Van Vuuren v. Berrien , 280 F. App'x 762 ( 2008 )

FILED
United States Court of Appeals
Tenth Circuit
June 4, 2008
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Elisabeth A. Shumaker
Clerk of Court
TENTH CIRCUIT
In Re:
WILLIAM DANIEL THOMAS No. 07-1294
BERRIEN, also known as William BAP
Thomas Berrien, also known as W.D. (BAP No. CO-06-107)
Thomas Berrien, also known as
William T. Berrien, also known as
Tom Berrien, Officer, Director,
Shareholder of Centaur Mountain
Farms, Inc.,
Debtor,
v.
LIZELLE J. VAN VUUREN, CEDRIC
G. TYLER, and VERONICA VAN
VUUREN TYLER,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
WILLIAM DANIEL THOMAS
BERRIEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
ORDER AND JUDGMENT *
*
This order and judgment is not binding precedent except under the
doctrines of law of the case, res judicata and collateral estoppel. It may be cited,
however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th
Cir. R. 32.1.
Before KELLY, TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges, and FRIZZELL, District
Judge. **
Debtor William Daniel Thomas Berrien and his wife, Joanne, fabricated a
hit-and-run accident, hoping for financial gain. The fabrication targeted eighteen-
year-old high school student Lizelle J. Van Vuuren. Based on the false
accusation, she was criminally prosecuted on misdemeanor and felony charges for
leaving the scene of an accident. Although Lizelle successfully defeated the
criminal charges, that was not before her parents, Cedric G. Tyler and Veronica
Van Vuuren Tyler, had spent substantial sums defending Lizelle in the criminal
cases.
Following the prosecutions, the Tylers and Lizelle filed a civil complaint in
Colorado state court against the Berriens, 1 alleging a number of torts, including
abuse of process, civil conspiracy to defraud, extreme and outrageous conduct,
and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Just prior to trial, Mr. Berrien
filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The Tylers filed an adversary proceeding in
bankruptcy court, alleging some of Mr. Berrien’s debt was nondischargeable
under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(6) as a result of his malicious conduct. After trial, the
**
Hon. Gregory K. Frizzell, United States District Court, Northern District
of Oklahoma, sitting by designation.
1
The Berriens apparently divorced in February 2002. For convenience we
refer to them collectively as the “Berriens.” The Tylers later settled their claims
against Mrs. Berrien.
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bankruptcy court agreed, concluding Mr. Berrien owed the Tylers
nondischargeable debt in the amount of the criminal defense costs because his
conduct caused “willful and malicious injury.” § 523(a)(6). The bankruptcy
appellate panel (BAP) affirmed.
The question presented in this appeal is whether the Tylers could recover
under § 523(a)(6) damages for Mr. Berrien’s misconduct, including the costs
incurred in defending Lizelle. We conclude the parents had numerous legally
cognizable interests that support a finding of nondischargeability under
§ 523(a)(6) in these bankruptcy proceedings.
We therefore AFFIRM the BAP’s order and judgment.
I. Background
Fabricated Hit-and-Run
After a three-day trial, the bankruptcy court made the following findings of
fact, which are not disputed in this appeal.
Hoping to gain financially, the Berriens fabricated a hit-and-run accident.
Their false accusation targeted Lizelle, a citizen of South Africa, who at the time
of the accusations was an eighteen-year-old high school student living with her
parents in Evergreen, Colorado.
On the afternoon of April 3, 2000, Lizelle was driving her parents’ car. For
reasons not relevant here, the car was uninsured. Lizelle, with a friend in the car,
drove to a Safeway store to pick up school supplies. The Berriens falsely accused
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Lizelle of hitting Mrs. Berrien with a car while she was walking in Safeway’s
parking lot.
According to the fabricated story, Mr. Berrien stood in the parking lot when
he saw Lizelle’s car race up and down the rows of cars. Then he saw the car hit
his wife on the left leg, causing her to twist and fall. Mr. Berrien allegedly ran to
help his wife and, while running, wrote down the car’s license plate number.
Although they knew about a nearby doctor’s office, located only about 200
to 300 feet away, the Berriens did not immediately go there for medical help. Nor
did they ask any of the people around them for help. And they did not seek help
from the Safeway store. Despite the alleged hit-and-run’s location—near the
front of the store—nobody apparently volunteered assistance.
Indeed, except for an individual named Shawn DePauw, nobody witnessed
the alleged accident. DePauw, who may have been acquainted with Mr. Berrien
prior to April 3, 2000, testified he had witnessed some 400 accidents in his
lifetime, but never once came to assistance or called for help. He claimed that,
from about two rows away, he saw Lizelle’s car hit Mrs. Berrien. According to
him, Mrs. Berrien’s feet flew up in the air before she fell. But having just
witnessed what is alleged to be a fairly serious accident, DePauw did absolutely
nothing to help. He did not call 911, report the accident to Safeway, or approach
either Mr. Berrien or his then-wife to offer help. He apparently got into his car
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and left. The Berriens claim they happened to run into DePauw a week later in
the same Safeway store. And so DePauw became a witness.
