United States v. Ramos ( 2023 )

Appellate Case: 23-6071 Document: 010110969290 Date Filed: 12/15/2023 Page: 1
FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS December 15, 2023
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v. No. 23-6071
ISAAC MANUEL RAMOS,
Defendant - Appellant.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Oklahoma
(D.C. No. 5:22-CR-00180-JD-1)
_________________________________
Shira Kieval, Assistant Federal Public Defender (Virginia L. Grady, Federal Public
Defender, with her on the briefs), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant – Appellant.
Wilson D. McGarry, Assistant United States Attorney (Robert J. Troester, United States
Attorney, with him on the brief), Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, for Plaintiff – Appellee.
_________________________________
Before BACHARACH, BALDOCK, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
MURPHY, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
I. INTRODUCTION
Frederick Police Department (“FPD”) Officer Jose Puentes arrested Isaac
Ramos and impounded Ramos’s truck. In anticipation of the truck’s impoundment,
Puentes conducted an inventory search. That search revealed the presence of a
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machine gun and ammunition. A federal grand jury issued a two-count indictment
charging Ramos with unlawful possession of a machine gun, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 922(o), and being a felon illegally in possession of ammunition, in
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Ramos moved to suppress the machine gun and
ammunition, asserting the impoundment of his truck violated the Fourth Amendment
because it was not consistent with standardized policy and not supported by a
reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. After the district court
denied his motion to suppress, Ramos entered a conditional guilty plea to the
unlawful-possession-of-a-machine-gun charge. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(a)(2). On appeal,
Ramos claims the district court erred in refusing to suppress the machine gun as the
product of an illegal search, reasserting the arguments he made in the district court.
This court exercises jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverses the
denial of Ramos’s suppression motion. We need not resolve whether the
impoundment of Ramos’s truck was consistent with FPD policy. Instead, it is
sufficient to conclude impoundment was not supported by a reasonable, non-
pretextual community-caretaking rationale. United States v. Sanders, 796 F.3d 1241,
1243 (10th Cir. 2015) (holding that to be valid under the community-caretaking
doctrine, an impoundment must be both consistent with standardized policy and
supported by a valid community-caretaking rationale). The matter is remanded to the
district court to grant Ramos’s suppression motion and to conduct any further
necessary proceedings.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Legal Background
The Fourth Amendment protects the “right of the people to be secure in their
. . . effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Vehicles are effects that fall within the Fourth Amendment’s protection. Coolidge v.
New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 461 (1971) (“The word ‘automobile’ is not a talisman
in whose presence the Fourth Amendment fades away and disappears.”). “To be
reasonable, a search generally requires the obtaining of a judicial warrant.” United
States v. Venezia, 995 F.3d 1170, 1174 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). “In the
absence of a warrant, a search is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception
to the warrant requirement.” Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 382 (2014). One such
exception, and the only exception at issue here, is a search conducted pursuant to a
police officer’s “community-caretaking function.” Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1175. This
exception allows law enforcement to impound an automobile and, in connection with
the impoundment, inventory the vehicle’s contents. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1244–45.
Such an impoundment, however, must be based on “something other than suspicion
of evidence of criminal activity,” such as “protecting public safety and promoting the
efficient movement of traffic.” Id. at 1245 (quotation omitted); see also United States
v. Chavez, 985 F.3d 1234, 1243 (10th Cir. 2021) (holding that “public safety lies at
the heart” of the community-caretaking doctrine). That is, a community-caretaking
impoundment cannot be based on a suspicion or hope evidence of criminal activity
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will be found in the vehicle. The government has the burden of proving a vehicle
impoundment satisfies the Fourth Amendment. Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1244.
The community-caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement operates differently depending on the nature of the property from which
the vehicle is impounded. When the vehicle is located on public property, specifically
including streets, roads, and ways, officers have far greater authority to impound. See
Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1175; see also generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S.
364 (1976); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); United States v. Trujillo, 993
F.3d 859 (10th Cir. 2021). When, on the other hand, police impound a car located on
private property, and that car is neither “obstructing traffic or creating an imminent
threat to public safety,” a community-caretaking rationale “is less likely to exist.”
Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1176, 1178. In such situations, this court imposes “heightened
requirements on police.” Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249. To be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment, such an impoundment must be “justified by both a standardized policy
and a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale.” Id. at 1248.1 A
1
This court’s precedents identify these two requirements as Sanders’s first
(justified by a standardized policy) and second (reasonable, non-pretextual
community-caretaking rationale) prongs. What makes the requirements for
impoundment in the private property context “heightened” is Sanders’s first prong.
See Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1178. Sanders’s second prong, on the other hand, “appl[ies]
to all community-caretaking impoundments.” Id. (quotation omitted). This is true
“because protection against unreasonable impoundments, even those conducted
pursuant to a standardized policy, is part and parcel of the Fourth Amendment’s
guarantee against unreasonable searches and seizures.” United States v. Kendall, 14
F.4th 1116, 1123 (10th Cir. 2021) (quotation omitted). As set out infra, when
analyzing whether a given impoundment satisfies Sanders’s second prong, this court
considers five non-exclusive factors.
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failure to satisfy either criterion is sufficient to establish that the impoundment, and
related inventory search, is unconstitutional. Id. at 1243.
