs, but even if the theory
were to be considered nothing prevented the application of a contractually agreed upon
3
standard of liability—negligence—in allocating the full loss to Pitkin. Aplt. App.,
Vol. VI at 141-42. The judge thus denied relief under Rule 59(e), and Pitkin appealed.
II
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo,” SCO Grp.,
Inc. v. Novell, Inc., 578 F.3d 1201, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009), and its “ruling on a Rule 59(e)
motion for abuse of discretion,” Hayes Family Tr. v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co.,
845 F.3d 997, 1004 (10th Cir. 2017). To the extent Pitkin challenges the judge’s
interpretation of the agency agreement, we apply Colorado law under a de novo standard
of review. See Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887 F.3d
1003, 1017-18 (10th Cir. 2018) (“Under Colorado law, ‘contract interpretation is a
question of law for the court to decide.’”) (quoting Copper Mountain, Inc. v. Indus. Sys.,
Inc., 208 P.3d 692, 696 (Colo. 2009) (en banc)) (brackets omitted)); see also Gorsuch,
Ltd., B.C. v. Wells Fargo Nat’l Bank Ass’n, 771 F.3d 1230, 1236 & n.7 (10th Cir. 2014)
(applying state law in diversity action).
We begin with the relevant provisions of the agency agreement: Pitkin “shall not,
without the prior written approval of [Fidelity’s] corporate underwriting department . . .
[c]ommit [Fidelity] to insure any Extra Hazardous Risk as defined herein,” or “[a]lter any
Title Assurance or other form furnished by [Fidelity] . . . .” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 89.
“Extra Hazardous Risk” is defined as “all risks which result in a liability not normally
assumed by [Fidelity].” Id. at 92. The title insurance forms Fidelity provided to Pitkin
included Schedule B, which contained standard Policy Exceptions 1, 2, 3, and 4. Id. at
219 (Flores Aff. ¶ 7). Policies issued without these exceptions “exposed Fidelity to
4
greater risk, including claims for off-record matters like easements and encroachments.”
Id. (Flores Aff. ¶ 8). Exception number 2 expressly excluded coverage for “[e]asements,
or claims of easements, not shown by the public records.” Id. at 216. But Schedule B in
the Henns’ policy stated, “EXCEPTIONS NUMBERED 1, 2, 3 AND 4 ARE HEREBY
DELETED.” Id. at 217.
Pitkin does not deny its breach of the agreement. Instead, it focuses on the
judge’s interpretation of the loss and allocation of loss provisions. The agreement defines
“Loss” as:
sums paid or to be paid by [Fidelity] . . . to settle or compromise claims
under any of [Fidelity’s] Title Assurances issued by [Pitkin]. Loss shall
include, but not be limited to, expenses, costs and attorney’s fees actually
paid or incurred in connection with investigation, negotiation, litigation, or
settlement of such claim which ultimately requires payment of any sum by
[Fidelity].
Id. at 92. Subject to subparagraph 6.B of the agreement, Pitkin’s “General Liability” was
capped at “the first $5,000.00 of any Loss sustained or incurred by [Fidelity] as a result of
the issuance of the Title Assurances by [Pitkin].” Id. at 93. But under subparagraph 6.B,
entitled, “ALLOCATION OF LOSSES,” Pitkin was liable for the entire loss incurred as a
result of its negligent, willful, or reckless conduct:
In the event that a Loss sustained or incurred for a matter arising under this
Agreement resulted or arose from the negligent, willful or reckless conduct
of [Pitkin], [Pitkin]’s employees or any independent contractor relied upon
by [Pitkin], then [Pitkin] shall reimburse [Fidelity] for the Loss. The
instances where [Pitkin] shall be liable to [Fidelity] under this subparagraph
shall include, without limitation, the following:
1. Failure of [Pitkin] to comply with the terms and conditions of this
Agreement or with the manuals, underwriting bulletins and/or
instructions given to [Pitkin] by [Fidelity].
5
Id. at 90.
Applying this provision, the judge’s summary judgment discussion concluded
“Pitkin was negligent in its breach of the Agreement,” id., Vol. VI at 74, and therefore
was liable for the entire loss. Pitkin here offers four arguments to the contrary.
First, it contends negligence is foreclosed by the economic loss rule: “a party
suffering only economic loss from the breach of an express or implied contractual duty
may not assert a tort claim for such a breach absent an independent duty of care under
tort law.” A.C. Excavating v. Yacht Club II Homeowners Ass’n, Inc., 114 P.3d 862, 865
(Colo. 2005) (en banc). There are three main policy reasons for applying the economic
loss rule between commercial parties:
(1) to maintain a distinction between contract and tort law; (2) to enforce
expectancy interests of the parties so that they can reliably allocate risks
and costs during their bargaining; and (3) to encourage the parties to build
the cost considerations into the contract because they will not be able to
recover economic damages in tort.