Either later on the day of the alleged accident or the next day, the Berriens
reported the fabricated story to the police. Mrs. Berrien also visited a doctor.
Criminal and Civil Cases in Colorado State Courts
The false accusations resulted in two criminal prosecutions against
Lizelle—one misdemeanor and one felony case. Although the cases were
dismissed on April 12, 2001 and February 12, 2002, respectively, Lizelle’s
parents had spent slightly over $96,000 in defending Lizelle against the charges.
As the bankruptcy court noted, had she been convicted, Lizelle faced potential
deportation to South Africa.
In addition, the Tylers had to defend two civil lawsuits filed against them.
In one, Mrs. Berrien’s insurance company sought subrogation for uninsured
motorist payments the company made to her in connection with the fabricated
accident. After investigating the facts surrounding the fabricated accident, the
insurance company dropped its claim against the Tylers.
The second civil case was Mrs. Berrien’s April 2, 2002 lawsuit against
Lizelle and her parents for damages from the fabricated hit-and-run. By the
parties’ stipulation, the action was dismissed with prejudice on October 25, 2002.
After resolving Mrs. Berrien’s lawsuit against them, Lizelle and her parents
filed their own lawsuit against the Berriens in Colorado state court. They alleged,
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among other claims, abuse of process, civil conspiracy to defraud, extreme and
outrageous conduct, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. As part of
their damages, the Tylers claimed expenses incurred in defending the civil and
criminal matters, including over $96,000 they had spent defending Lizelle’s
criminal charges. Before the trial scheduled for November 2004, however, Mr.
Berrien filed for bankruptcy, thus staying the Tylers’ civil case.
Bankruptcy Proceedings
The Tylers then filed adversary proceedings in the bankruptcy court to
establish the nondischargeability of Mr. Berrien’s debt for damages caused by the
false hit-and-run accusation. Among other allegations, the complaint charged Mr.
Berrien with making false statements “willfully and maliciously for the purpose
of monetary gain,” abusing “the criminal justice system for the ulterior purpose of
obtaining money fraudulently from” the Tylers, and engaging “in extreme and
outrageous conduct.” Aplt. App. 16–22.
After a three-day trial, comparing the credibility and reliability of Lizelle,
her parents, and other plaintiff witnesses with that of the Berriens and other
witnesses for the defense, the bankruptcy court unequivocally concluded “the
plaintiffs win by a reasonably wide and deep margin.” Id. at 1033. The court
then awarded the Tylers $96,049.41 for expenses in defending Lizelle’s criminal
charges and a nominal sum of $1 for lost business opportunity and emotional
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distress. All damages represented nondischargeable debt under 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(6) (“willful and malicious injury”). The BAP affirmed.
II. Analysis
“On appeal from BAP decisions, we independently review the bankruptcy
court’s decision.” Educ. Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Mersmann (In re Mersmann), 505
F.3d 1033, 1041 (10th Cir. 2007). When, as here, the only dispute is a matter of
law, our review is de novo. Id.Unlike in his appeal to the BAP, Mr. Berrien does not now challenge the
bankruptcy court’s conclusion that his conduct caused “willful and malicious
injury” within the meaning of § 523(a)(6). Rather, he repeats the argument that
Lizelle’s parents could not recover the cost of defending Lizelle’s criminal
charges. Mr. Berrien contends the parents were merely volunteers, with no legal
obligation whatsoever to pay for their eighteen-year-old daughter’s legal
expenses. He thus reasons the parents have no legally cognizable claim for which
the bankruptcy court could have awarded them over $96,000 in damages. We
disagree.
A.
In the first place, we cannot accept Mr. Berrien’s characterization of
Lizelle’s parents as mere volunteers. The Tylers were defending their own legal
interest in paying for Lizelle’s criminal defense. Had she been convicted, her
criminal responsibility could have collaterally estopped the parents from arguing
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the opposite in defending a potential civil lawsuit against them, a lawsuit Mrs.
Berrien in fact commenced in short order. See, e.g., A-1 Auto Repair & Detail,
Inc. v. Bilunas-Hardy, 93 P.3d 598, 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (holding “that
issue preclusion will bar litigation in a civil trial of an issue that has been
previously litigated in a criminal trial, provided the requisites for the application
of issue preclusion are satisfied”). Had Lizelle been convicted, the conviction
would have helped Mrs. Berrien prove her civil case against the Tylers.
Moreover, the car Lizelle was driving was uninsured, and the Tylers faced
significant exposure for their own liability if Lizelle were convicted of a hit-and-
run. See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 10-4-619(1) (“Every owner of a motor vehicle
who . . . knowingly permits the operation of the motor vehicle on the public
highways of this state shall have in full force and effect a complying [insurance]
policy . . . covering the said motor vehicle . . . .”); Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v.
DeWitt, No. 05CA2687, 2008 WL 451742, at *3 (Colo. Ct. App. Feb. 21, 2008)
(“The family car doctrine imputes liability to the head of a household when he or
she has control over the vehicle and the vehicle is used by a person who is a
member of the household”).