Ramos asserts on appeal that the impoundment of his truck fails both
requirements set out in Sanders. This court need not resolve whether the
impoundment was consistent with FPD policy because, in any event, it is not
supported by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. See
United States v. Braxton, 61 F.4th 830, 835 & n.3 (10th Cir. 2023) (resolving appeal
solely on basis of Sanders’s second prong and emphasizing that both Sanders
requirements must be satisfied for a community-caretaking impoundment to pass
Fourth Amendment muster). Law enforcement must take “objectively reasonable”
action in its community-caretaking role and must do so pursuant to a non-pretextual
“subjective motivation.” Kendall, 14 F.4th at 1128; see generally United States v.
Woodard, 5 F.4th 1148, 1155–59 (10th Cir. 2021). This court has identified “five
non-exclusive factors” that are helpful to determining “whether an impoundment is
justified by . . . a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale.”
Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1177. These factors include:
(1) whether the vehicle is on public or private property; (2) if on private
property, whether the property owner has been consulted; (3) whether
an alternative to impoundment exists (especially another person capable
of driving the vehicle); (4) whether the vehicle is implicated in a crime;
and (5) whether the vehicle’s owner and/or driver have consented to the
impoundment.
5
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Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1250. Although this court weighs the Sanders factors de novo,
“we review the district court’s factual findings for clear error and view the evidence
in the light most favorable to the government.” Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1155.
B. Factual Background2
At 11:51 p.m. on February 13, 2022, FPD Officer Puentes responded to a call
about a public disturbance at the Hop & Sack Convenience Store. The Hop & Sack is
located at the intersection of 14th Street and Gladstone Avenue; Gladstone Avenue is
also State Highway 5. Puentes observed two men involved in a physical altercation in
the parking lot. Puentes separated the combatants, recognizing both men, Ramos and
Caleb Hogan, as his former classmates.3 As Puentes was pulling Ramos off to the
side, Ramos turned and “lightly tapped” him on his right cheek. At that moment,
Puentes placed Ramos under arrest for assault and battery on a police officer. Puentes
placed Ramos in handcuffs and detained Ramos in the backseat of his patrol car.
Puentes spoke with Hogan to get his side of the story. Puentes described Hogan as
the victim because when Puentes arrived on the scene, he saw Hogan walk toward his
vehicle as Ramos followed and then instigated the altercation.
2
The district court’s factual findings are set out in 202 numbered paragraphs
spread over 35 pages. This court sets out only those facts relevant to the second part
of the Sanders inquiry. In so doing, as discussed further below, we do not summarize
the extensive findings regarding how Hop & Sack employees or management might
have reacted if Puentes would have consulted them regarding their preferred
disposition of Ramos’s truck. Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1155–56.
3
The Town of Frederick spans less than five square miles. Ramos had lived in
Frederick most of his life and was well known to the people in Frederick.
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FPD Assistant Chief Joe Rodriguez arrived on scene after Puentes detained
Ramos and while Puentes was talking to Hogan. Puentes already had control of the
scene and was visiting with witnesses when Rodriguez arrived. Rodriguez assisted
Puentes with the investigation and consulted with Puentes about the charges and what
to do that night.
Once Puentes had Ramos in custody, he considered towing or impounding
Ramos’s vehicle. Puentes described his decision as “protocol,” meaning “as soon as I
arrest someone, and no one is around, I’ll impound their vehicle.” By 11:59 p.m.,
Puentes decided he was going to impound the vehicle. His decision never changed
and was based solely on the fact he had arrested Ramos.4
Ramos was driving a tow truck, which was parked on the east side of the Hop
& Sack. The Hop & Sack closes at midnight and it was past midnight when Puentes
asked Ramos if he needed anything out of his truck. Ramos responded he had
everything he needed and indicated the truck belonged to his mother. 5 When Puentes
4
To be clear, the vehicle was unrelated to the reason for Ramos’s arrest and
was not needed for evidence.
5
Puentes knew Ramos’s mother, Lupe Juanes, since he was a child. Puentes
acknowledged Juanes resided about three blocks from the Hop & Sack, a one-minute
drive. Similarly, Rodriguez has known Juanes his entire life, as they both grew up in
Frederick. Rodriguez also recognized Juanes lived near the Hop & Sack, about three
blocks away. In contrast, the closest towing service was ten blocks away. Rodriguez
conceded that if Juanes was home and awake, she could have arrived at the Hop &
Sack quickly if the officers had called her. Indeed, Juanes testified that if the officer
had called her to pick up the truck, she would have been at the Hop & Sack in three
minutes.
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asked if Juanes was home, Ramos shook his head yes. Ramos asked if he could call
Juanes to come pick up the truck. Puentes did not answer yes or no to Ramos’s
request because his plan was to first check the vehicle’s registration. Puentes never
called Juanes, despite admitting he could have obtained her phone number from
Ramos. Puentes asked Rodriguez whether he should let Juanes come get the truck.