Spring Creek Expl. & Prod., 887 F.3d at 1020 (quoting BRW, Inc. v. Dufficy & Sons, Inc.,
99 P.3d 66, 72 (Colo. 2004)).
Fidelity stipulated to the dismissal of its negligence claim precisely because it was
barred by the economic loss rule. See Aplt. App., Vol. IV at 17. Following through,
Pitkin tells us parties may not incorporate a negligence standard into their contract. But
Colorado courts have recognized that “sophisticated parties can build the anticipated cost
of a breach of their respective duties into their bargain,” A Good Time Rental, LLC v.
First Am. Title Agency, 259 P.3d 534, 537 (Colo. App. 2011), and generally may
6
incorporate tort standards into their contract, see, e.g., BRW, Inc., 99 P.3d at 74-75
(holding that economic loss rule barred negligence claims because duty to perform in a
non-negligent manner was provided for by contract). It points to an exception to the
economic loss rule, one which allows a tort claim alleging breach of a duty independent
of a contract. See A.C. Excavating, 114 P.3d at 865. Pitkin asserts this exception
precludes a finding of negligence here because “[n]egligence must be based on breach of
a duty independent of a contract.” Aplt. Br. at 16. But conspicuously missing from this
tangled argument is any acknowledgement that there is no tort claim here. Nor does
Pitkin explain how applying an exception to the economic loss rule, which would permit
an independent negligence claim, helps its cause.
Pitkin’s second argument is equally flawed. It asserts the dismissal of Fidelity’s
negligence claim precludes consideration of its negligence, even for purposes of applying
the allocation of loss provision to resolve this breach of contract claim. It characterizes
this argument as a procedural bar, akin to collateral estoppel, but once again, this
argument distorts the economic loss rule and frustrates the contractual intent of the
parties. In Colorado, the economic loss rule applies unless a duty of care is imposed by
tort law, independent of contractual obligations. The rule and exception are distinct and
ought not be conflated. Fidelity’s dismissal of its negligence claim under the economic
loss rule is not a procedural bar to enforcement of the allocation of loss provisions
contained in the agency agreement. Pitkin would have us apply the economic loss rule to
bar recovery—not only as to a negligence claim—but also as to the express contract
provisions. It cites no authority for such a dubious application of the economic loss rule.
7
Moreover, it does not deny it agreed (under subparagraph 6.B) to be liable for the entire
loss resulting from its negligent, willful or reckless conduct. Even if there was no
independent tort (alleged or not) the language of the contract dictates the remedy. At
bottom, Pitkin asks us to ignore the parties’ expressly manifested intent. See Pepcol Mfg.
Co. v. Denver Union Corp., 687 P.2d 1310, 1313 (Colo. 1984) (en banc) (“An integrated
contract in the first instance is to be interpreted in its entirety with the end in view of
seeking to harmonize and to give effect to all provisions so that none will be rendered
meaningless.”).
Third, Pitkin contends Fidelity waived the issue of negligence by failing to plead
and establish the elements of a negligence claim in its summary judgment briefs. This
argument again conflates the dismissed negligence claim with the agreed contract remedy
for a loss resulting from the “negligent, willful or reckless conduct of [Pitkin],” which is
expressly identified as the “[f]ailure of [Pitkin] to comply with the terms and conditions
of this Agreement or with the manuals, underwriting bulletins and/or instructions given to
[Pitkin] by [Fidelity].” Aplt. App., Vol. III at 90.2
2
The district court declined to apply this definition of “negligent, willful or
reckless conduct” and instead applied a definition of “negligence” contained in
Colorado’s civil jury instructions. In its reply brief, Pitkin objects to revisiting the
district court’s construction of the agreement, asserting Fidelity did not challenge it.
But, as Pitkin acknowledges, we review the district court’s interpretation de novo.
See Spring Creek Expl. & Prod. Co. v. Hess Bakken Inv., II, LLC, 887 F.3d 1003,
1017-18 (10th Cir. 2018). Moreover, it does not contend the agency agreement is
ambiguous, nor does it explain why we should not apply its plain terms.
8
Finally, Pitkin contends it is not responsible for the entire loss because Fidelity
paid the Henns to settle its own claims, not necessarily a claim arising under the policy.
The undisputed evidence indicates otherwise. Fidelity provided evidence demonstrating
its settlement with the Henns consisted of payments for attorney’s fees and the
diminution of their property value resulting from the easement. See id., Vol. III at 210
(Nygaard Aff. ¶¶ 14-15). These were “sums paid . . . by [Fidelity] . . . to settle or
compromise claims under any of [Fidelity’s] Title Assurances issued by [Pitkin].” Id. at
92. Thus, the entire settlement amount qualifies as a “Loss” under the agency agreement,
and Pitkin was obligated to reimburse Fidelity for that loss.
III
The judgment of the district court is affirmed. Pitkin’s motion to seal Volume VII
of the appendix is granted, subject to its correction of an apparent filing error. Volume
VII contains a redacted version of Pitkin’s amended statement of undisputed facts. See
Aplt. App., Vol. VII at 87-88. This document was not included elsewhere in the
appendix. Accordingly, Pitkin shall supplement the appendix with a publicly available
redacted version of this document and an unredacted version filed under seal. See
10th Cir. R. 25.6(B).
Entered for the Court
Terrence L. O’Brien
Circuit Judge
9