We thus cannot agree Lizelle’s parents were legally disinterested volunteers
when they paid for her criminal defense.
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B.
In any event, the Tylers had independent claims against Mr. Berrien that
they sought to vindicate in bankruptcy court.
Section 523(a)(6) excepts from discharge any debt “for willful and
malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another
entity.” The debtor’s conduct, in other words, must have caused “willful and
malicious injury.” As explained by the Supreme Court, this language means “that
the actor intend the consequences of an act, not simply the act itself.”
Kawaauhau v. Geiger, 523 U.S. 57, 61–62 (1998) (quotation marks omitted). For
debt to become nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6), “the debtor must desire to
cause the consequences of his act or believe that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.” Panalis v. Moore (In re Moore), 357 F.3d
1125, 1129 (10th Cir. 2004) (quotation and alteration marks omitted); see also 4
Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 523.12[2] (15th ed. rev. 2008) (noting most courts
require an injury inflicted “either with the intent to cause the harm complained of,
or in circumstances in which the harm was certain or almost certain to result from
the debtor’s act”).
The “willful and malicious injury” language, “[b]y its terms, . . . may apply
to a broad range of [tortious] conduct causing harm to people or property.” Id.
¶ 523.12[1]. Thus, for example, not only does this exception apply to liabilities
“arising from assault or assault and battery,” but claims “based on . . . intentional
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infliction of emotional distress . . . have [also] typically been held
nondischargeable.” Id. ¶ 523.12[4] (collecting authorities).
The Tylers easily satisfy the “willful and malicious injury” requirement.
Prior to the bankruptcy filing, Lizelle and her parents filed a civil lawsuit against
the Berriens seeking damages for, among others, abuse of process, civil
conspiracy, extreme and outrageous conduct, and intentional infliction of
emotional distress. When Mr. Berrien stayed the case by petitioning for
bankruptcy, the Tylers intervened in his bankruptcy proceedings. In their
discharge complaint, the Tylers again broadly alleged Mr. Berrien’s outrageous
and malicious conduct, though this time tying the allegations, as they should
have, to the “willful and malicious injury” requirement of § 523(a)(6).
Ruling in favor of the Tylers, the bankruptcy court concluded Mr. Berrien’s
outrageous conduct caused injury not only to Lizelle’s but also to her parents’
legal interest to be free from intentionally inflicted emotional distress and from
the abusive civil process directed against them. These tort claims all arose from
the pattern of abusive conduct employed by the Berriens against Lizelle and her
parents collectively, ranging from the false criminal charges, to the filing of civil
proceedings, to false claims against the Berriens’ insurance company, which
might have bolstered the credibility of the accusations.
Under Colorado law, the Tylers were entitled to compensatory and punitive
damages for Mr. Berrien’s numerous torts. These damages include, among other
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things, emotional distress, lost business opportunity, and costs of defending
frivolous civil and criminal proceedings. See, e.g., Technical Computer Servs,
Inc. v. Buckley, 844 P.2d 1249, 1256 (Colo. Ct. App. 1992) (explaining “that, in
an action for malicious prosecution or abuse of process, a plaintiff may recover
attorney fees incurred in defending against the earlier wrongful litigation”). The
criminal proceedings were but a part of the larger scheme to abuse the legal
process and inflict emotional injuries on the Tylers and Lizelle. Thus, the
amounts expended by the Tylers in combating the fraudulent scheme necessarily
include the costs of defending Lizelle.
The BAP correctly concluded, “Debtor’s statements to Safeway, the police,
and investigators were clearly intended to support a claim for damages, in which
Debtor believed he would share.” Aplt. Br. Att. at 8. Seeking “to fraudulently
obtain money from whatever source he could find,” Mr. Berrien “caused the
Tylers to incur the expense of defending Lizelle against his false allegations.” Id.at 8–9. 2
2
Mr. Berrien also challenges the award of criminal defense costs to
Lizelle. He argues Lizelle, who did not herself pay the cost of criminal defense,
should not be able to recover for these expenses. Because we conclude the
bankruptcy court did not err in awarding damages jointly to Lizelle’s parents, any
error would be harmless. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 61 (“At every stage of the
proceeding, the court must disregard all errors and defects that do not affect any
party’s substantial rights.”); Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9005 (incorporating Rule 61 in
bankruptcy proceedings).
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We therefore agree with the bankruptcy court’s conclusion awarding the
parents and Lizelle damages for emotional distress and compensatory expenses in
the amount of approximately $96,000.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the BAP’s order and judgment. 3
Entered for the Court
Timothy M. Tymkovich
Circuit Judge
3
We DENY the Tylers’ motion to dismiss the appeal and motion for
attorney’s fees. Both rely on a written agreement between the Tylers and Mrs.
Berrien, stipulating that only Mrs. Berrien would consider the BAP’s decision to
be final and non-appealable. As best we can tell from the record, Mr. Berrien was
not a party to the agreement, and we thus cannot enforce it against him.
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