Rodriguez deferred to Puentes, but suggested they first see whether the vehicle
registration came back to Juanes. Puentes and Rodriguez were considering releasing
the vehicle to Juanes, but needed to see if the vehicle was registered to her because
their “protocol” was “to release the vehicle to the registered owner.”6
While the officers were discussing whether to release the vehicle to Juanes,
Puentes discovered the truck had no license plate displayed. Rodriguez then advised
Puentes to call a tow truck. Rodriguez recognized it was Puentes’s call whether to
call a tow truck but indicated he was the supervisor on the scene, so he was advising
Puentes. When he discovered no license plate was displayed on the truck, Puentes
concluded it was irrelevant whether the vehicle was registered to Juanes because it
could not be lawfully driven on the roadway without a license plate displayed and,
without a license plate, the police could not confirm the vehicle’s registration.
Further, Ramos was alone, Juanes was not at the scene, and Puentes suspected Ramos
was intoxicated.
6
Puentes did not attempt to defend this “protocol” during the suppression
hearing. Instead, he agreed that family members may be entrusted with a vehicle with
the permission of the driver and that Ramos had asked him to release the truck to
Juanes.
8
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Puentes testified he would not leave the truck parked at the Hop & Sack
overnight because the FPD would be liable if the vehicle were burglarized or
vandalized while Ramos was in police custody. He also indicated the truck’s engine
was still running at the time.7 Additionally, Puentes would not leave the truck parked
at the Hop & Sack overnight because the store had a posted sign that prohibited
parking to non-customers. Puentes believed Ramos was no longer a customer because
it was fifteen minutes past midnight and the store closed at midnight.8 Although
Puentes had never towed a vehicle from the Hop & Sack before, he believed it would
be the store manager’s decision whether the truck could remain parked there
overnight. Puentes had no information indicating Ramos had permission from the
store manager to leave his vehicle overnight.
After deciding to impound the truck, Puentes asked Rodriguez to transport
Ramos to the jail so he could remain at the scene. As Ramos got into the back of
Rodriguez’s patrol car, Puentes asked him about the missing license plate. Ramos
indicated it was likely in the truck behind the seat but could also be in his other truck.
7
In its brief on appeal, the government repeatedly emphasizes this fact. It is,
however, mentioned only one time in the district court’s order: it appears as a single
sentence in the district court’s summary of Puentes’s testimony. Puentes did not
testify this fact played a meaningful role in his decision to impound Ramos’s truck
and it played no part in the district court’s analysis of the five Sanders factors. In any
event, for those reasons set out infra in notes 13 and 22, the fact Ramos’s truck was
running is of no significance to the resolution of this appeal.
8
Nevertheless, Puentes acknowledged Ramos purchased merchandise from the
Hop & Sack and that his vehicle was lawfully parked on the east side of the store in a
private parking lot, where it posed no impediment to traffic. Rodriguez likewise
testified Ramos’s vehicle was parked in a legal parking spot on private property.
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Puentes looked for the license plate in the truck, eventually finding it behind the
passenger seat. Puentes prepared to run a check on the license plate, but he did not
put the license plate back on the truck.9 Puentes testified he had never done that
before or heard of a police officer doing so. He also indicated there could be liability
issues if an officer were to damage the truck remounting the plate. Puentes called the
license plate number into dispatch; the dispatcher advised that the license plate return
came back to Ramos’s truck with an expiration date of November 30, 2022. The
dispatcher also advised that the insurance was confirmed. The dispatcher did not
indicate the vehicle was registered to anyone else besides Ramos.10
After Rodriguez and Ramos left in the patrol vehicle for the jail, Puentes
obtained a written statement from the store clerk, Jessica Ward. Puentes did not ask
for Ward’s permission to tow Ramos’s truck. It was not on his mind, he did not think
to ask, and, in his view, it would not have mattered because it would have been up to
the store manager whether Ramos could leave his vehicle overnight. Rodriguez,
9
Although the record is not entirely clear, it appears Ramos was displaying the
license plate on the rear window of the trunk, rather than on the rear bumper. Puentes
testified a license plate must be mounted on the back bumper. Ramos’s vehicle had
tinted glass, meaning the plate may not have been visible in the back window.
Puentes noted it was dark that night and he did not place the license plate in the back
window to determine whether it was visible.
10
Later that evening, after the truck had already been inventoried and released
to the towing company, officers learned Ramos’s mother was one of the registered
owners of the vehicle. Puentes testified this information would not have changed his
impoundment decision because (1) the license plate was not properly attached to the
vehicle and (2) he is required not to cancel a tow truck once one has been called
because the tow trucks are on an on-call rotation.
10
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likewise, did not consult with any Hop & Sack employee about leaving Ramos’s
vehicle at the store overnight. Rather, he acted based on the store’s posted sign11 and
his past experience in being called out to tow vehicles left in the Hop & Sack parking
lot. He testified there have been a few times over the years when someone was
arrested and the store personnel did not want the arrestee’s vehicle left on the
property because they did not want to be responsible for damages. There had been
other times when a vehicle was “abandoned” and the store clerk or manager did not
know why the vehicle was left there or who it belonged to, so they called the police
to come out and tow the abandoned vehicle. Rodriguez admitted he could not recall a
specific instance or specific year in which he was called out to the Hop & Sack to
tow a vehicle, or a specific employee with whom he spoke.12 He further indicated that
there has “been a time or two” when an individual left their vehicle overnight with
the Hop & Sack’s permission.
Subsequently, Puentes inventoried the contents of the vehicle to ensure the
FPD was not liable if something came up missing once the truck left their possession.
Puentes estimated he conducted the inventory around 12:25 a.m. This was after he
had called the towing company. While conducting the inventory search, Puentes
found a loaded M-16 firearm behind the driver’s seat. Meanwhile, as he was being
11
A sign posted in the window of the Hop & Sack read as follows: “Customer
Parking Only Violators Towed.”
12
In contrast to Rodriguez’s testimony, the Hop & Sack’s manager could not
recall another vehicle being impounded from the Hop & Sack in her 22.5 years of
working there.
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booked into the jail, Ramos received a call on his cell phone. He told the caller to
contact Juanes. Juanes arrived at the Hop & Sack after Puentes completed his
inventory of the truck, but approximately fifteen minutes before the tow truck
arrived. Puentes advised her that the tow truck was enroute and it was too late to
cancel the tow.13
The record contains significant detail about the Hop & Sack and surrounding
neighborhood. Several businesses are located near the Hop & Sack, including the
United Supermarket, the Tillman County Courthouse, Allsup’s Convenience Store,
Security Finance, a radio station, a laundromat that closes at 10:00 p.m., and a hair
salon or barbershop. The remainder of the streets are occupied by residential housing.
The proximate businesses have “fairly decent” lighting at night. As to the Hop &
Sack itself, Puentes testified he was familiar with its features and hours of operation.
After the store closes for the night, a few lights are left on. The gas pumps are,
however, always open to anyone purchasing gas with a credit card. Overall, except
for the gas pumps, the area is not well lit at night. The officers testified, inter alia,
that there was a significant amount of crime in the area, the vehicle was accessible to
13
According to Puentes, he had alternatives to towing until he learned the
truck did not have a license plate displayed. He, nevertheless, agreed he could have
called Juanes after he learned the license plate was validly registered to the truck, she
could have put the license plate on the truck, and it would have then been legal to
drive. Puentes further acknowledged that at no point before he called the tow truck
did he ask Ramos if he would consent to leaving his truck at the store until someone
could come pick it up. Finally, Puentes agreed that if the police had released the
vehicle to Juanes, this would have relieved the police of any liability. Juanes
testified, without contradiction, that she could have attached the license plate to the
truck with the tools already present in the vehicle.
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heavy foot traffic from citizens “who are usually up to no good and their intentions
are probably not the best,” and the vehicle would be exposed in the parking lot of a
closed convenience store located on a state highway.
C. Procedural Background
The district court began its analysis of Sanders’s second prong by concluding,
as a prefatory matter, that the record lacked evidence Puentes’s actions were
motivated by a desire “to find evidence of a crime” or to “get” Ramos. It then
concluded the five Sanders factors, on balance, demonstrated the impoundment was
justified by a reasonable, non-pretextual community-caretaking rationale. As to the
first factor, the district court concluded it weighed in favor of impoundment despite it
being private property. In reaching this conclusion, the district court ruled that the
private nature of the property did not significantly decrease the risk that Ramos’s
truck would be burgled or vandalized. Further, the district court weighed this factor
in favor of impoundment because the property did not belong to Ramos. The district
court also concluded the second Sanders consideration supported impoundment.
Although Puentes did not consult the Hop & Sack’s manager or clerk, the district
court ruled that Puentes’s knowledge of the sign posted in the store’s window tipped
this factor in the prosecution’s favor. The district court also weighed the third
Sanders factor in favor of impoundment. It did so on the following two bases: (1) the
truck could not be legally driven by anyone because it did not have a license plate
attached to its bumper; and (2) as the only patrol officer on duty that night in
Frederick, it would not have been reasonable to obligate Puentes to wait to see if
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someone would arrive to pick up the truck. Finally, as conceded by the government,
the district court recognized that the fourth (implicated in a crime) and fifth (consent)
factors weighed against impoundment. Nevertheless, on balance, the district court
concluded the Sanders factors and lack of evidence of pretext supported the
conclusion the impoundment of Ramos’s truck was a reasonable community-
caretaking action.
III. ANALYSIS
This court reviews each of the Sanders factors individually before weighing
them together, de novo, to determine whether the impoundment at issue was a
reasonable exercise of community-caretaking. See Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1178. Before
doing so, however, we explain why the presence or absence of a pretextual motive on
the part of Puentes or Rodriguez is not outcome determinative in this case.
A. Pretext
The district court appears to have given particularly significant weight to its
finding that the officers did not impound Ramos’s truck as a pretext to “get” Ramos
or as “an excuse to find evidence of a crime.” At the “outset,” the district court ruled
“none of the Sanders’[s] factors point[] toward pretext on the part of the officers
involved.” In support of this conclusion, the district court summarized the officers’
interactions with Ramos as captured on the officers’ body cameras. Thereafter, the
district court “turn[ed] to the individual factors, and weighing the factors, . . .
conclude[d] that the impoundment was justified by a reasonable, non-pretextual
community-caretaking rationale.”
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Ramos vigorously contests the district court’s determination that the
impoundment of his truck was not pretextual. He notes Puentes testified his protocol
was to always impound an arrestee’s vehicle if no one else is around. Thus, according
to Ramos, without regard to whether Puentes was specifically trying to target him or
find evidence of specific unrelated criminality in his truck, the impoundment was
more broadly pursuant to an arbitrary pretext for criminal investigation. See United
States v. Pappas, 735 F.2d 1232, 1234 (10th Cir. 1984) (holding that the community-
caretaking doctrine “cannot be used to justify the automatic inventory of every car
upon the arrest of its owner”); see also Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1249–50 (holding that
the second prong of its required analysis—the presence of a reasonable, non-
pretextual community-caretaking rationale—protects against impoundment practices
like “impounding all vehicles whose owners receive traffic citations”); cf. Arizona v.
Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 347 (2009) (holding that the Fourth Amendment does not permit
officers to search every vehicle incident to arrest). Likewise, Ramos argues, the
officers’ decision not to explore the possibility of releasing the truck to Juanes was
tainted by a protocol of only releasing vehicles to registered owners. The government
does not defend the validity of this “protocol” on appeal. See supra n.6.
Ultimately, this court need not resolve whether the district court erred in either
its (1) focus on whether the officers had a pretextual motive directed specifically at
Ramos, or (2) finding that the officers did not have a pretextual motivation to target
Ramos or find evidence he was committing additional crimes. Application of the
Sanders factors compels the conclusion that the impoundment was unreasonable even
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if undertaken without any type of pretextual motive. To be valid under Sanders’s
second prong, an impoundment must be both reasonable and non-pretextual. Venezia,
995 F.3d at 1182 (“It is unnecessary to decide whether the asserted community-
caretaking rationale was also ‘pretextual.’ In fact, in this case, the evidence of pretext
is scant. Yet, we held in Sanders that an asserted community-caretaking rationale
must be both ‘reasonable’ and ‘non-pretextual.’”); see also Chavez, 985 F.3d at 1244
(“The government must show that its [community-caretaking] interest outweighs the
individual’s interest in being free from arbitrary governmental interference. This is
because a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are not eviscerated simply because a
police officer may be acting in a non-investigatory capacity for it is surely anomalous
to say that the individual is fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the
individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” (quotations, alterations, and citation
omitted)).14
14
Our determination that this case can be fully resolved based on the
reasonableness, or lack thereof, of the impoundment means there is no need to further
elucidate or question the applicable standard of review. As noted above, this court
has held that although the district court’s underlying factual findings are reviewed for
clear error, the Sanders factors are weighed de novo. Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1155;
Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1178. Furthermore, it is clear the five Sanders factors bear on
the existence of both pretext and reasonableness. Compare Woodard, 5 F.4th at
1155–58 (concluding all five factors point toward pretext), and id. at 1158–59 (“Not
only does every factor point toward pretext, but other powerful evidence of pretext
exists.”), with Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1182 (holding that even absent evidence of
pretext, the Sanders factors demonstrate the community-caretaking impoundment
was unreasonable). Sanders’s focus on both reasonableness and pretext is unusual,
but not without precedent. Compare Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 736 (2011)
(“Fourth Amendment reasonableness is predominantly an objective inquiry. We ask
whether the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the challenged action. If so,
that action was reasonable whatever the subjective intent motivating the relevant
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B. Public or Private Property
The district court found that Ramos’s “truck was lawfully parked on private
property and not impeding traffic.” Thus, one could safely assume the district court
concluded it must weigh this factor against the reasonableness of the impoundment.
See Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1178 (“The first Sanders factor weighs against
impoundment because the vehicle was located on [private property]. Public safety
and convenience are less likely to be at risk when the vehicle is located on private
property as opposed to public property.”); see also Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1155.
Instead, the district court concluded this factor weighed in favor of impoundment
because, (1) although the Hop & Sack parking lot was private property, it was not
Ramos’s private property; and (2) the private nature of the parking lot did not
“eliminate all risk” to Ramos’s truck. The district court erred in concluding this
factor weighed in favor of the reasonableness of the impoundment. Instead, this
court’s binding precedent dictates the conclusion that this factor weighs against the
reasonableness of the impoundment. Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1178. Indeed, the private
nature of the property is a factor weighing against impoundment “that is entitled to
more than a little weight.” Id. (quotation omitted).
officials.” (quotations, citations, and alteration omitted)), with id. (identifying
exceptions to the general rule “where actual motivations do matter” (quotation
omitted)). Because we resolve this appeal exclusively on the basis of objective
reasonableness, it is entirely proper to consider each factor individually and to weigh
them together de novo.
17
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We begin with the district court’s reliance on Ramos’s non-ownership of the
Hop & Sack parking lot in weighing this factor in favor of the reasonableness of the
impoundment. Notably, the government does not mention this conclusion in its brief
or attempt to defend the district court’s reasoning. This court has weighed this factor
against the reasonableness of a vehicle impoundment from private property, even
when the private property did not belong to the vehicle owner. See Venezia, 995 F.3d
at 1173, 1178 (motel parking lot); Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1151, 1155 (convenience store
parking lot); Sanders, 796 F.3d at 1243, 1251 (Goodwill parking lot); Pappas, 735
F.2d at 1233, 1234 (tavern parking lot). To be clear, then, this factor asks whether the
impoundment was undertaken from private property, not from the vehicle owner’s
property.15
In asking this court to weigh Sanders’s first factor in favor of impoundment,
the government urges us to adopt the district court’s view that the existence of a risk
of vandalism bears on the public-versus-private-property question. The government’s
request in this regard runs into several hurdles. First, this court has concluded
15
Because this court’s precedent makes clear the question whether the vehicle
owner is also the private property owner plays no part in Sanders’s first factor, it is
unnecessary to address whether such an approach would impermissibly collapse the
first and second Sanders factors. See Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1178–79 (holding as
follows regarding Sanders’s second factor: “As mentioned [in discussing Sanders’s
first factor], public safety and convenience are less likely to be at risk when a vehicle
is located on private property. That risk is particularly diminished when the private
property owner does not object to the vehicle’s presence. For these reasons, we
consider the property owner’s consent, even if the property owner does not own the
vehicle.”); id. (refusing to consider matters relevant to Sanders’s third and fifth
factors in considering whether Sanders’s second factor weighed against
impoundment).
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concerns relating to possible vandalism, and the municipal liability that could flow
therefrom, are properly considered at the third Sanders factor. Venezia, 995 F.3d at
1179. Second, the only case cited by the government in support of its risk-based
analysis of Sanders’s first factor, Chavez, 985 F.3d at 1244–45, does not bear the
weight the government attempts to place on it. Chavez considered whether the seizure
of an in-plain-sight firearm from a vehicle was a reasonable community-caretaking
function.16 Id. at 1243–44. It concluded firearm seizures were only “community-
caretaking tasks” if necessary “to protect the public from the possibility that a
[weapon] would fall into untrained or perhaps malicious hands.” Id. at 1243
(quotation omitted). Necessarily noting the context-specific nature of this inquiry,
and recognizing this court had approved some such in-plain-sight seizures from
heavily trafficked, but private locales, Chavez nonetheless concluded the seizure at
issue was unreasonable. Id. at 1243–45. In so holding, Chavez relied heavily on the
remote nature of the private property and the availability of alternatives to seizure.
Id. at 1244–45. This court sees nothing in Chavez to support the notion that a risk of
vandalism is a viable consideration in Sanders’s first factor. Third, there is no merit
to the government’s assertion that just because this court has previously validated
some community-caretaking impoundments from private property, the private nature
of property must, sometimes, support such impoundments. Instead, a review of those
16
Notably, there is not a single reference to Sanders in Chavez. This is most
likely because of the vast contextual differences between vehicle impoundments and
seizures of in-plain-sight firearms.
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cases makes clear that impoundment was reasonable in each despite the fact the
subject vehicles were parked on private property, not because the private nature of
the property weighed in favor of impoundment.17
Ramos’s truck was legally parked in a private parking lot and was not
obstructing traffic. Thus, the first Sanders factor weighs against the reasonableness of
the impoundment and must be accorded “more than a little weight.” Venezia, 995
F.3d at 1178 (quotation omitted).
C. Consulting Property Owner
Sanders’s second factor considers whether the owner of the private property
upon which the vehicle is located was consulted about the potential impoundment.
796 F.3d at 1250; see also Venezia, 995 F.3d. at 1179 (“[P]ublic safety and
convenience are less likely to be at risk when a vehicle is located on private property.
That risk is particularly diminished when the private property owner does not object
to the vehicle’s presence. For these reasons, we consider the property owner’s
17
See Trujillo, 993 F.3d at 869–70 (validating impoundment from roadside
private property when the vehicle position amounted to a traffic hazard, no licensed
passenger was present, the driver lacked registration documents, and 2:30 a.m. “was
not a good time of day to look for help from friends”); see also id. at 872 (holding
that the two-prong Sanders inquiry does not apply to impoundments when there is
“threat to public safety or traffic”); United States v. Kornegay, 885 F.2d 713, 715–16
(10th Cir. 1989) (validating impoundment from private parking lot when the officers
did not know where the vehicle was registered because it had a Missouri license plate
temporarily fastened over a Louisiana plate and officers could not identify the driver-
arrestee because the driver’s license he produced pictured someone else); United
States v. Johnson, 734 F.2d 503, 504–05 (10th Cir. 1984) (validating impoundment
when, in response to a call at 2:30 a.m., officers found a “highly intoxicated” man
sitting in his car outside a lounge with a .357 caliber magnum revolver in plain view
on the passenger seat).
20
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consent . . . .”). Here, as set out specifically in the district court’s order, “it is
undisputed that the store owner, manager, and clerk were not consulted about towing
or leaving [Ramos’s] truck” in the parking lot. Nevertheless, the district court
concluded this factor weighed in favor of impoundment because of the late hour, the
Hop & Sack’s midnight closing time, Puentes’s “knowledge” of Hop & Sack’s
preferences as conveyed on the signage posted in the store’s front window. The
district court erred in concluding this factor weighed in favor of the reasonableness of
the impoundment of Ramos’s truck.
This court finds no real relevance to the late hour or the Hop & Sack’s
impending closure. These facts posed no impediment to Puentes’s ability to consult
with the clerk on duty that evening. Puentes obtained from the clerk a written
statement regarding the events surrounding Ramos’s assault on Hogan. Puentes did
not consult with the clerk, or ask the clerk to consult with management or ownership,
about Hop & Sack’s preferences. According to Puentes, “it was not on his mind, he
did not think to ask.” Indeed, Puentes testified he believed consultation was
unnecessary because impoundment was permitted by FPD policy. But see Sanders,
796 F.3d at 1250 (holding that compliance with standardized policy is necessary, but
not sufficient, to render certain kinds of community-caretaking impoundments from
private property reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment). The record
conclusively establishes consultation with the private property owner would not have
been difficult, let alone impracticable. Accordingly, nothing about the circumstances
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identified by the district court could make this factor weigh in favor of impoundment
when no consultation occurred.
On appeal, the government leans heavily into the district court’s conclusion
that Puentes’s knowledge of the Hop & Sack’s preferences by reference to the store
sign is sufficient to tilt this factor in its favor.18 It is certainly true that “the
community-caretaking interest may permit officers to impound a vehicle that
interferes with a private property owner’s use or enjoyment of their property.”
Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1179. As this court’s precedent makes clear, however, this is a
decision left up to the private property owner, not the police. This court’s decision in
Woodard holds that guesses about a property owner’s preferences, even if they turn
out to be correct,19 are insufficient to carry this factor. Instead, this court “consider[s]
whether the officers . . . consulted the property owner and learned of the property
18
To the extent the government’s brief could be read as advancing the notion
Rodriguez’s knowledge of Hop & Sack’s preferences is relevant, this court rejects
that assertion. See supra at 11–12 (summarizing Rodriguez’s testimony regarding his
knowledge of Hop & Sack’s preferences). Although the record makes clear
Rodriguez consulted with Puentes about some aspects of the impoundment decision,
there is no evidence indicating the officers consulted on this question. Furthermore, it
is clear Puentes made the decision to impound Ramos’s truck. Importantly, the
district court found that “Puentes does not have any knowledge or understanding
regarding the Hop & Sack’s owner’s or manager’s preferences regarding vehicles
being left overnight. His only knowledge is what is posted on the store sign.”
Consistent with all of this, there is no reference in the district court’s analysis of this
factor to Rodriguez’s knowledge. Instead, the focus is exclusively on Puentes’s
knowledge obtained via the sign.
19
Here, the record is entirely uncertain as to whether Puentes correctly
predicted Hop & Sack’s preferences. Based on various formulations of the relevant
facts, both the Hop & Sack clerk and manager offered various after-the-fact answers
as to the store’s preferences.
22
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owner’s preference, not whether the officers . . . correctly inferred the property
owner’s preference.” Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1156; see also Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1179
(explaining officers’ “fail[ure] to . . . consult . . . anyone who could speak for the
owner” belies contention they “impounded . . . based on the . . . owner’s objection”).
Because no such consultation occurred here, this factor weighs against the
reasonableness of the impoundment of Ramos’s truck.20
D. Alternatives to Impoundment
“Whe[n] an alternative to impoundment does not threaten public safety or
convenience, impoundment is less likely to be justified by a community-caretaking
rationale.” Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1179. The district court concluded no reasonable
alternatives to impoundment existed because (1) Ramos’s truck could not have been
legally driven on the roadway without the license plate attached, (2) Puentes was the
only officer on patrol that night in Frederick, and (3) Puentes had no obligation to
allow Ramos to make alternative arrangements. On the record before this court, and
20
Of course, context is key. As noted above, the entirety of Puentes’s
understanding of Hop & Sack’s preferences flowed from the posted sign. If that sign
reasonably conveyed a desire on the part of the Hop & Sack to have law enforcement
remove from its parking lot vehicles the officers considered to be trespassing, the
result could very well be different. Here, however, the sign merely stated as follows:
“Customer Parking Only Violators Towed.” The government does not argue on
appeal that this language could reasonably be read as an invitation to tow directed at
the officers. Instead, it recognizes the sign’s “purpose” was to “disclaim liability”
under Oklahoma’s trespass statute. Gov’t Response Br. at 36. The government’s
concession is consistent with the only evidence in the record: the Hop & Sack
manager testified the sign simply “meant the store was not responsible for a vehicle
left in the parking lot, or if a vehicle was towed, the store would not pay the towing
fee.”
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given our decisions in Woodard and Venezia, we must conclude the district court
erred in concluding Puentes had no reasonable alternative to impounding Ramos’s
truck.
On appeal, Ramos identifies several approaches Puentes could have taken as
alternatives to impoundment. It is enough to resolve this case to conclude that neither
the district court nor the government has identified a valid impediment to acceding to
Ramos’s request to call Juanes to come and get the truck. See Woodard, 5 F.4th at
1156 (“[T]he police had an alternative to impoundment: letting [the defendant] call
someone to get the car. He had asked, and the police refused.”).
In reaching a contrary conclusion, the district court first focused on the
absence of the license plate from the truck’s bumper. Despite the government’s
vigorous embrace of this asserted impediment to allowing Juanes to retrieve the
truck, the record reveals reliance on this fact is unreasonable. The truck was validly
licensed, registered, and insured. The plate was present in the vehicle. Ramos used
the truck as a tower and the tools necessary for this trade were present in the truck.
Puentes testified he had no concerns about Juanes’s ability to reattach the plate to the
bumper and Juanes specifically testified she had the ability to do so. This case is,
thus, entirely distinguishable from the facts in Kendall, 14 F.4th at 1123. The car in
Kendall was stopped in the evening, had a faulty taillight, and was uninsured. Id. at
1120, 1124. “That means that no one could have legally operated [the car at issue in
Kendall] that night.” Id. at 1124. Here, on the other hand, the record leaves no doubt
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that the condition rendering Ramos’s truck “unlawful” to operate could have been
remedied in a few short minutes with the simple use of a wrench or screwdriver.
Nor, on the facts of this case, can it reasonably be argued Puentes’s status as
the only FPD officer on patrol rendered this alternative to impoundment unavailable.
There are no facts in the record demonstrating Puentes would be tied up dealing with
the truck for a prohibitive length of time if he would have allowed Juanes to retrieve
the truck. Instead, the scant record facts, specifically including the facts found by the
district court, demonstrate just the opposite. Both Puentes and Rodriguez were well-
familiar with Ramos and Juanes. Frederick is a small town and Ramos was well-
known. Puentes had known both Ramos and Juanes since he was a child; Rodriguez
had known Juanes his entire life.21 Both officers knew Juanes lived in very close
proximity to the Hop & Sack. Indeed, she lived several blocks closer to the Hop &
Sack than the nearest tow truck operator. Ramos specifically told Puentes that Juanes
was home when he asked that she be called to retrieve the truck. Juanes testified that
she could have been at the Hop & Sack within three minutes if officers would have
called her. In fact, although Puentes refused to honor Ramos’s request to call Juanes
21
These facts demonstrate why this court’s decision in Kornegay, 885 F.2d at
715, is not meaningfully applicable to this case in several important ways. The
officers in Kornegay did not know where the defendant’s vehicle was registered
because it had a Missouri license plate temporarily fastened over a Louisiana plate.
Id. This left officers with no way to determine who owned the car and whether the
owner would retrieve the car. Id. Furthermore, the officers in Kornegay, could not
identify the defendant because the driver’s license he produced pictured someone
else. Id. Unlike in the case at hand, the facts in Kornegay left officers no option to
either leave the vehicle in place or have an associate of the defendant take control of
the car.
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to take possession of the truck, Juanes learned on her own about the events at the
store and arrived there approximately fifteen minutes before the tow truck arrived.
Thus, there is nothing in the record to indicate it would have been more time
consuming for Puentes to call Juanes as an alternative to impounding the truck. Nor
can the government rely on any uncertainty that flows from the officers’ flat
unwillingness to explore an alternative.22 The district court erred in doing just that in
concluding this factor weighed in favor of the reasonableness of the impoundment.
Finally, this court’s decision in Woodard compels the conclusion that the
officers’ asserted lack of “duty” to allow a defendant to arrange alternatives to
impoundment is legally irrelevant to the third Sanders factor. Woodard, 5 F.4th at
1157 (“We express no opinion on whether the police have a duty to let someone else
pick up a car when the driver is arrested. . . . It has nothing to do with the third
pretext factor, which addresses the existence of alternatives to impoundment.
Regardless of whether the police have a duty to let someone else pick up or move a
car, the police either have alternatives or they don’t.”); id. (“Do the police have a
duty to allow an arrestee to contact someone else to pick up or move the car from
22
Because the record evidence indicates the reasonable alternative of
contacting Juanes would not have left the truck exposed to a risk of vandalism for
any time, let alone a meaningful time period, this court need not consider the matter
further. See Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1158 (“The car was in a high-crime area? It
wouldn’t be for long if the police had let [the defendant] ask someone to pick up the
car.”). The same is true as to the government’s after-the-fact briefing emphasis on the
importance of Ramos’s leaving the keys in the truck with the ignition running outside
the Hop & Sack.
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property? The parties haven’t raised this question, and it has nothing to do with the
third pretext factor.”). Id.
None of the alleged impediments to contacting Juanes to come and pick up the
truck, as Ramos specifically requested, identified by either the district court or the
government on appeal reasonably render that alternative to impoundment
unavailable. Because a reasonable alternative to impoundment existed, this factor
weighs against the reasonableness of the impoundment.
E. Implicated in a Crime
It is uncontested that Ramos’s truck was not implicated in a crime and,
therefore, “police had no need to preserve evidence by impounding the” vehicle.
Woodard, 5 F.4th at 1158. That is, impounding the truck would not have provided
evidence relating to the charges underlying his arrest—disturbing the peace, assault
and battery on Hogan, or assault and battery on Puentes. Thus, the Fourth Sanders
factor weighs against the reasonableness of the instant impoundment. Id.; see also
Venezia, 995 F.3d at 1182.
F. Consent of Vehicle’s Owner/Driver
It is also uncontested that Ramos did not consent to the impoundment of his
truck. Accordingly, the district court concluded below, and the government concedes
on appeal, that this factor weighs against the reasonableness of the community-
caretaking-based impoundment of Ramos’s truck.
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G. Weighing All Factors Together
To one degree or another, each of the five Sanders factors weigh against the
reasonableness of the community-caretaking-based impoundment of Ramos’s truck.
That being the case, no weighing of the factors against each other is necessary. The
impoundment was not reasonable and, thus, violated the Fourth Amendment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The order of the United States District Court for the Western District of
Oklahoma denying Ramos’s suppression motion is hereby REVERSED. The matter
is REMANDED to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. The government is hereby ORDERED TO SHOW CAUSE within three
business days of the issuance of this opinion why the mandate should not issue
forthwith.
28